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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
FLORIDA-PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1960's, unrest among public employees in Florida, as
well as in the rest of the nation, increased significantly.' Although
there was no recorded public employee work stoppage in Florida in
the period prior to 1960, a total of twenty-five strikes idled some 31,000
public employees, causing a loss to the public employers of over
400,000 man-days during the 1960-1969 period.2 The most significant
of these work stoppages involved a strike which was called by the
Florida Education Association3 in February 1968, and which was
joined by over 35,000 public school teachers. 4 Although "job actions"
by teachers were not at that point unknown in Florida5 and were
*Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.S., Canisius College, 1960;
LL.B., Harvard, 1964; LL.M., Columbia, 1968.
The author served as a consultant to the Committee on Manpower and Development
of the Florida House of Representatives during the 1971 and 1972 legislative sessions.
The assistance in the preparation of this article of Mr. Thomas G. Pelham, a member
of the Florida Bar, is gratefully acknowledged.
1. See Work Stoppages in Government, 1958-68, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP.
REFERENCE FILE 71:1011 (1970). It is reported that:
Over the period, 1958 to 1968, the number of government strikes rose from 15
to 254, workers involved from 1,700 to 202,000, and man-days of idleness from
7,500 to 2.5 million.
... Since 1966 the rate of increase [of strikes] has accelerated. The number of
work stoppages and workers involved were each 25 percent higher in 1967 than
in 1966. In 1968, strikes exceeded those of the previous year by 40 percent and
there were 50 percent more workers involved than in 1967.
Id.
2. FLA. HOUSE COMM. ON LABOR AND INDUSTRY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT 15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as STUDY REPORT]. The statistics, according
to the report, have been "derived from information available." Their accuracy is some-
what questionable. In Table II it is indicated that there were six work stoppages in
Florida during 1968. Id. In Table IV selected strikes of county and municipal employees
are listed. Id. at 18. The table, however, fails to mention the state-wide teacher strike
of 1968. A report issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics charts nineteen strikes in
Florida up to the end of 1968, involving over 33,000 employees, resulting in over
380,000 idle man-days. See Work Stoppages in Government, 1958-68, supra note 1, at
71:1023-25.
3. The Florida Education Association (F.E.A.) is an affiliate of the National Edu-
cation Association (N.E.A.), the largest professional association or union of teachers
in the country. See note 22 infra.
4. For a summary of the reasons leading to the strike, see St. Petersburg Times,
Feb. 15, 1968, p. IA, col. 1; id., Feb. 16, 1968, p. 10A, col. 3.
5. In September 1967, 2,800 teachers in Broward County resigned in a pay dispute;
in the same month, a threatened strike by 2,000 Pinellas County teachers was averted
by a court injunction; and in December 1967, over 700 teachers in Bay County struck
for five days because of salary reductions. STUDY REPORT 16.
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on the increase in other sections of the country,6 Florida was the first
state in the nation to experience a state-wide teachers' strike.7
The emotional shock experienced by the public during and after
the teachers' strike provoked a re-examination of the laws regulating
the relationship of public employees and public employers." Although
the school boards had used the traditional judicial remedies available
to the struck public employer, these had to be sought by each local
school board to meet what was essentially a state-level problem.9 More
importantly, the duties and obligations of local school boards with
respect to teachers and their associations had been poorly defined
prior to the walk-out; 10 subsequent to the return of the teachers,
6. See Work Stoppages in Government, 1958-68, supra note 1, at 71:1021 Table 8.
In public schools and libraries, the number of idle man-days as a result of work stop-
pages increased from 1,400 in 1959 to 2,193,800 in 1968. See also National Education
Association Memorandum on, Teacher Strikes, Work Stoppages, and Interruptions of
Service, 1970-71, id. at 71:1051 (1972).
7. See St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 18, 1968, p. IA, col. 1.
8. See note 13 infra. Unless otherwise indicated, citations throughout this article
to Florida statutory provisions will be to the current edition of the Florida Statutes
where there has been no change of substance in the language involved.
9. Although a number of suits were filed seeking temporary injunctions against
F.E.A. local affiliates, few of them survived to trial and appeal. See St. Petersburg
Times, Feb. 17, 1968, p. 8A, col. 2 and 3B, col. 1; id., Feb. 18, 1968, p. IA, col. 2.
The constitutionality of FLA. STAT. § 839.221 (1971), to the extent it prohibited strikes
against the government, however, was litigated in Pinellas County Classroom Teachers
Ass'n v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1968). This case arose out of a
refusal of defendant's members to honor what the court found were binding employment
contracts at the commencement of the 1967-1968 academic year. Since the court found
in that case that the prohibition on strikes by public employees was constitutional,
there was little point in appealing the injunction issued by trial courts. See 21 U. FLA.
L. REv. 403 (1969).
Florida's Department of Education did become indirectly involved in legal pro-
ceedings. State School Superintendent of Education, Floyd Christian, reportedly re-
quested the Attorney General to intervene on behalf of the state in a federal court
action brought by the Dade County Classroom Teachers' Association to have the
statutory prohibition of strikes declared unconstitutional. No single action was brought,
however, to enjoin all teachers from striking; and in no action was the Florida
Department of Education the party plaintiff.
10. Collective bargaining between local school boards and "professional associations"
of teachers had been taking place prior to 1968, either pursuant to special legislation
or without specific legislative authorization. The authority of the school board to
bargain, however, was questionable under then existing law. See pp. 40-47 infra. Section
230.22(1), however, envisioned at least a species of bargaining. The problems were
circumvented to some extent by calling the collective bargaining exchanges "pro-
fessional negotiations" and the resultant contract a "professional affairs agreement."
But little agreement existed on the answers to interpretative problems arising under
FLA. STAT. § 230.22 (1971). Could a school board recognize one employee organiza-
tion as an exclusive representative of all employees; was the board obliged to bargain
or merely consult; was "check-off" of organization dues permitted? These questions
were eventually raised in Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So.
1973)
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the status of the former strikers and the Florida Education Association
local chapters was the subject of several lawsuits." As a result of the
strike and the ensuing litigation, therefore, the need for a clarification
of the reciprocal rights and duties of teachers' organizations and school
boards became obvious.
A legislative response to the problem provoked by increasing de-
mands for bargaining rights by public employees, symbolized by the
teachers' strike, was delayed by the legislature's preoccupation with
constitutional revision and governmental reorganization. An early
attempt at comprehensive public employee bargaining legislation, the
Fleece Bill,'12 was introduced, but failed to pass, in the 1969 session.
Seventeen general bills, five proposed constitutional amendments and
five local bills relating to collective bargaining were introduced in the
2d 903 (Fla. 1969). See notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text infra. FLA. STAT. § 230.22
(1971) provides:
General powers of school board.-The school board, after considering recom-
mendations submitted by the superintendent, shall exercise the following general
powers:
(I) DETERMINE POLICIES.-The school board shall determine and adopt
such policies as are deemed necessary by it for the efficient operation and general
improvement of the district school system. In arriving at a determination of
policies affecting certificated personnel, the school board may appoint or recognize
existing committees composed of members of the teaching profession, as defined
in the professional teaching practices act, §§ 231.54, 231.55, 231.57-231.59. When such
committees are involved in the consideration of policies for resolving problems or
reaching agreements affecting certificated personnel the committee membership
shall include certificated personnel representing all work levels of instructional
and administrative personnel as defined in the school code.
(2) ADOPT RULES AND REGULATIONS.-The school board shall adopt
such rules and regulations to supplement those prescribed by the state board as
in its opinion will contribute to the more orderly and efficient operation of the
district school system.
(3) PRESCRIBE MINIMUM STANDARDS.-The school board shall adopt
such minimum standards as are considered desirable by it for improving the
district school system.
(4) CONTRACT, SUE, AND BE SUED.-The school board shall constitute
the contracting agent for the district school system. It may, when acting as a body,
make contracts, also sue and be sued in the name of the school board; provided,
that in any suit, a change in personnel of the school board shall not abate the
suit, which shall proceed as if such change had not taken place.
(5) PERFORM DUTIES AND EXERCISE RESPONSIBILITY.-The school
board may perform those duties and exercise those responsibilities which are
assigned to it by law or by regulations of the state board and, in addition
thereto, those which it may find to be necessary for the improvement of the
district school system in carrying out the purposes and objectives of the school code.
11. See National Educ. Ass'n v. Lee County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 260 So. 2d
206 (Fla. 1972); Board of Pub. Instruction v. State ex rel. Allen, 219 So. 2d 430 (Fla.
1969).
12. Fla. H.R. 117 (1969).
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1970 session.13 All of the local bills passed but were vetoed by the
Governor; the general bills and proposed constitutional amendments
failed to pass during the session. 14 The Committee on Labor and In-
dustry substitute for the original Fleece Bill, H.R. 3556, died in the
Appropriations Committee. 5
During the 1971 session, H.R. 3556 was reintroduced as H.R. 206
by Representatives Fleece and Baumgartner.' For various reasons,'1 7
the bill never left the Committee on Manpower and Development
(the successor committee to the Committee on Labor and Industry).
At the commencement of the 1972 session, an amended version of
13. The number, committee reference, and final disposition of these bills are listed
in STUDY REPORT 83 Table V. Many of these were companion bills: Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970)
was prefiled as the 1970 committee substitute for Fla. H.R. 117 (1969); the Subcom-
mittee on Collective Bargaining later combined it with Fla. H.R. 3203 (1970), drafted
by the Labor Law Committee of the Florida Bar, and it became Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970);
Fla. H.R. 3617 (1970) was restricted to collective bargaining by policemen and firemen;
Fla. H.R. 959 (1970) was a "meet and confer" type proposal, although comprehensive
in its terms; Fla. H.R. 4943 (1970), a mild version of Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970), applied
only to Pinellas, Hillsborough, Duval, and Dade Counties; Fla. H.R. 5013 (1970) and its
companion, Fla. S. 1250 (1970), as well as Fla. H.R. 5011 (1970), and its companion,
Fla. S. 1352 (1970), addressed themselves to grievance procedures for public employees;
four other bills, Fla. H.R. 5012 (1970) and its companion, Fla. S. 1475 (1970), Fla.
H.R. 3279 (1970), and Fla. H.R. 3149 (1970), were concerned with the regulation or
prohibition of "check-off" provisions.
Five joint resolutions were introduced: Fla. S.J. Res. 1306 (1970), Fla. S.J. Res.
1336 (1970), Fla. S.J. Res. 1297 (1970), Fla. H.R.J. Res. 5037 (1970), and Fla. H.R.J.
Res. 5016 (1970); all called for constitutional amendments which would have prohibited
bargaining by public employees. None were passed.
Five local bills, which authorized collective bargaining by certain groups of public
employees in certain municipalities, all passed the legislature but were vetoed by
Governor Kirk. They were Fla. S. 1569 (1970), a comprehensive local act applicable
only to employees of the City of Jacksonville; Fla. H.R. 3761 (1970), authorizing im-
partial mediation to resolve disputes between firemen and their employer in Pinellas
County; Fla. H.R. 5518 (1970) and Fla. H.R. 5507 (1970), requiring school boards in
Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties to bargain with a professional organization desig-
nated by a majority of the teachers in Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties respectively;
and finally, Fla. H.R. 5233 (1970), authorizing collective bargaining by firefighters in
Palm Beach County. In his veto message to the Secretary of State, Governor Kirk
criticized the legislature's "piecemeal" approach to the problem of public employee
relations. He stated that a public policy which "pretends" to grant collective bargaining
rights to public employees is unfair, purposely misleading, and results in a frustration
which ultimately manifests itself in the form of striking employees, garbage piled in the
streets, unguarded prison doors, empty classrooms, and "on and on." Governor Kirk
advocated instead a policy which "clearly defines the limits in which public employees
can press their legitimate grievances with management." Governor Kirk did not elaborate
on the precise legislative form such a policy should take. See Letter From Governor
Kirk to Secretary of State Adams, July 5, 1970, on file with Secretary of State of Florida.
14. See note 13 supra.
15. Ft.. H.R. JouR. 81 (1970).
16. FLA. H.R. JouR. 17 (1971).
17. See note 118 infra.
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H.R. 2061s was introduced by the Committee on Manpower and
Development as the committee bill. It passed the House but died in
a conference committee at the end of the session. S. 423, however,
which authorized collective bargaining between firefighters and their
employers, was enacted into law as section 447.20-.35 of the Florida
Statutes.
This flurry of legislative activity in Florida has had its parallel
in numerous other states. Since the passage of Wisconsin's municipal
employee act in 1959,19 a total of thirty-three states and the District
of Columbia have enacted legislation which authorizes some species
of public employee collective bargaining.20 The states have, however,
barely kept pace with the phenomenal growth of public employment, 2'
public employee unions,22 and the expectations and demands of the
organized public sector.
All of the factors that ordinarily favor union growth-a large
public payroll,2 3 significant urban centers, 24 comparatively poor salaries
and working conditions, 2 and apparent employer insensitivity2 o-  are
18. See note 118 infra.
19. Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 509.
20. For a summary of this legislation, see Seidman, State Legislation on Collective
Bargaining by Public Employees, 22 LAB. L.J. 13 (1971).
21. See The U.S. Economy in 1980: A Preview of BLS Projections, Monthly Lab.
Rev., April 1970, pp. 3, 17.
22. From 1960 to 1970, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees increased its membership from 180,000 to 500,000 members and was expected to
add another 100,000 before the end of 1970. See D. WOLLETT & D. SEARS, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT Xii (Labor Relations and Social Problems, Unit Four,
1971). President Wurf reported to the General Convention of the American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees in May and June 1972 that the Federation's
membership had been growing at the rate of 1,000 new members a week and had
surpassed 550,000. See Chase, State, County and Municipal Employees Convention, 1972,
Monthly Lab. Rev., Aug. 1972, pp. 38-39.
The American Federation of Teachers, an AFL-CIO affiliate, has gone from 60,000
members in 1961 to 225,000 members in 1971. See O'NEILL, UNIONIZATION OF MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES 1 (1970). And the most dramatic increase occurred in the National Education
Association, which jumped from 465,000 to 1,000,000 members during the 1960's. See D.
WOLLE-rr & D. SEARS, supra.
23. In the latest detailed census figures available, Florida, in October 1967, had
276,128 employees at the local and state level. Florida, ranking eighth in population,
ranked ninth in its number of public employees. See U.S. BUREAU OF Tm CENSUS, DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, 1967, Vol. 7: State Reports, No. 9: Florida, at 8.
By 1971 the number of nonfederal, public employees had increased to 351,661. See U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN 1971, at 14.
24. Eight standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA) are located in Florida:
(1) Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood; (2) Jacksonville; (3) Miami; (4) Orlando; (5) Pensa-
cola; (6) Tallahassee; (7) Tampa-St. Petersburg; (8) West Palm Beach. See U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 23, at 9.
25. In October 1971, the average monthly earnings of full-time state and local
government employees were $645.00, eighty-five dollars below the national average of
[Vol. 1:26
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present to some degree in Florida. Whether the growth exacerbates
existing employee discontent and employer hostility will, in large
measure, depend on the legal context in which the employer-union
relationships are formed and carried on.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the collective bargaining
rights and responsibilities of public employees and the duties of their
employers, at both the municipal and state level, as these rights existed
prior to the 1968 Constitution; to review the current status of the
law regulating those rights and responsibilities; and finally to sum-
marize the major features of the various proposals introduced during
the past few legislative sessions as perhaps indicative of the collective
bargaining law of the future. The final section of the article will con-
sist almost entirely of a critical analysis of H.R. 3314. Although no
assurances can be given at this point that the bill will become law,
an exegesis of its major sections will be useful for several reasons.
Not only has a version of this bill been introduced at the beginning
of each of the past four legislative sessions and been the subject of
debate, but it is the only collective bargaining bill that has been
seriously debated.2 7 Finally, a discussion of H.R. 3314 in terms of the
issues it has confronted and attempted to resolve will provide useful
insights into a spectrum of problems that must be understood before
an intelligent judgment can be passed on the provisions of any future
collective bargaining legislation. Although such technical discussion
may fail to attract the general reader, the points there raised will be
of interest to the legislator and labor law specialist.
$730.00, and lower than the earnings of public employees in twenty-seven other states.
See U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, DEPT OF COMMERCE, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN 1971, at 12.
26. Employer insensitivity is difficult to document, but is nonetheless a very real
factor in the push for collective bargaining rights. Intimations of the kind of employer
attitude that provokes employee resentment and contributes to the organization of
public employees can be found in the repeated refusal of local governments to bargain
with employee organizations, see, e.g., notes 89 & 91 infra, and in the refusal of two
governors to permit collective bargaining by state agencies, with former Governor Kirk
expressing his order in terms calculated to irritate employees seeking bargaining rights,
see note 118 infra.
Public employers at the municipal level are certainly not convinced that public em-
ployees have the right to engage in collective bargaining. An aide to the Mayor of
Orlando, in response to illegal picketing of City Hall by off-duty firemen to compel
recognition of their bargaining representative by the City, was quoted as stating that
the union's activity was "fruitless . . . because there is nothing in the Florida Constitu-
tion that says we must recognize any union as a collective bargaining agent." St.
Petersburg Times, Nov. 4, 1971, p. 2B, col. I.
27. Of all the bills filed, this was the only one to reach the floor of the House.
See note 13 supra.
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II. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN FLORIDA
A. Pre-1968 Constitutional Revision
Prior to 1943, both the Florida Statutes and the Constitution of
1885 were silent on the right of public employees to bargain col-
lectively or to strike against their employers. As a common law state,
however, Florida presumably followed the traditional rule that, in
the absence of direct legislative mandate, public employers had no
obligation to bargain with the collective bargaining representative
of their employees.2 8 In addition, public employees not only had no
right to, but were effectively prohibited from, engaging in concerted
work stoppages against a public employer. 2
These principles were so well established in state and federal law
that they were not seriously challenged until relatively recently.30 The
controverted issues during the 1940's and 1950's centered more on
the right of public employees to form or join labor organizationssl
and the right of a willing public employer to recognize or bargain
with a union of his employees.-
Many states, in response to the vigorous organizing activities of
unions in the late 1930's and early 1940's, passed labor codes designed
to regulate the increased union organizing and striking activities
characteristic of the 1935-1945 decade.3 3 These statutes were of limited
28. See, e.g., Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d
59 (1957); New York City Transit Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209
(1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 740, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1957); Cleveland v. Amalgamated Ass'n
of St. Employees, 41 Ohio Op. 236, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 173, 90 N.E.2d 711 (1949); cf. Miami
Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 450-51, 26 So. 2d 194, 196-98
(1946) (dictum). But see Dole, State and Local Public Employee Collective Bargaining
in the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorization, 54 IOWA L. REV. 539, 544-45 (1969),
in which the author argues persuasively that the general power to contract possessed
by state and local governmental employees should include the power to negotiate and
sign collective bargaining agreements. Various reasons, summarized in Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d
1147 (1971), have been used by courts in justifying the almost universal prohibition of
public employee strikes.
29. See Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 451, 26 So.
2d 194, 197 (1946) (dictum); Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees, 157
So. 2d 176, 183 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (dictum), appeal dismissed, 166 So. 2d
149 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1965). See also Pinellas County Classroom
Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1968).
30. See, e.g., Anderson Fed'n of Teachers Local 519 v. School City of Anderson,
252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1969) (dissenting opinion of DeBruler, C.J.), rehearing
denied, 252 Ind. 558, 254 N.E.2d 329, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970); School Dist. v.
Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). See also Dole, supra note 28.
31. See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951); [1959-1960] FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 241.
32. See generally Dole, supra note 28.
33. See 94 U. PA. L. REV. 114 n.7 (1945).
[Vol. 1:26
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usefulness in the private sector since many of them invaded areas
pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act. 1 But in the attempt
to regulate labor-management relations in the private sector, laws
were enacted which arguably affected employees in the public sector.
In Florida, for example, the legislature, during the 1943 session,
enacted legislation to regulate the activities of union officials and
certain aspects of labor-management relations within the jurisdiction
of the state.3 5 Among the rights created by the new law were the
rights of employees to self-organization.1" Although the statute did
not explicitly include public employees within the class of employees
entitled to exercise the right, neither did it expressly exclude them.
In the same session, the House and Senate approved Joint Resolution
No. 13, which amended section 12 of the declaration of rights of the
1885 Constitution in order to protect workers from employment dis-
crimination resulting from membership or nonmembership in a labor
organization.3 7 Again the reference to "employees" was generalized;
public employees were neither included nor excluded from the section.
The possible applicability of chapter 447 and section 12 of the
constitution to public employees was considered by the Florida Supreme
Court in 1946. In Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, s
34. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
NLRA]. The doctrine of federal pre-emption in labor disputes has been the subject of
myriad law review articles, many of which are listed in THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw
784-85 n.17 (C. Morris ed. 1971). For a recent illuminating analysis of this very complex
area, see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972).
The Supreme Court began to articulate the doctrine of federal pre-emption in Hill v.
Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), a case drawing into question the constitu-
tionality of § 447.04 of the Florida Statutes. This statute purported to stipulate qualifi-
cations that had to be met by union business agents before they could act as collective
bargaining representatives of employees in the state. The Court invalidated an injunction
by a Florida court prohibiting a union and its business agents from acting as bargaining
agents until the registration requirements were met on the ground that the state law
interfered with rights guaranteed by the NLRA.
35. See FLA. STAT. ch. 447 (1971). The chapter, entitled "Labor Organizations,"
guarantees employees the right to join labor organizations, the right to engage in col-
lective bargaining, and the right to engage in concerted activities; it also sets up a
licensing and registration system for business agents and labor organizations and pro-
hibits various kinds of strikes, boycotts and picketing activities.
36. FLA. STAT. § 447.03 (1971) provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
37. Fla. H.R.J. Res. 13 (1944) provides:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or nonmembership in any labor union, or labor organization; pro-
vided, that this clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge the right of
employees by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain col-
lectively with their employer.
38. 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946). A local composed of municipal employees
1973]
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the union petitioned the court to find and declare that section 12 of
the declaration of rights of the Florida constitution and chapter 447
of the Florida Statutes required the City to accord the union the
right to bargain in matters of wages, hours of work, and conditions
of employment. The court held that neither the statute nor the
constitution required the City to recognize the union for purposes of
collective bargaining.
It found, for several reasons, that the statute "was meant to be
operative only in the field of private business and industry."39 First,
the statute did not expressly purport to regulate government employ-
ment. Secondly, the statute authorized collective bargaining, provided
for strikes, and prescribed penalties for unlawful labor practices,
"strange and incongruous terms when attempted to be squared with
the governmental process as we know it, or when projected into the
field of municipal legislation." 40 In addition, the Miami City Charter
already regulated the employees' conditions of employment. Thirdly,
if the legislature had intended to abandon or revise provisions of the
City Charter regulating conditions of municipal employment, "there
is no reason to believe that it would not have said so in that many
words, instead of leaving the matter to sheer speculation and con-
jecture."41 The court held, therefore, that chapter 447 did not sup-
plant or amend, either directly or by implication, the Miami City
Charter.
The court also rejected the argument that section 12 gave the
right of collective bargaining to the union. As construed by the court,
the right-to-work amendment did not confer the right of collective
bargaining upon any group. The proviso to the section was interpreted
as merely "an expression of the popular will that if the right of
collective bargaining is given, an assertion of the rights contained in
the main clause of the section shall not operate to deny or abridge
the right to bargain collectively. ' ' 2 Since neither federal 43 not state
legislation gave the union the right to bargain collectively with the
City, the constitutional provision was held inapplicable to the case
at bar.
in the Department of Water and Sewers instituted suit for a declaration of its collective
bargaining rights in its relationship with the City of Miami. It was alleged that for over
a year the City had refused to deal with the local on the ground that bargaining with
a union would constitute a violation of the City Charter.
39. Id. at 450, 26 So. 2d at 197.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 451, 26 So. 2d at 197-98.
42. Id. at 452, 26 So. 2d at 198.
43. NLRA § 2(2), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2) (1970). This section ex-
cludes states or their political subdivisions from coverage of the NLRA.
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The supreme court's decision in Miami Water Works has been
subsequently interpreted as holding either that public employers have
no constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining with their
employees 44 or that public employees have no constitutional right to
engage in collective bargaining with their employers.4 5 These inter-
pretations find no support in the formulations used to express the
precise holdings of the court and only slight support in the obiter
dicta included in Justice Sebring's opinion. The precise holdings were,
first, that chapter 447 did not amend the Miami City Charter and
that the Charter did not place a legal duty on the city to recognize
the petitioner-union for purposes of collective bargaining;46 and sec-
ondly, that section 12 did not give the right of collective bargaining
to any group.17
Some language was included in the opinion indicating that the
City of Miami had "no authority to enter into negotiations with [a]
labor union . . . and to make such negotiations the basis for fiscal
appropriations. '" 48 But the court's judgment did not require a finding
on the right of the municipal employer to enter into negotiations
since the City had indicated quite clearly it had no wish to bargain
with the union. Further, no authority was cited in support of Justice
Sebring's dictum. No part of the opinion expressly limits the right
of public employees to bargain. The only limitation derives from the
44. See [1959-1960] FLA. Ai-r'v GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 241, 244. The report states:
"Government has no power or authority to recognize any labor union as the representa-
tive of the employees of such government, or to bargain collectively or negotiate with
any labor organization concerning hours, wages or conditions of employment, or to
make such negotiations the basis for fiscal appropriations."
45. "Thus [after reviewing Miami Water Works Local 654] it is the established
public policy in Florida that public employees and labor unions do not have any right
to bargain collectively, to picket, or to strike against government, whether the govern-
ment involved is state, county or municipal in character." Id. at 244 "Having determined
that ... the Union has not demonstrated error upon the [circuit] court's application of
the Florida law which prohibits collective bargaining by and strikes against the govern-
mental entity, we must affirm the decree upon . . . appeal .... ." Dade County v.
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees, 157 So. 2d 176, 183 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct, App. 1963),
appeal dismissed, 166 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1965).
The district court of appeal quoted with approval a part of the order of the
circuit judge which stated: "Unless clearly authorized to do so by the enactment
of legislation, the plaintiffs would not be authorized and are not now authorized to
enter into collective bargaining agreements, within the labor relations meaning of the
term, with the defendants." Id. at 181. It is possible that the circuit court interpreted
a demand for the "right to engage in collective bargaining in the labor relations sense"
as including the right to strike, since the union in that case claimed the right to strike
against the County. Id. But cf. Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1968).
46. 157 Fla. at 451, 26 So. 2d at 198.
47. Id. at 452, 26 So. 2d at 198.
48. Id. at 451, 26 So. 2d at 197, 1
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absence of an obligation on the part of the municipal employer to
respond to a union's bargaining demand.
Even if the opinion is read as limiting the right of bargaining by
a municipality because of inherent limitations in the powers dele-
gated to it by the legislature, the decision would still stand merely
as one interpreting a statutory scheme, not as an authoritative inter-
pretation of constitutional rights. The legislature could then eliminate
the alleged disability by expressly conferring on municipal govern-
ment the power to engage in collective bargaining.
Whatever its ambiguities, the Miami Water Works decision tem-
porarily laid to rest the question of the right of public employees to
engage in collective bargaining; the decision did not, however, ex-
pressly prohibit union membership for government employees. But
the court's refusal to acknowledge a right of collective bargaining,
coupled with the prohibition of strikes against the government, seemed
to foreclose any meaningful union activities for this employee group.
The issue of the legality of union membership remained unsettled
until 1959 when the Florida legislature defined the limits of union
membership for government employees. The 1959 statute prohibits
government employment of any person who participates in any strike
or asserts the right to strike against the government at any level
or who is "a member of an organization of government employees
that asserts the right to strike against" the government, "knowing
that such organization asserts such right."49 Government employees
49. FLA. STAT. § 839.221 (1971) provides in its entirety:
Governmental officers and employees; prohibited participation in strikes or
membership in organizations that assert right to strike against government em-
ployer.-
(I) No person shall accept or hold any office, commission or employment in
the service of the state, of any county or of any municipality, who:
(a) Participates in any strike or asserts the right to strike against the state,
county or any municipality or
(b) Is a member of an organization of government employees that asserts the
right to strike against the state, county or any municipality, knowing that such
organization asserts such right.
(2) All employees who comply with the provisions of this section are assured
the right and freedom of association, self-organization, and the right to join or to
continue as members of any employee or labor organization which complies with
this section, and shall have the right to present proposals relative to salaries and
other conditions of employment through representatives of their own choosing.
No such employee shall be discharged or discriminated against because of his
exercise of such right, nor shall any person or group of persons, directly or in-
directly, by intimidation or coercion, compel or attempt to compel any such
employee to join or refrain from joining a vocational or a labor organization.
(3) In the event that any public utility owned and operated by a private
person, firm or corporation is taken over on or after May 1, 1959, by the state.
a county or a municipality but in fact said person, firm or corporation maintains
[Vol. 1:26
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING
who comply with these provisions, however, are guaranteed "the
right to join or to continue as members of any employee or labor
organization which complies with this section, and shall have the
right to present proposals relative to salaries and other conditions
of employment through representatives of their own choosing."50
The nature of this right to present proposals relating to conditions
of employment was somewhat unclear. According to one opinion of
the Attorney General, 51 the provision did not place government em-
ployees in a bargaining position similar to that of employees in private
industry. Indeed, the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute
would prohibit public employee membership in any organization
that did not specifically disavow any claim to collective bargaining
rights on behalf of such employees.5 2 In the Attorney General's opinion,
the statute merely gave public employees the right to submit recom-
mendations which their public employers had no obligation to adopt
or even to consider. The Florida Supreme Court, on the other hand,
later stated in Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 3 that section 839.221(2) guarantees "the right to
bargain as a member of a union or labor organization . . ... 5 Un-
fortunately, the court did not elaborate on this statement, which was
not essential to its holding that the circuit court had authority to
enjoin public school teachers from striking.
Meanwhile, the previously mentioned opinion of the Attorney
General, as well as several other similar opinions, gave currency to
a substantial financial or operating control, said persons then employed or to be
employed shall be excluded from the operation of this section.
(4) Upon the acquisition of any public utility system from a private person,
firm or corporation by any state, county or municipal government, then and in
that event the employees of such private person, firm or corporation other than
executive or management staff, shall be eligible to be included in classified civil
service and other benefit provisions and systems of that governmental unit.
50. FLA. STAT. § 839.221 (2) (1971).
51. [1959-1960] FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 241.
52. Id. at 245. The Attorney General found that the constitution of the union
involved, a Teamsters local, asserted the right to strike. Although the executive board
of the local promised not to strike the government unit involved, and the President of
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters affirmed the resolution in a telegram, the
Attorney General held that the "constitution of the brotherhood of teamsters is con-
trolling." Id. The absence of an assertion of the right to strike would not have been
sufficient. The opinion indicated that a specific disavowal of the right to strike against
government in the constitution would be necessary to comply with FLA. STAT. § 839.221
(1971). Id. at 246. The opinion then advised the union, indirectly, that it would be well
advised to avoid admitting public employees to membership. Id. at 246-47.
53. 214 So. 2d 34 (1968).
54. Id. at 36. The court was not required to rule on the constitutionality of FLA. STAT.
§ 839.221 (1971), since the lower court based its judgment "on the general powers of
equity to prevent the breakdown of an essential aspect of government because of an
unauthorized work stoppage by its employees." 214 So. 2d at 36.
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the mistaken interpretation of Miami Water Works which read it as
placing a constitutional prohibition on collective bargaining by public
employees. Except for the Florida Supreme Court's gratuitous com-
ment on the meaning of section 839.221(2) in the Pinellas County
Teachers Ass'n case, there was little reason to believe, prior to 1968,
that the Miami Water Works "doctrine" would be overturned. In
1968, however, the Florida constitution, including the right-to-work
amendment on which the court had partially based its decision in
the Miami Water Works case, was revised. Shortly thereafter, the
Florida Supreme Court was confronted with the task of construing
the new right-to-work amendment.
B. Post-1968 Constitutional Revision
In 1968, the people of the State of Florida approved a revised
constitution. Section 12 was, in part, replaced by article I, section 6,
dealing specifically and exclusively with collective bargaining rights.55
The purpose of the legislature in recommending to the people the
language changes in section 6 remains unclear. 56 No specific pur-
pose can be divined from the separation of the section 12 clause into
a separate section 6;57 nor does the elimination of the proviso struc-
ture appear significant.-5
The Florida Supreme Court first interpreted article I, section 6,
in Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan.59 The supreme
55. The new section states:
Right to work.-The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged
on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union or labor organi-
zation. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain
collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the
right to strike.
56. See note 64 infra.
57. The applicable portion of § 12 of the declaration of rights of the 1885 Con-
stitution states: "[P]rovided, that this clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge
the right of employees by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain
collectively with their employer." Although expressed as a proviso to the right-to-work
portion, the old section recognized the right to bargain and commanded that it neither
be denied nor abridged-precisely what the new art. I, § 6, of the 1968 Revised
Constitution does.
58. Both versions create or acknowledge a "right" to engage in collective bargaining.
The addition of the final sentence prohibiting strikes by public employees adds a new
part that was not present in the 1885 Constitution, but apart from the importance of
the sentence as a self-contained and separable limitation on public employees (and local
and state government), what color or meaning it lends to the first sentence is problematic.
59. 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969). Since the technical posture the parties were forced
to assume on appeal influenced the phrasing of the opinion, if not the outcome of the
case, the origins of the litigation require close attention.
In November 1968, the Dade County Education Association, together with two
teachers employed by the Board of Public Instruction of Dade County (Ryan was one
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court noted that in the trial below the circuit court made extensive
findings of fact and conclusions of law, including the following: 60
[T]he process of collective bargaining contravenes the laws and
statutes of the State of Florida, citing Miami Water Works Local
No. 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194, 165 A.L.R.
967, and Dade County v. Amalgamated Association of Street Electric
Railway and Motor Coach Employees (Fla. App.), 157 So. 2d 176,
and that the revised Constitution of 1968 does not change the rule
of the above cited cases.
The lower court's remedial order had enjoined the board from giv-
ing effect to certain disputed policy changes and from recognizing the
Teachers' Association as the representativc of nonmember teachers. 61
The Teachers' Association appealed the final order to the supreme
court. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Ervin, a unanimous court
rejected the lower court's construction of article I, section 6. Stating
that the circuit court had "[painted] with too broad a brush in
eliminating all collective bargaining by public employees . . . " the
court held "that with the exception of the right to strike, public
employees have the same rights of collective bargaining as are granted
private employees by Section 6."62 Chief Justice Ervin summarily
of the two), filed an action in the Circuit Court of Dade County, requesting, inter alia,
an injunction prohibiting the Board of Instruction from recognizing the Dade County
Classroom Teachers' Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of the teachers em-
ployed by the Board. The petitioner also sought to block the Board from entering
into a collective bargaining agreement with the Education Association. In support of
its petition the Education Association alleged that the Board had, in contravention of
its own published policy, secretly recognized and bargained with the Teachers' Asso-
ciation and, after revoking the representation status of the Education Association, in-
tended to execute a master agreement recognizing the Teachers' Association as exclusive
bargaining representative of the teachers employed by the Board.
The Board took a somewhat neutral position in its answer, claiming that it was
entitled to bargain with the Teachers' Association under FLA. STAT. § 230.22 (1971), but
that its policy of exclusive recognition would not be implemented until the conclusion
of the present litigation.
The Teachers' Association, however, was granted its motion for leave to intervene
as a party defendant and took a more aggressive stance, attacking the standing of the
plaintiffs and the jurisdiction of the court, as well as offering statutory justification
for the policy of the Board that created the Teachers' Association's status as exclusive
representative.
60. 225 So. 2d at 904-05.
61. For example, the circuit court found that the action of the school board in
recognizing a majority organization as the exclusive representative of the employees
"violates the Florida and United States constitutions." Id. at 905. It also found that
allowing the majority organization to run the grievance procedure violated both con-
stitutions. Id. The supreme court disallowed both practices, but did not base its decision
on constitutional grounds. Id. at 907.
62. Id. at 905.
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disposed of Miami Water Works and Dade County v. Amalgamated
Ass'n of St. Employees, stating: "The holdings in the two cited cases
only went so far as to construe the law then existing and did not pass
upon later modifications in the law relating to collective bargaining
rights of public employees." 63 Thus, the misconstrued "rule" of Miami
Water Works had no bearing on the construction of article I, section 6.
In interpreting the constitutional provision, the court purported to
follow the intent of the legislature.6 4 The legislative history of article
63. Id. at 905-06.
64. The legislative background of art. I, § 6, of the 1968 Revised Constitution,
set out below, is based on a document prepared by William A. O'Neill, a member of
the Constitution Revision Commission. The document is entitled "Statement-Chronology
-History." This invaluable aid to the legislative history of art. I, § 6, is on file in
the Florida Supreme Court Library. During the last special session of the legislature
in which the proposed constitution was adopted for submission to the electorate, Mr.
O'Neill notes that he "was employed by both the Florida Senate and the House of
Representatives as a liaison attorney advising members of both houses and participating
in advice [sic] to the various committees and to the conferees on the part of both
houses." Id. at 3. Mr. O'Neill indicates that he was "requested to present his background
and his experience as it relates to the Florida Constitution of 1969 [sic]; and to
prepare a chronology and history of Section 6, Article I .... ." Id. at 1. He does not
indicate by whom he was requested to prepare the document, nor for what purpose.
All the versions of the Constitution of 1968, from the initial draft of the Constitution
Revision Commission down through the several House and Senate point resolutions,
are also on file in the Florida Supreme Court Library.
Mr. O'Neill's document is especially helpful in evaluating Chief Justice Ervin's
reliance on the legislative history of art. I, § 6, in support of his interpretation of the
section. The journal references given in the footnote supporting Chief Justice Ervin's
interpretation of the legislative history of art. I, § 6, contain merely the text of the
section, as it was eventually approved by the people, in the form of a joint resolution
agreed to by the House-Senate Conference Committee and approved by the respective
houses of the legislature. 225 So. 2d at 905 n.l. The Chief Justice states that the final
resolution, in comparison with earlier versions of the section, indicates that the legis-
lature intended the word "employees" to include both public and private employees. Id.
In order to comment on that conclusion, a more complete statement of the legislative
history of art. I, § 6, is necessary.
The new constitution had its origins in the 1965 session of the Florida Legislature,
which established the Florida Constitution Revision Commission. See Fla. Laws 1965,
ch. 65-561. The Commission held public meetings throughout the state, and convened
in convention at Tallahassee, Florida, in 1966 to consider and formulate a proposed
constitution for the Florida Legislature.
The Commission submitted its report and recommendation to the legislature in
January 1967. The legislature evaluated the Commission's report during the regular
and special sessions in 1967 and 1968. At the conclusion of a special session of the legis-
lature in 1968, both houses of the legislature passed a joint resolution which contained
a proposed constitution. This was submitted to and adopted by the electorate on
November 5, 1968. The constitution became effective on January 7, 1969.
The language changes and structural revisions which translated § 12 of the declara-
tion of rights of the 1885 Constitution into art. I, § 6, of the 1968 Revised Constitution,
began with the proposed revised constitution released on November 10, 1966, by the
Florida Constitution Revision Commission. Section 12 of this proposal provided:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
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membership nor non-membership in any labor union or association. The right of
employees, public or private, by and through a labor union or association to
bargain collectively shall not be denied nor abridged. Public employees shall not
have the right to strike.
This initial draft was amended by the Commission in convention between November
28, 1966, and December 16, 1966. The former § 12 then appeared in the report of
the Commission as art. I, § 6. Only technical changes were made in the language of
the former § 12.
This version of art. I, § 6, was introduced in the original drafts submitted to
both houses on January 9, 1967. See F-la. S.J. Res. 1-X(67); Fla. H.R.J. Res. 4-X (67).
The same version of art. I, § 6, appeared in Fla. S.J. Res. I-XXX (67) and Fla. S.J.
Res. 2-XXX (67). The section remained unchanged during subsequent legislative debate
on the proposed constitution. See Fla. S.J. Res. 2-4XX (67).
Fla. H.R.J. Res. 3-XXX(67) contained the identical version of art. I, § 6. On
September 11, 1967, the Chairman of the Constitutional Revision Committee of the
House of Representatives forwarded by letter the engrossed Fla. H.R.J. Res. 3-XXX (67)
to each House member. The language of the proposed art. I, § 6, had not changed.
Thereafter the Joint House and Senate Style and Drafting Committee, on September
29, 1967, considered this particular section. At page 3 of this Committee's report the
following version of art. I, § 6, appears with an appended comment:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The
right of employees, public or private, by and through a labor union or labor
organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public em-
ployees shall not have the right to strike.
NOTE: Many persons reading the original draft raised the question that "associa-
tion" might not be restricted to labor organizations and for clarification and
certainty the Drafting Committee made this change, in addition to the House
committee receiving permission for editorial clarification in this area. This
goes back to the 1885 wording. There was no intention to change the substance
by the committee, but is purely editorial.
The Interim Constitution Revision Committee of the House and Senate recommended
the language as it was contained in Fla. H.R.J. Res. 1-2X (68), and Fla. S.J. Res. 1-2X (68).
These were introduced into the legislature on June 24, 1968. The language in both
resolutions was as follows:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The
right of employees, public or private, by and through a labor union or labor
organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public em-
ployees shall not have the right to strike.
Fla. S.J. Res. 2-2X (68) was adopted by the Senate as introduced. The House, how-
ever, during its deliberations on Fla. H.R.J. Res. 1-2X(68), adopted an amendment
which changed the language of its version to the following:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The
right of private employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain
collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the
right to strike.
Thus, the language of art. I, § 6, in the Senate joint resolution and in the House
joint resolution was different, and a failure to concur on the part of either house
caused the appropriate motions to be made for the appointment of a Conference Com-
mittee on the part of each house. See FLA. S. Jou. 91 (Special Sess. June 24, 1968-
July 3, 1968); FLA. H.R. JouR. 45 (Special Sess. June 24, 1968-July 3, 1968).
According to Mr. O'Neill, a memorandum was prepared by the staff of the Conference
Committee for comparison by the conferees before final adoption. Its title read: "Section
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I, section 6, indicated to the justices that "the Legislature intended
both private and public employees to be included in the word 'em-
ployees' in the second sentence of Section 6." 5 Even more important,
however, was the text of section 839.221 of the Florida Statutes.
Since article I, section 6, of the Revised Constitution was proposed by
the legislature with full knowledge of the statutory policy contained
in section 839.221(2), Chief Justice Ervin reasoned that the new
constitutional provision "is in large part a constitutional restatement"
of that statute, which, as the court had previously stated in the
Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n case, guarantees to a public
employee "the right to bargain as a member of a union or labor
organization ...... 6 Seemingly, then, article I, section 6, merely
6-Right to Work, draft: New provisions specifically giving public employees the right
to join labor unions, to bargain collectively, but prohibits them from striking." (Emphasis
added.)
The Conference Committee of the House and Senate considering Fla. H.R.J. Res.
1-2X (68) and Fla. S.J. Res. 2-2X (68) voted to accept and recommend to the respective
houses the Senate proposal with the words "public or private" stricken. This was the
Fla. H.R.J. Res. 1-2X (68) version with the word "private" stricken; Fla. H.R.J. Res.
1-2X (68) was taken up and considered by both houses by the appropriate motions.
The Conference Committee recommended that Fla. H.R.J. Res. 1-2X (68) be passed
and amended by the conferees. See FLA. H.R. JouR. 89 (Special Sess. June 24, 1968-July
3, 1968); FLA. S. JoUR. 113 (Special Sess. June 24, 1968-July 3, 1968). This version was
adopted by the legislature and was submitted to the electorate of the State of Florida
on November 5, 1968, in the following form:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The
right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively
shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike.
Although the intent of the staff members who advised the Conference Committee
emerges clearly from this account of the creation of art. I, § 6, whether their intent
was shared by the Conference Committee itself is problematic. The more important
question is whether the legislature could have intended to work a change from § 12 of
the declaration of rights by using almost precisely the same language-language, more-
over, that had been commonly interpreted as prohibiting collective bargaining by public
employers and employees. Even if the Conference Committee adopted the intent of
the staff and the legislature that of the Committee, it does not follow that the people
necessarily adopted the intent of the legislature. A more reasonable interpretation is
simply that since no major language changes occurred in the transition from § 12 to
art. I, § 6, the meaning of the section remained unchanged. Thus if § 12 had pro-
hibited public employee bargaining, so should art. I, § 6. Chief Justice Ervin, however,
reached a contrary conclusion: in his view § 12 had been interpreted as prohibiting
public employee bargaining in Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157
Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946), and Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees,
157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963); but he concluded that those cases had
been legislatively overruled by the enactment of art. i, § 6, a virtually identical provision
to § 12. See 225 So. 2d at 905-06. The legislative history does not necessarily support
that interpretation.
65. 225 So. 2d at 905 n.l.
66. Id. at 906.
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elevates to constitutional status a right which had been given to public
employees by the legislature when it enacted section 839.221 in 1959.
In one paragraph of his opinion, Chief Justice Ervin gently urged
the legislature to "enact appropriate legislation setting out standards
and guidelines and otherwise regulate the subject within the limits
of said Section 6."67 In a perceptive observation on the nature of the
task facing the legislature, the Chief Justice concluded his admonition
by noting: 68
A delicate balance must be struck in order that there be no denial
of the guaranteed right of public employees to bargain collectively
with public employers without, however, in any way trenching up-
on the prohibition against public employees striking either directly
or indirectly or using coercive or intimidating tactics in the collec-
tive bargaining process.
The Ryan case raised as many questions as it answered, if not
more. First, the court stated that public employees "have the same
rights of collective bargaining as are granted private employees by
Section 6."' 9 The court, however, failed to indicate what bargaining
rights are granted to private and thus to public employees by section
6. Presumably the second sentence of section 6, which used a con-
struction and syntax parallel to the first sentence, and which was
certainly directed against private discrimination, must have been in-
tended to reach denials by private conduct as well as denials by
governmental action. But no completely successful attempt has been
made by private parties, either under the 1885 or 1968 Constitutions,
to enforce a constitutional right to collective bargaining.70 Nor has the
legislature enacted legislation which acknowledges or provides for
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 905.
70. In Miami Laundry Co. v. Laundry Local 935, 41 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1949),
the supreme court held that "[t]hese rights and guarantees [of § 12 exist only in
favor of the individual employee and do not inure to the benefit of the union in
which he holds membership. They are purely personal to the employee and may be
protected . . . only in an action brought by the employee." As a consequence of this
decision, no union could bring an action under § 12 charging an employer with a
violation for his refusal to engage in bargaining. An employee or group of employees
might, however, be permitted to bring such an action. Cf. Hotel & Restaurant Employees
v. Boca Raton Club, Inc., 73 So. 2d 867, 872 (Fla. 1954), in which the court noted the
possibility of permitting an employee class action seeking specific performance of a
collective bargaining agreement. No specific reported cases have held, however, that a
labor organization or a group of employees can compel bargaining by an employer by
virtue of § 12.
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such a right.71 What the court meant when it equated public em-
ployees' rights of collective bargaining with the rights of private em-
ployees remains unclear.
In an alternative formulation of its holding, the court found that
the legislature had acknowledged bargaining rights for public em-
ployees in section 839.22 1.72 But section 839.221 speaks not of col-
lective bargaining, a bilateral exchange between parties of equal
status, but of the right of employees "to present proposals" 7- to their
employer. The statute says nothing of the employer's obligation to
respond to or even acknowledge the proposals. In the absence, there-
fore, of implementing legislation laying down more specific guidelines
for collective bargaining than does section 839.221, the general right
of public employees to engage in bargaining cannot be specifically
enforced.
A major difficulty in the Ryan case lay with the nonadversary
status of the three parties with respect to the central issue on appeal.
Neither the teacher organizations nor the Board briefed the issue of
whether article I, section 6, accorded to public employees the right to
bargain collectively. All acknowledged the bargaining rights of at
least one of the two employee organizations. If the meaning of article
I, section 6, had been analyzed in an adversary context, perhaps the
court would not have changed its crucial interpretation that the
section applied to public employees. But in the face of a resisting
employer, it would have had to measure the practical implications
of its decision. How is a representative of employees selected? How
can an employer "bargain" with four or five unions representing
groups of the same class of employees? How does he deal with their
conflicting demands? How are impasses resolved? How are unfair
labor practices adjudicated?
71. FLA. STAT. § 447.03 (1971) states: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." FLA. STAT. § 447.14
(1971) provides: "Any person or labor organization who shall violate any of the pro-
visions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punish-
able as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083." The statute suffers from the same defect
as § 12 of the declaration of rights of the 1885 Constitution. No guidelines are
furnished to indicate when an employee has the right to bargain through representa-
tives, and no provisions are included to compel an employer to recognize the right.
Consequently the section has never been used to compel an employer to bargain, nor
do any reported cases indicate that the penalty provisions have been applied to an
employer because of his refusal to bargain.
72. 225 So. 2d at 905.
73. FLA. STAT. § 839.221 (2) (1971).
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But the court had neither the obligation nor perhaps the oppor-
tunity to stray beyond the parameters fixed by the circuit judge's
order. The decision at least cleared up the misinterpretations of
Miami Water Works74 and established beyond challenge the right of
a public employer to engage in collective bargaining with an employee
organization. As a result of its failure to settle more than that one
issue the decision has had little effect except to provoke more litiga-
tion attempting to clarify its meaning.7 5 The right of collective
bargaining Ryan established for public employees exists more in the
pages of the opinion than in the bargaining room.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Ryan, therefore, com-
pletes the circle it unwittingly began to trace in the Miami Water
Works decision. Despite several intervening judicial statements, 6
opinions of the Attorney General, 77 statutory enactments,7 8 and a con-
stitutional revision, 79 public employees stand precisely where they stood
when the court held in 1946 that public employers had no obligation to
engage in collective bargaining with the representatives of public
employees.
Former Governor Claude Kirk, who was adamantly opposed to
collective bargaining by public employees, dramatized the illusory
nature of the right recognized by the Florida Supreme Court. On
May 13, 1970, the Governor issued an executive order prohibiting
any state agency or officer from negotiating or bargaining with any
labor organization representing public employees.8 0 The order, predi-
cated upon the Governor's powers as chief budget officer,8 ' declared
Governor Kirk's intention to veto any attempt by the legislature to
delegate its negotiating and bargaining power to any state agency.
In addition, the order required each state agency to report to the
Governor any efforts to organize employees under its jurisdiction.
74. See note 45 and accompanying text supra. Ryan thus made it clear that, whatever
their obligation, public employers have the right to bargain, and that, whatever their
rights, public employees are not prohibited from bargaining.
75. See notes 88 & 91 and accompanying text infra.
76. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
77. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
78. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
79. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
80. Fla. Exec. Order (May 13, 1970) (on file in office of Secretary of State of Florida).
81. On the second page of the order, the Governor states:
WHEREAS, I as Chief Budget Officer have the responsibility for making
budgetary recommendations to the Legislature, and
WHEREAS, negotiations or bargaining affect [sic] personnel administration,
planning and budgeting . ...
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The executive order, although of questionable legality s2 was appar-
ently effective. 3
Shortly after Governor Askew took office in 1971, he issued an
executive order which, while considerably different in tone, had the
effect of re-enacting Governor Kirk's ban on collective bargaining."
The Governor affirmed, in his order, the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation in Ryan of article I, section 6, but pointed out that
the legislature had not implemented that right by approving pro-
cedures to be followed in the conduct of public employee bargaining.
Consequently, he declined to permit collective bargaining by state
agencies until collective bargaining legislation, which the Governor
promised to propose, was enacted.8 5 The position of both Governor
82. No doubt exists as to the legal power of the Governor to control the collective
bargaining activities of state executive departments under his control; the heads of
the departments serve at the pleasure of the Governor and are therefore subject to
dismissal for violating his order. The Governor's authority to regulate collective bar-
gaining by executive departments under the control of other members of the Cabinet
is less clear. Certainly, his authority in his capacity as chief budget officer to regulate
all matters concerning budgeting and personnel must have limits; otherwise he would
be empowered to control all Cabinet affairs by executive order, since even the most
minor decision can be tied to budgeting or personnel. His exercise of authority would
have to be challenged by the other members of the Cabinet. Attempts by public
employees or their organizations to invalidate the order of Governor Kirk would most
likely be futile.
83. The Governor's office is unaware of any collective bargaining agreement between
a state agency and a labor organization. Telephone conversation with Douglas Stowell,
Governmental Assistant, in Tallahassee, Florida, Nov. 9, 1972.
84. Fla. Exec. Order No. 71-20 (Apr. 5, 1971) (on file in office of Secretary of State
of Florida).
85. Governor Askew did not formally submit proposed legislation to the 1971 legis-
lature. See note 118 infra. In Fla. Exec. Order No. 72-1, at 2 (Jan. 10, 1972) (on file in
Office of Secretary of State of Florida), Governor Askew directed Lieutenant Governor
Adams to develop "proposed legislation establishing guidelines for collective bargaining."
Lieutenant Governor Adams prepared legislation for the 1972 session which was closely
modeled on Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970) and Fla. H.R. 206 (1971). See note 118 infra. But
the proposed legislation was not formally pre-filed. Governor Askew's Executive Order
No. 72-1 reiterated in most respects his original order contained in Executive Order
No. 71-20, supra note 84. In that order, however, he had, as had Governor Kirk before
him, directed "[t]he head of each state agency . . . to immediately report to the
Governor, through the Secretary of Administration, any efforts to organize employees
under his jurisdiction." Id. at 2. He had also directed that "no state agency . . . shall
negotiate . . . with any labor organization . . . on matters for which the Depart-
ment of Administration has legal authority." Id. Although the exact wording of the
order did not preclude collective bargaining between employee organizations and state
agencies, the limitation on bargaining subjects coupled with the direction to agency
heads to report any organizational activity did not positively support collective bargain-
ing attempts. In Executive Order No. 72-1, however, the Governor directed all state
agencies, "pending enactment or approval of legislation setting forth guidelines for
collective bargaining . . . [to] assist the Lieutenant Governor . . . in the formulation
of uniform procedures to guarantee the right of public employees to bargain collectively."
Fla. Exec. Order No. 72-1, at 2-3 (Jan. 10, 1972). Whether Executive Order No. 72-1
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Kirk and Governor Askew, that public employers presently have no
legal obligation to bargain, has been implicitly supported by a recent
interpretation of the Ryan decision by the Attorney General. In re-
sponse to an inquiry as to the responsibilities of a municipality with
regard to collective bargaining with public employees, the Attorney
General stated that article I, section 6, of the Florida constitution and
section 839.221 of the Florida Statutes, as construed by the court in
the Ryan case, guarantee public employees the right to bargain col-
lectively."" The opinion emphasized, however, that since the court
had characterized implementation of these provisions as a legislative
responsibility, 7
those of us in the Executive branch must be content with the law
as it exists today, as any other action would be outside the scope
of our constitutional power.
... [I]n light of the Ryan case and the fact [that] the Governor
has vetoed all legislative attempts to enact guidelines dealing with
this subject matter, it would be inappropriate for this office to
attempt to set forth any specific procedural guidelines with respect
to the conduct to be employed by any state, county or municipal
employer in implementing the collective bargaining process.
In addition to the Governor and Attorney General, the supreme
court has also been requested to act on the implications of its de-
cision in Ryan. In 1971, a local of the International Association of
Firefighters in Broward County petitioned the court for a writ of
mandamus compelling the respondent Board of County Commissioners
to engage in collective bargaining. In a per curiam disposition,
the court noted the existence of "substantial and numerous issues of
fact" and consequently transferred the case to the circuit court.8
More recently, a local of the Fraternal Order of Police petitioned
the supreme court for an alternative writ of mandamus against the
City of Orlando to compel it to grant the local the right of collective
bargaining."9 The petition alleged that while the City Council agreed
to allow the Fraternal Order to present certain demands to it, the
overruled Executive Order 71-20 is unclear. It is equally uncertain whether the Governor
directed state agencies to recognize and bargain with labor organizations, at least on a
limited basis, pending the enactment of legislation. If the Governor did so intend, his
order was either not understood or was not executed by agency heads. See note 83 supra.
86. FLA. Ops. ATr'y GN. 070-101 (1970).
87. Id. at 3, 4.
88. See State ex rel. International Ass'n of Firefighters v. Board of County Comm'rs,
254 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1971).
89. See State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Orlando, 269 So. 2d 402 (Fla.
1972).
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Council specifically voted to deny the Order the right to enter into
bilateral negotiations leading to a collective bargaining agreement.
The supreme court again transferred, this time to the District Court
of Appeal for the Fourth District.9"
On the same day that the Fraternal Order of Police filed its petition,
the Dade County Classroom Teachers' Association filed an original
petition for a "constitutional writ," requesting the Florida Supreme
Court to order the legislature to show cause "why it has failed and
refused to enact collective bargaining guidelines . ... "-91 The petition
prayed in addition that, in the event the legislature did not adequately
explain its failure, the court "appoint a Commission to recommend
collective bargaining guidelines to be subsequently adopted by this
Court, thereby and for the first time effectuating the judgment of
this Court . . . [in Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan]."'9 2
The apparent theory of the action was that, since the legislative
and executive branches had defaulted in their obligations to enact
legislation to implement the constitutional right to engage in collective
bargaining guaranteed by article I, section 6, the obligation shifts to
the court to provide guidelines to permit the exercise of employees'
previously stated constitutional rights.93
The initial questions raised by the suit revolved around the
supreme court's competency to entertain the petition for a constitu-
tional writ and to afford the relief sought.94 The court, however,
90. See id. Cases are transferred to a circuit court when substantial questions of
fact are involved. Otherwise they are transferred to a district court of appeal.
91. Brief for Petitioner, p. 4, Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature,
No. 42323, Fla. Sup. Ct., Nov. 8, 1972.
92. Id.
93. The Dade County Classroom Teachers' Association was the intervening party
in the Ryan case. In one sense, the present litigation could be construed as an appeal
to the continuing jurisdiction of a court of equity to oversee the effectuation of its
previous decree recognizing a constitutional right to bargain. The normal device for
invoking the power of a court of equity to implement an order resisted by respondent
is to petition the court to hold the respondent in contempt for violating the court's order.
94. The petition was for a "constitutional writ" and was brought pursuant to FLA.
App. R. 4.5 (g). The writ appears designed more to preserve a legal issue for the court's
determination on appeal rather than to provide an extraordinary route for invoking
the original jurisdiction of the supreme court. Nor was the writ apparently designed,
as the petition suggests, to provide a device whereby the court might "effectuate" a
prior judgment. The effectuation of judgments and orders is the responsibility of the
prevailing party, using the ordinary post-judgment devices. FLA. App. R. 4.5 (g), how-
ever, was not intended as one of those post-judgment devices. If the obstacles to the use
of rule 4.5 (g) could be surmounted, the court would still have to confront a constitu-
tional objection to its assertion of jurisdiction based on the division of power among
the three branches. The creation of collective bargaining guidelines has traditionally
been a function of the legislative branch. No state or federal court has ever furnished
"guidelines" for the conduct of bargaining. It is doubtful, therefore, that the supreme
court has the competency, in a constitutional sense, to grant the relief requested.
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treated this action as an original mandamus proceeding to "compel
the Legislature of the State of Florida to enact standards or guide-
lines regulating the right of collective bargaining by public employees
of this state, as guaranteed by Section 6, Article I, 1968 Constitution
of Florida."95 The petition was denied because of the "doctrine of
separation of powers mandated by . . . [Florida's] Constitution."96
In reaching its decision, the court reasserted the principle that the
judiciary is the ultimate guardian of constitutional rights such as
those involved in this case, citing Marbury v. Madison s9 and other
landmark cases.98 The court also took judicial notice of the fact that
although the legislature in 1972 had many problems with which to deal
it nevertheless had managed to adopt standards and guidelines for
collective bargaining for one group of public employees, the fire-
fighters. 99
Finally, the court concluded that judicial intervention would be
premature until the legislature had been allowed a reasonable time
in which to act. But if the legislature failed to act within a reasonable
time, the court felt that it would "have no choice but to fashion such
guidelines by judicial decree ....- 100 The thrust of the opinion is
clear: if the legislature does not enact a collective bargaining statute
in the 1973 session, the Florida Supreme Court will "enact" collec-
tive bargaining guidelines by judicial decree. The court, however,
did not specify in what manner these judicial guidelines would be
fashioned.
The petitioner in Dade County suggested the appointment of a com-
mission to establish the necessary collective bargaining guidelines which
would be adopted, subject to approval by the court. This suggested ap-
proach is novel but not particularly farfetched. The commission could,
through formal and informal devices, secure a representative sampling
of opinion on the design of a workable collective bargaining system.
Even though any bargaining bill would consist of a series of value
judgments involving complex problems and requiring an adept politi-
cal judgment for their proper resolution, the task would not be be-
95. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, No. 42323, Fla. Sup. Ct.,
Nov. 8, 1972.
96. Id.
97. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
98. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962). In the last case the court stated
that it would "fashion a remedy of reapportionment by judicial decree in such manner
as may seem to the Court best adapted to meet the requirements of equal protection"
if the Florida Legislature failed to do so. 208 F. Supp. at 318.
99. See FLA. STAT. §§ 447.20-.35 (Supp. 1972).
100. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, No. 42323, Fla. Sup. Ct.,
Nov. 8, 1972.
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yond the capacity of a commission with well-chosen members. That
kind of judicial resolution of the problem might, however, create
more problems than it would solve.
First, it is not clear that the supreme court necessarily has the
power in every case to enforce nonself-executing sections of the con-
stitution. Cases might arise in which a judicial response, in the de-
fault of legislative responsibility, represents a possible, perhaps the
only practical, solution to a problem of this type. But when, as here,
the legislature has taken the problem up in debate and discussions,101
judicial pre-emption of an essentially legislative task is inappropriate.
In the case of public employee bargaining guidelines, judicial de-
crees are not merely inappropriate, they are potentially dangerous.
A poorly constructed collective bargaining system could create serious
financial and political problems for state and municipal government.
In addition, a collective bargaining apparatus which employers and
employee representatives did not have a hand in constructing would
have no claim on either of the parties. The task of enforcement
would be made considerably more difficult if the affected parties have
not been involved in, and consequently feel no responsibility for,
the final solution to the collective bargaining problems. These prob-
lems could be mitigated by allowing the parties before the court to
draw up potential guidelines for consideration by the court. Amicus
briefs could be filed suggesting alternative guidelines. In this manner,
employers and employee organizations could be involved in promul-
gating guidelines. This method is cumbersome and suggests that the
matter is one obviously more suited to the legislation forum.
The supreme court might attempt to establish guidelines on a
case-by-case basis by remanding with directions to the circuit courts
to fashion tentative guidelines tailored to each specific situation.102 On
the other hand a system of circuit-by-circuit solutions is not adequate
101. See note 118 and accompanying text infra.
102. For example, in International Ass'n of Firefighters Local 2010 v. City of Home-
stead, Civil No. 72-9285, Dade County Cir. Ct., Jan. 8, 1973, the court found that the
City Council of Homestead, acting through its members, violated the Fire Fighters
Bargaining Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 447.20-.35 (Supp. 1972), by refusing to bargain in good
faith with the plaintiff labor organization. The court also found, however, that the
activities of the City Council and one of its members constituted an independent violation
of the constitutional rights of the employee-firefighters and that they were entitled to
compensatory and punitive damages for the injuries they might have suffered. Although
the court entered judgment against the individual councilman for only eighteen dollars
compensatory and one dollar punitive damages, the principle that art. I, § 6, creates
a right upon which an award of damages can be based is an extremely important one.
The court ordered the defendants to bargain with the plaintiff labor organization on
the basis of their obligation under the statute, but the order could presumably have
been based on their obligation under art. I, § 6.
(Vol. 1:26
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING
to a problem of state-wide dimensions. Conflicts between the circuits
would be inevitable and confusing. 1 3 Although conflicts can theo-
retically be worked out through the appellate processes, considerable
damage could be inflicted on the public before conflicting decisions
reach and are decided by the supreme court.
Since the proponents of public employee bargaining have not
compelled a satisfactory solution at the bench, they may well appeal
to the executive branch for relief. Several theories and combinations
of statutory provisions could be urged to support the Governor's
intervention in the collective bargaining dispute.
The constitution provides that: "The supreme executive power
shall be vested in a governor. . . . He shall take care that the laws
be faithfully executed .... .. "4 An argument has been made with
reference to similar provisions that these powers could provide gen-
eral constitutional authority for gubernatorial administrative orders.1°5
If that liberal reading were given to the Florida constitutional pro-
vision, the Governor might be justified in promulgating collective
bargaining guidelines by executive order to ensure that the provisions
of article I, section 6, are enforced. Since the Governor is chief
executive officer of the entire state, responsible for the execution of
all its laws, the executive order, according to this theory, could regu-
late the bargaining rights of state, county, and municipal employees.
A second theory justifying the enactment of bargaining guidelines
through executive order relies on the administrative authority pos-
sessed by the Governor over executive departments. Aside from the
state executive agencies under cabinet members, the constitution re-
quires that other departments shall be placed under the Governor
"or an officer or board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of
the governor."' 1 6 The Governor could issue bargaining guidelines,
covering at least those agencies under his supervisory control, pursuant
to his authority as "employer" of executive department employees.
A third theory, or rather a technique for implementing one or
both of the two previously mentioned theories, derives from the
Department of Administration's authority over the personnel policies
103. For example, a circuit court in Dade County might order a representation
election among employees of a Sunland Hospital in Miami at the same time the circuit
court in Leon County orders an election at the request of a different union petitioner
among the employees of all Sunland Hospitals throughout the state. The other possible
areas of conflict need not be enumerated at length; they are, however, certainly sufficient
to make unattractive the prospect of ad hoc solutions at the judicial circuit level.
104. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
105. See Note, Gubernatorial Executive Orders as Devices for Administrative
Direction and Control, 50 IOWA L. REV, 78 (1964).
106. FLA. CoNsr. art. IV, § 6,
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of all executive departments and the Governor's constitutional au-
thority over the head of that department. 10 7 Florida law confers upon
the Department of Administration the power, inter alia, to develop
"[s]uch other programs as are found to be necessary in the establish-
ment and maintenance of a current and sound program of uniform
personnel administration."'' 0 8 Pursuant to this power and under the
provision of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act,109 the Depart-
ment of Administration could develop and promulgate rules regulating
collective bargaining between executive departments and employee
organizations with members subject to the control of the department.
Although the procedures would have to be authorized by the
Secretary of Administration, he serves at the pleasure of the Governor.
Presumably the Governor could issue what in effect would be a
binding order to the Secretary to have the Department of Administra-
tion promulgate bargaining guidelines.
Strong arguments can be mounted in opposition to the issuance
of collective bargaining guidelines based on any of the three approaches
mentioned. With respect to their issuance pursuant to the "supreme
executive authority" clause of the constitution, no precedent exists
in Florida, and very little in other states, justifying the use of that
clause to create rather than to execute laws. In theory, of course,
the Governor is merely enforcing article I, section 6. In fact the
enforcement of this nonself-executing section would require an elabo-
rate panoply of regulations resembling the collective bargaining
statutes passed by legislatures in other states. 110 These can hardly be
disguised as merely executive enforcement orders in Florida.
A derivative objection to this use of the executive order might
be based on two apparently limiting provisions in the constitution.
When the Governor is permitted to use the executive order, the
constitution confers this power on him directly."1 Secondly, the Gover-
nor's issuance of collective bargaining guidelines would impinge on
areas now governed by civil service regulations. Since the constitution
requires that the civil service system be created "by law,"" 2 arguably
any alteration or modification of that system should be accomplished
only "by law"-not by executive order.
Similar objections could be raised to the Governor's issuing guide-
107. Id.
108. FLA. STAT. § 110.022(1)(g) (1971).
109. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1971).
110. See, e.g., 1 CCH STATE LEG., CALIF. 47.177 (1971).
111. E.g., FLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 7. The Governor is authorized to suspend by
executive order any state officer not subject to impeachment.
112. FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 14.
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lines by virtue of his supervisory authority over the executive depart-
ments. No specific authority can be found for that exercise of authority
in the constitution or statutes, whereas regulation of public employ-
ment relations is traditionally accomplished by legislation.
The third approach states the strongest basis for the issuance of
bargaining guidelines by executive authority. Chapter 110 of the
Florida Statutes permits the Department of Administration to de-
velop new programs as the need arises through its rule-making power.
Although the legislature perhaps did not envision the exercise of
authority so delegated in this precise form, it did vest considerable
discretion in the Department of Administration in its role as super-
visor of state personnel. 113 Also the rule-making requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act permit the involvement of interested
parties;" 4 employer groups as well as those representing employee
organizations would therefore have an opportunity to plead their
cases and unique needs before the rules become law.
Whether the enactment of collective bargaining guidelines in this
fashion would be prudent presents a more difficult question. The
financing of the apparatus necessary to ensure proper administration
of the guidelines would be problematic." 5 If necessary financing is
not available, that factor alone could abort the proposal.
If, on the other hand, a formal budget proposal were submitted
to the legislature for the necessary funds, the legislature might be
reluctant to appropriate funds for what many might consider a project
more properly planned and executed by the legislature. The size and
seriousness of these obstacles involve political judgments that do not
lend themselves to academic analysis. Suffice it to note that these
factors are relevant in the decision that might be made by the execu-
tive branch in deciding whether to regulate at least a part of state
employment relations by executive order or administrative regulation.
113. Since the Secretary of Administration serves at the pleasure of the Governor,
no doubt exists as to the Governor's authority to initiate the procedure for collective
bargaining rules.
114. See FLA. STAT. § 120.041 (4) (1971).
115. Especially would this be so if the guidelines were promulgated before a
budget request had been submitted to and approved by the legislature. The project
would require highly skilled and experienced personnel for its successful administration;
a poorly administered program would otherwise be the likely result. The ramifications
of poor administration could easily be disproportionate to the error that provoked the
problems; the fact that the error was made in good faith would provide little con-
solation. Whether the necessary talent could be formed and retained with present re-
sources is uncertain.
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C. Post-1968 Legislative Developments
Of the several bills that have been introduced in the Senate and
House during the 1969-1972 legislative sessions, the one that has re-
ceived the closest attention is H.R. 3314. The bill originated in the
1969 legislature as H.R. 117; it has subsequently undergone extensive
alteration, but has remained remarkably true to the original outline
of the collective bargaining system envisioned by H.R. 117116
Numerous other bills have been introduced during the past four
sessions; still other unofficial collective bargaining proposals have
wandered from hand to hand through the capitol halls, and some have
even been the subject of extensive debate in committee meetings.
Despite these occasional and sometimes tempting diversions, the atten-
tion of the legislature has consistently turned back to H.R. 3314, the
most thoroughly thought-out attempt to provide comprehensive col-
lective bargaining procedures for all public employees in the State
of Florida.
In 1971 H.R. 206, an amended version of H.R. 3556, was referred
to the House Committee on Manpower and Development and the
House Committee on Appropriations.117 During the regular session,
most of which was devoted to Governor Askew's tax program, the bill
was bottled up in committee, where it eventually died. A number of
factors complicated committee debate on the bill and perhaps in-
fluenced its eventual death in committee.1ls
116. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
117. See FLA. H.R. JouR. 17 (1971).
118. First, Governor Askew issued an executive order on April 5, 1971, which con-
tinued former Governor Kirk's ban on collective bargaining over "matters for which the
Department of Administration has legal autbority"-presumably wages, hours and con-
ditions of employment. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 71-20 (Apr. 5, 1971). Among the
justifications recited by the Governor for the continuance of his ban were a statement
of support for collective bargaining legislation implementing the constitutional right
of collective bargaining by public employees and a promise to introduce a bill which
would accomplish that objective. Id. at 2. A draft of the promised bill appeared during
the middle of the session, but was not introduced and was not formally debated. The
draft had, nonetheless, significant impact since legislators presumably felt debate on
Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970) was pointless until the Governor's recommended legislation was
routed to committee. The bill, however, never got to committee, but a good deal of
time was consumed in waiting for it. 'When the draft of the bill was circulated,
interested parties, including legislators, could not have failed to note an important
difference in the language and approach of the bill in comparison to Fla. H.R. 3556
(1970). Whereas the latter stated forcefully the right of public employees to bargain
through a certified representative, prohibited an employer from refusing to bargain
in good faith with a certified representative, and conferred appropriate powers of en-
forcement on the Public Employee Relations Commission to enforce these rights and
obligations, the Governor's proposal equivocated in detailing collective bargaining rights.
The findings and purpose clause did claim that an object of the bill was to require
"public employers and employee organizations to negotiate and bargain in good faith"
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Prior to the 1972 session, H.R. 3556119 was introduced as H.R.
3314 by the Committee on Manpower and Development; 12 0 a com-
panion bill, H.R. 2008,121 was introduced to implement the right-to-
work section of the constitution. 12 2 Both passed out of the Committee on
Manpower and Development and received the approval of the Appro-
priations Committee, after vigorous debate resulted in some crucial
amendments. Finally, again after several days of debate and several
further key amendments, H.R. 3314 and H.R. 2008 were approved
by the overwhelming majority of the House of Representatives.1 23
Both bills were sent over in messages to the Senate where the co-
operative truce that had managed to secure the passage of both bills
in the House disintegrated. H.R. 2008 was quickly passed out of
committee, approved by the Senate with a few minor amendments
and § 4 (4) stated that public employees would have the right "to negotiate collectively
through [an] . . . agent . . . concerning the terms and conditions of employment,"
but the draft bill failed to create a corresponding obligation on the part of the em-
ployer to negotiate or bargain in good faith. Subsequent sections did little to clarify
the ambiguities surrounding the employer's bargaining obligations. The bill resembled
"meet and confer" legislation more than the collective bargaining approach of Fla.
H.R. 3556 (1970).
The filing of a strong right-to-work bill, Fla. H.R. 2008 (1971), further compli-
cated the political context in which Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970) was debated. Fla. H.R.
2008 (1971) attempted to implement the "right" provided employees in art. I, § 6, to
be protected against abridgement or denial of the right to work because of membership
or nonmembership in a labor organization. Since the alleged right-to-work was created
in the same paragraph as the alleged right of public employees to engage in collective
bargaining, and since both required legislation to become effective, the bills were viewed
by many as aspects of the same issue. Inevitably, the collective bargaining bill and the
right-to-work bill became the counters in a political struggle between supporters and
opponents of the concept of public employee bargaining. Each side professed a willing-
ness to support some version of its opponents' bill in exchange for reciprocal support
for its bill. At the end of the session, an attempt was made by House staff members
to construct a single two-part bill out of Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970) and Fla. H.R. 2008 (1971),
including both right-to-work and collective bargaining sections. In the process, many
of the sections in Fla. H.R. 2008 (1971) deemed objectionable by opponents of right-to-
work were excised or modified; at the same time important language changes were
wrought in several key sections of Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970).
This bill, like the Governor's bill, was not yet formally introduced; nor did it
survive into the 1972 session. Several ideas were incorporated into the bill, however,
which did have important effects on subsequent versions of Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970)
and Fla. H.R. 2008 (1971). The most important consequence was the symbolic union
of public employee bargaining legislation with right-to-work legislation; that union
proved indissoluble during the 1972 session. Also many of the changes made in the
two bills found their way into the 1972 session version of Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970) and
Fla. H.R. 2008 (1971).
119. This bill borrowed a few sections from the Governor's bill and some language
from the staff bill.
120. FLA. H.R. JouR. 235 (1972).
121. Substantial changes in the approach of Fla. H.R. 2008 (1971) had been made.
122. FLA. H.R. JouR. 36 (1972).
123. FLA. H.R. JouR. 312, 325 (1972).
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and sent back to the House. 124 The House agreed to the amend-
ments,'125 but then, in an ingenious parliamentary maneuver, amended
H.R. 2008 by adding a new section, H.R. 3314."0
The Senate refused to accede to the House amendment, and what
had become a committee substitute for H.R. 2008 was referred to a
conference committee.1 27 The Senate and House members could not
agree on a compromise version, and the House instructed its con-
ference committee members not to accept a report that did not in-
clude both bills. 28 A last minute attempt by supporters of the right-
to-work bill to extract it from the conference committee for a floor
vote was defeated on the final day of the regular session." 9 Prior to
the final defeat of the all-inclusive H.R. 3314, the House and Senate
passed a bill giving firefighters the right to engage in collective bar-
gaining.2 0
124. FLA. S. JousR. 320-21 (1972).
125. FLA. H.R. Jous. 596 (1972).
126. See FLA. H.R. JoUp. 596 (1972). That parliamentary maneuver was in response
to the difficulties faced by Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970) in the Senate, where it had received
multiple committee references and an apparently low priority status at a time when
the session was beginning to wind up. The amendment of Fla. H.R. 3556 (1970) on to
Fla. H.R. 2008 (1971) was an attempt, therefore, to get the bill onto the Senate floor
and at the same time preserve the political compromise in the House, which had
implicitly agreed to accept both bills or neither.
127. See FLA. S. Jous. 374 (1972).
128. See FLA. H.R. JouR. 1065 (1972).
129. Fla. H.R. 3314 (1972) died in conference. In the meantime, during the
conference committee sessions, House staff members drafted at least two other "ghost
bills," essentially shortened versions of Fla. H.R. 3314 (1972), in an attempt to find a
common ground on which Senate and House members could agree. Whether these bills,
or the idea of a shortened version, will survive into the 1973 sessions will have to await
the renewal of debate over collective bargaining.
130. FLA. STAT. §§ 447.20-.35 (Supp. 1972), entitled the Fire Fighters Bargaining
Act, effective January 1, 1973, not only recognizes the right of firefighters to organize
and bargain collectively, but also imposes on their public employers an obligation to
bargain. The obligation "shall include the duty to cause any final agreement resulting
from negotiations to be reduced to a written contract .... ".Id. § 447.25. This
contract cannot exceed two years.
Section 447.24 places a duty on the employer to recognize any employee organization
selected by the majority of the firefighters of any municipality, county, metropolitan
government, or fire district, but, no employee is prevented from refusing to join any
organization or from presenting grievances personally or by counsel.
Section 447.27 provides for the submission of unresolved issues to a board of arbi-
tration whose composition is defined by § 447.28. Section 447.29 sets out the factors
to be considered by the arbitration board as follows:
(1) Comparison of the annual income of employment of the employing
authority in question with the annual income of employment maintained for
the same or similar work of employees exhibiting like or similar skills under
the same or similar working conditions in the local operating area involved.
(2) Comparison of the annual income of employment of the employing
authority in question with the annual income of employment of employing
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Since a renewed effort to pass a version of H.R. 3314 seems likely
during the 1973 session, this proposed legislation will be analyzed in
close detail. The analysis is not merely an academic exercise. Points
will be raised and options explored to aid interested legislators, public
employers and employee organizations in drafting a more perfect
bill. Although the criticisms leveled at the language and approach of
some of the sections might appear extensive, if not serious, this
meticulous probing does not imply a lack of confidence in the bill.
On the contrary, H.R. 3314 is a well-conceived and structured vehicle
for regulating public employment relations in Florida. With com-
paratively few changes, the bill would certainly be counted as one
of the finer examples of state attempts to contain the phenomenon
of public employee bargaining.
Because of the length and complexity of the bill, a brief overview
will be presented to facilitate more detailed discussion of its compon-
ent parts. The synopsis will follow a somewhat chronological sequence:
(1) mechanisms for administration; (2) representation procedures;
(3) collective bargaining procedures; (4) impasse resolutions; (5) un-
fair union practices; (6) local option; and (7) miscellaneous pro-
visions.
III. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 3314
A. Summary of Bill
1. Mechanisms for Administration. a. The Public Employee
Relations Commission.-The bill will be administered by a Public
authorities in municipalities, counties, or metropolitan governments, or fire
districts of comparable size.
(3) Interest and welfare of the public.
(4) Comparison of peculiarities of employment in regard to other trades or
professions, specifically:




(e) Job training and skills;
(f) Retirement plans;
(g) Sick leave; and
(h) Job security.
Procedural requirements for actions taken by the board of arbitration are set forth
in § 447.30. The arbiters' desicion is "advisory only and shall not be binding upon
either the bargaining agent or the employing authority .... ." Id.
Under § 447.33 compensation of arbiters and other expenses are to be shared
equally by the two parties. Under § 447.34 all bargaining discussions are subject to
the provisions of FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1971), relating to public meetings. Section
447.35 authorizes the extension of any time limit by mutual consent of the bargaining
parties.
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Employee Relations Commission within the Department of Adminis-
tration, comprised of five members appointed by the Governor and
confirmed by the Senate.13' The Chairman of the Commission will
devote full time to his duties; the other four members will serve as
needed. The Commission will have four principal functions:
(1) It is directed to "resolve questions and controversies concern-
ing claims for recognition" by employee organizations."
(2) It is responsible for remedying unfair practices by employers
and employee organizations. 3
(3) It is responsible for initiating procedures to stop public em-
ployee strikes and punish employees and employee organizations en-
gaging in strike activity.13 4
(4) It is responsible for appointing mediators and fact finders to
aid public employers and employee organizations which encounter an
impasse in their negotiations. 35
The Commission is authorized by the bill to adopt necessary rules
and regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.13 6 It
is also authorized to employ supporting personnel137 and to create
and maintain lists of qualified mediators and fact finders.113
b. Regulation of Public Employee Organizations.-The bill re-
quires public employee organizations to register with the Commission
before they will be permitted to request recognition or a representa-
tion election.'39 The employee organization must also submit copies
of the organization's constitution and bylaws.14 Finally, it is required
to keep accurate accounts of its income and expenses, which accounts
must be opened to members of the Commission upon request. 141
2. Representation Procedures.-The bill accords to public em-
ployees the right to be represented by an employee organization of
their own choosing and to negotiate collectively through a certified
bargaining agent with their public employer in the determination of
131. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.003 (1) (1972). The bill is divided into seven sections.
Section 2 is subdivided into subsections, each numbered according to its intended
location in the Florida Statutes, should the bill be enacted into law. Thus the
designation, for example, "§ 2-447.003 (1)" means that this provision can be found in
§ 2 of Fla. H.R. 3314 and is intended upon enactment to appear as § 447.003(1) of the
Florida Statutes.
132. Id. § 2-447.004(6).
133. Id. § 2-447.020.
134. Id. § 2-447.022(2).
135. Id. §§ 2-447.004(5), .014(2)-(3).
136. Id. § 2-447.004(1).
137. Id. § 2-447.003 (2).
138. Id. § 2-447.004 (5).
139. Id. § 2-447.008 (1).
140. Id. § 2-447.008 (5).
141. Id. § 2-447.008(4).
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the terms and conditions of their employment.1 4 2 Certification of
a bargaining agent can be obtained in two ways. The organization
can inform the public employer that it has been selected by a majority
of the employees in a proposed unit as their bargaining representative
and request recognition by that employer.143 If the public employer
has no doubt of the union's "majority" status, and if it agrees with
the bargaining unit proposed by the employee organization, the em-
ployer can recognize the organization as the bargaining agent of the
employees., 4 Upon recognition, the employee organization must peti-
tion the Commission for certification. If the Commission approves of
the proposed unit, it will certify the bargaining agent. If it does not
approve the proposed unit, it will deny the request for certification. 1' 5
The second route to certification is by a secret ballot election. If
the employer disputes the "majority" status of the organization or
disagrees with the proposed bargaining unit, it can refuse to recognize
the employee organization. The organization must then petition the
Commission for a representation election. 46 The petition must con-
tain a sworn statement that the organization has the support of at
least thirty per cent of the employees in the unit. 47 After investigation
and a hearing, the Commission will direct an election in a unit which
it has determined is appropriate for bargaining.14 The employees
will have an opportunity to vote for or against representation. If an
employee organization receives a majority of the votes cast, provided
at least thirty per cent of the employees eligible to vote actually vote,
the Commission will certify the organization as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the unit. 49
In determining the appropriate unit the Commission is directed
to take into account a variety of factors, but the Commission is
specifically admonished to avoid a multiplicity of fractionalized units.15°
3. Collective Bargaining Procedures.-After a bargaining agent has
been certified, it is authorized to engage in collective bargaining with
the public employer concerning the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of all employees in the unit.'5 ' The bill, however, exempts from
bargaining any proposal pre-empted by provisions of federal, state or
142. id. § 2-447.006(2).
143. Id. § 2-447.009(1).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. § 2-447.009 (2) (a).
147. Id.
148. Id. §§ 2-447.009 (3)-(4).
149. ld. § 2-447.009 (4) (c). See note 222 and accompanying text infra.
150. Id. §§ 2-447.009(5)(a)-(b).
151. Id. § 2-447.011 (1).
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local law; proposals which invade the area of management rights de-
fined by the bill; or proposals which infringe on the authority of any
career or civil service commission or personnel board.152
If the provisions of the agreement conflict with any law over which
the executive officer representing the employer has no amendatory
power, he will request an amendment of the conflicting law. If the
amendment is not adopted the conflicting provisions of the agreement
will be void. 153
The chief executive officer will also request funds sufficient to
implement the provisions of the negotiated agreement. If sufficient
funds are not provided, then the executive officer will return and
negotiate with the bargaining agent within the framework of the
funds appropriated. 5 4
4. Impasse Resolution.-If the employer and the bargaining agent
cannot resolve their disagreements through negotiations and an im-
passe occurs in the bargaining, either party can petition the Commis-
sion to initiate mediation.' 55 The Commission will then supply the
names of five mediators and within three days the parties shall elect
one of them.156 That mediator has fifteen days in which to bring the
parties together.15 7
If mediation fails, the Commission will next appoint a fact-finding
board of three persons, one appointed by the employer, one by the
bargaining agent and the third selected by both.15s The board must
be selected within fifteen days.- 59 The board must begin its investiga-
tion within ten days of its appointment and finish it within thirty
days of its appointment. 6
The board shall then transmit its findings of fact and recommend
solutions to the parties. 161 If the dispute is not settled within ten
days, the board shall make its report public, and present it to the
appropriate legislative body.16 2 The employer and the bargaining agent
152. Id. § 2-447.013.
153. Id. § 2-447.011(3).
154. Id. § 2-447.011 (5). It is important to note that under this proposed statute
the legislature would retain ultimate authority and control over both the economic and
noneconomic items in a contract concerning state employees. No state agency or officer,
including the Governor, can commit the legislature to a wage increase or to a change
in any state law affecting state employees.
155. Id. § 2-447.014(1).
156. Id. § 2-447.014 (2).
157. Id. § 2-447.014(3).
158. Id. § 2-447.014 (3) (a)- (b).
159. Id. § 2-447.014 (3) (b).
160. Id. § 2-447.015 (1).
161. Id.
162. Id. §§ 2-447.015(2)- (3).
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may also submit separate recommendations to the legislative body.163
That body has authority to impose a final settlement. 16 4
5. Unfair Labor Practices.-Both employers and employee organiza-
tions are prohibited from interfering with employees because of par-
ticipation in concerted activities or because of their nonparticipation
in such activities.' 65 It is an unfair labor practice to discriminate
against employees who exercise rights guaranteed by the bill.166 It is
also an unfair labor practice for either side to refuse to bargain in
good faith.'67
The Commission may, after a hearing, order the guilty party to
cease and desist from such unfair practices. 68 The Commission's order
is not self-executing and the party defendant may seek review of the
order in the appropriate district court of appeal. 1 9 The Commission
or the charging party may also petition for enforcement of the order
in the district court of appeal. 70 If the order is not appealed within
thirty days, however, it will, upon request of the Commission, be
automatically enforced by the district court of appeal.1
71
6. Strikes and Strike Penalties.-It is an unfair labor practice for
an employee organization to engage in a strike.' 7 2 A "strike" is de-
fined very broadly to include concerted slow-downs, mass resignations,
boycotts or picket lines.' 7 3 It is also a violation of the bill for public
employees to strike, with or without the sanction of the employee
organization. 74 If a strike is threatened or actually occurs, either the
Commission or the public employer affected may petition the appro-
priate circuit court for an injunction prohibiting the strike. 75 If the
employee organization disobeys the injunctive order, the circuit court
is empowered to fine the organization up to $5,000 for contempt. 76
In addition, the court can fine striking employees between fifty and
one hundred dollars per day for each day they remain on strike. 7 7
163. Id. § 2-447.015 (3).
164. Id. § 2-447.015(4).
165. Id. § 2-447.019(1)-(2).
166. Id. § 2-447.019(1) (a).
167. Id. §§ 2-447.019(1) (c), (2) (c).
168. Id. § 2-447.020(3) (a).
169. Id. § 2-447.020(4).
170. Id. § 2-447.020 (5) (a).
171. Id. § 2-447.020 (5) (e).
172. Id. § 2-447.019 (2) (e).
173. Id. § 2-447.002(5).
174. Id. § 2-447.021.
175. Id. § 2-447.022(2).
176. Id. § 2-447.022(3).
177. Id.
Florida State University Law Review
The employee organization is prohibited from paying the fines for
the employees.17
The Commission is also authorized to penalize an employee or-
ganization and individual employees for engaging in strike activity.
The Commission can, after a hearing, revoke any "check-off" (dues
removal) privilege which may have been negotiated by the offending
union; 7 9 revoke its certification for a period of one year;8 0 fine
the organization up to $20,000 for each day of the strike;'8 ' or fine the
organization in excess of $20,000 per day if the costs of the strike
exceed that amount.' 2 With respect to the striking employees, the
Commission may, after a hearing, place an employee on probation
for a six-month period; 8 3 and the Commission must forbid an in-
crease in remuneration for a period of one year.18 4
7. Miscellaneous.-The bill permits a "local option." Any political
subdivision of the state may adopt its own collective bargaining legis-
lation provided that the legislation is "substantially equivalent" to
the provisions and procedures of the state bill.185
The inclusion of a "check-off" clause, stipulating that the employer
will deduct organization dues and assessments from those employees
who sign authorization cards, is a negotiable item. The employer does
not have to agree to "check-off" or to pay for the expense involved,
but must discuss the issue if the employee organization raises it.86 All
proceedings authorized or required by the bill are subject to the
Government in the Sunshine Law.8 7
B. Matters of Representation
1. Procedure for Selecting a Bargaining Agent.-The drafters chose
a useful technique to determine the representative status of an em-
ployee organization seeking to represent a group of employees. The
choice involves not only a selection among several possible technical
approaches to the representation issue, but involves also several value
judgments which might well be influential in determining the eventual
success or failure of the proposed legislation. The bill authorizes an
employee organization to raise a question or controversy concerning
178. Id. § 2-447.023 (2).
179. Id. § 2-447.022 (6) (a) (3).
180. Id. § 2-447.022 (6) (b).
181. Id. § 2-447.022 (6) (a) (4).
182. Id.
183. Id. § 2-447.022 (5) (a).
184. Id. § 2-447.022 (5) (c).
185. Id. § 2-447.025.
186. Id. § 2-447.007.
187. Id. § 6.
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a claim for recognition in either of two ways: 88 first, the employee
organization, if it believes that it has been "designated or selected by
a majority of public employees ... as their representative" may re-
quest recognition by the public employer.1 19 The bill goes on to state
that a public employer shall recognize an organization as the repre-
sentative of his employees if he is satisfied that the employee organiza-
tion has been selected by a majority of the employees and that the
unit for which representation is requested is a unit appropriate for
bargaining. 90
Up to that point the bill restates the law as it has evolved under
the NLRA'91 and also the law regulating representation procedures
in most of the states that have adopted public employee bargaining
legislation. 92 The obvious explanation of why these laws allow a
private settlement of the representation issue based on an informal
assessment of employee sentiment rests with the relative ease, con-
venience and economy of a private resolution. In many representation
cases, little doubt exists as to the feelings of the employees, and the
expense and inconvenience of a representation election are unneces-
sary.' 93
Many employers prefer the informal method in the clear case.
Organizational campaigns provide myriad distractions to employees
and can have an adverse impact on production, discipline and mo-
rale. '94 When the employees' choice is clear, some employers prefer
to recognize the union quickly and to get on with the bargaining. The
NLRB also prefers the informal settlement and for a long while
188. In language borrowed from NLRA § 9(c)(1), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1) (1970), the jurisdiction of the Commission over representation matters is
created by giving it the power to "resolve questions and controversies concerning claims
for recognition as the bargaining agent for a bargaining unit ...... See Fla. H.R.
3314, § 2-447.004 (6) (1972).
189. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009(1) (1972).
190. Id.
191. For a discussion of the development of the law prior to recent developments
discussed at note 199 infra, see Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without
an NLRB Election, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 851 (1967). See also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
246--67 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
192. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468 (b) (1972); N.Y. Civ. Sxav. LAw § 201
(McKinney Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.602 (Supp. 1972).
193. In the private sector, for example, when a group of ten employees gets to-
gether, forms its own union, selects its own officers and votes unanimously for strike
action in a secret ballot election, could a legitimate doubt exist as to the union's
majority status? Or in the public sector, when virtually every teacher in a school
district has been a dues paying member of the Florida Education Association or American
Federation of Teachers for ten years running, is there any legitimate doubt as to this
organization's majority status when it requests recognition?
194. Cf. Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954); United Air-
craft Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1632 (1961).
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appeared to coerce employers to use that method in preference to
the Board-conducted election. 19 The Board's preference is easily ex-
plainable. Many employers used the complex administration procedures
that characterized representation hearings, elections and appeals to
delay and, on occasion, to defeat the right of employees to choose a
bargaining representative.19 6 In addition private settlements conserved
manpower and funds for the perenially underfunded and understaffed
regional offices of the NLRB.197 The United States Supreme Court
recently decided, however, that the Board had overstepped the bounds
of discretion in its efforts to force employer recognition without an
election. 198 As a result, the employer in most cases now has the option
of choosing between informal recognition and a secret ballot election.' "
Most states which have adopted comprehensive public employee
bargaining legislation permit employer recognition to confer repre-
195. To trace the history of the Board's reliance on "card checks," i.e., the use of
authorization cards signed by employees as informal evidence of a union's majority
status, see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB,
185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), modifying and enforcing 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951); Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964);
Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962); Cudahy
Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939). See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 246-59
(C. Morris ed. 1971).
196. Cf. Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 1280 (1964). The NLRB has re-
duced the number of days consumed in processing representation petitions from a median
of eighty-nine days in 1961 to a median of forty-three days in 1970. See 35 NLRB ANN. REP.
12 (1970). But the statistics do not indicate how long the Board took to process cases
where each appeal possibility was utilized. See K. McGuINESS, How To TAKE A CASE
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARO 47-175 (3d ed. 1967), for an explanation
of the myriad appeal possibilities in a representation proceeding. Nor do the Board's
statistics indicate the length of time a litigant can consume in seeking review of the
Board's order in a federal court of appeals.
197. Cf. A. Cox & D. BOK, LABOR LAW 1163-68 (7th ed. 1969); Miller, Our Rube
Goldberg Labor Board, Nation's Bus., Feb. 1972, p. 30.
198. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
199. See id. at 591-92:
When confronted by a recognition demand based on possession of cards allegedly
signed by a majority of his employees, an employer need not grant recognition
immediately, but may, unless he has knowledge independently of the cards that
the union has a majority, decline the union's request and insist on an election,
either by requesting the union to file an election petition or by filing such a petition
himself under § 9 (c) (1) (B). If, however, the employer commits independent and
substantial unfair labor practices disruptive of election conditions, the Board may
withhold the election or set it aside, and issue instead a bargaining order as a
remedy for the various violations. A bargaining order will not issue, of course,
if the union obtained the cards through misrepresentation or coercion or if the
employer's unfair labor practices are unrelated generally to the representation
campaign.
See also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 264-65 (C. Morris ed. 1971). But see Pogrebin,
NLRB Bargaining Orders Since Gissel: Wandering from a Landmark, 46 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 193 (1971).
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sentative status on a bargaining agent.200 Unfortunately, possibilities
for abuse inhere in unsupervised recognition. In the private sector
informal recognition can be used by an employer to foist a corrupt
or "co-operative" union on the employees before they can join or
form a union of their choice. 201 In addition, an unscrupulous union
can compel recognition from an economically weaker employer by
picketing and boycotting tactics, despite the employees' wish to do
without representation.2 0 2 Sufficient remedies exist for these abuses
both under the NLRA20 3 and H.R. 3314,204 but employees are too
often unaware of them, or too intimidated to use them. It is unlikely,
but not impossible, that similar abuses will creep into public employee
bargaining under H.R. 3314. Public employers do not personally profit
from low wages and benefits and inferior working conditions, nor do
they necessarily suffer economically from increased wages and benefits.
The only temptation for the public employer to circumvent the re-
quirement of majority designation would proceed from a desire to
work with what he believes is a "reasonable" or "understanding" union
despite its lack of support among the employees. The risk of public
employers violating the law in this way is probably not significant
enough to justify the elimination of informal recognition, certainly
a very useful and economical technique for settling representation
issues.
One possible disadvantage does inhere in the use of this technique
in the public sector that does not generally arise in the private sector.
The private employer can refuse a demand for recognition either
because the union has not proved to his satisfaction that it has been
designated by a majority of the employees, or because the union has
demanded the right to represent employees in a unit that the employer
200. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 204.1 (McKinney Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 1101.602 (Supp. 1972). But see WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.83(2) (Supp. 1972).
201. See 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 155-59 (1951), quoted in A. Cox & D. BOK, supra
note 197, at 215-20; Note, Section 8(a)(2): Employer Assistance to Plant Unions and
Committees, 9 STAN. L. REV. 351 (1957).
202. See, e.g., C. S. Smith Metropolitan Mkt. Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal. 2d 389, 106 P.2d
414 (1940). For an examination of one form of union pressure tactics, see Lauritzen.
The Organizational Picket Line-Coercion, 3 STAN. L. REV. 413 (1951). But see Tobriner,
The Organizational Picket Line-Lawful Economic Pressure, 3 STAN. L. REV. 423 (1951).
203. Section 8(a)(2), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970), prohibits
employer domination of or assistance to a labor organization; § 8 (b)(7), 73 Stat. 544
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(7) (1970), prohibits most forms of organizational picketing.
204. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.019 (1)(e) (1972), makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to dominate, interfere with or assist in the formation, existence or ad-
ministration of an employee organization; Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.019(2)(e) (1972), for-
bids employee organizations from participating in strikes; Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.001 (5)
(1972), defines strike to include picketing.
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considers inappropriate. 2 5 If the latter is his reason, the case will go
to the NLRB for resolution. The employer will generally raise the
appropriate unit issue when it is in his self-interest to do so. Unit
determinations can cause him economic and managerial problems if
they do not reflect his own internal management scheme. His failure
to raise a timely objection will generally cause only himself discom-
fort.206
In the public sector, however, an inappropriate unit determina-
tion will not necessarily create immediate problems for the public
employer, and consequently his self-interest might not dictate an ob-
jection to such units if they are requested by the employee organiza-
tion. But inappropriate unit determinations, while they might not
have an immediate adverse impact on the employer, can create havoc
within a given governmental unit, ultimately costing the taxpaying
public serious losses in funds and services.2 0 7 To guard against this
possibility, the Florida bill provides that even when an employer on
demand has recognized an employee organization, the employee unit
for bargaining implied in the recognition must be expressly approved
by the Commission before certification will issue. 20 8 And despite in-
formal recognition the employee organization cannot function under
the bill until it has been certified by the Commission.2
0 9
The Commission, on the other hand, has the power to deny
certification, but only on the ground that the unit is inappropriate
for bargaining. 210 In making that determination, the Commission will
measure the unit approved against the enumerated criteria used for
de novo unit determinations by the Commission.2 11 Since the main
purpose of the review process is to permit Commission intervention
when the employer appears to be permitting fractionalization, the
unit accepted by the employer should be approved by the Commission
205. Even prior to NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the employer
could decline to recognize a union if he had a good faith doubt as to the appropriate-
ness of the unit requested by the union. See NLRB v. Morris Novelty Co., 378 F.2d
1000 (8th Cir. 1967); Clermont's, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1397 (1965). But cf. NLRB v. Ralph
Printing & Lithographing Co., 379 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1967).
206. See generally N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, CoLLEaTrvE BARGAINING 233-63 (2d
ed. 1965).
207. Anderson, The Structure of Public Sector Bargaining, in PUBLIC WORKERS
AND PUBLIC UNIONS 37, 39-42 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
208. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009 (1) (1972).
209. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.006(2) (1972), gives public employees the right "to
negotiate collectively through a certified bargaining agent" (emphasis added); in addition,
an employer is required to bargain only with a certified bargaining agent. Id. § 2-
447.011 (1).
210. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009(1) (1972).
211. Id. See note 244 infra.
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unless fractionalization would be the probable result 212 or approval
of the unit requested would involve a serious departure from the
criteria set out in the bill.2
13
If the employer refuses to recognize the employee organization
either because he doubts the organization's majority status or cannot
ascertain majority status because of uncertainty as to the appropriate
unit to use in testing the union's claim, then the employer will re-
fuse to recognize the organization; his next recourse is to petition the
Commission for certification through a representation election.21
The bill, borrowing what developed as an administrative rule with
the NLRB, requires that the petition contain a sworn statement that
thirty per cent or more of the public employees in the proposed
bargaining unit desire to be represented for purposes of collective
bargaining by the employee organization.215 In an apparent attempt
212. In theory, the Commission could exercise very close scrutiny over the unit
determinations made in the course of informal recognition by the employer; but since
the parties themselves are in the best position to know what arrangement is the most
workable for them, and since the number of factors for deciding on an appropriate
unit permit a great deal of flexibility, it is highly unlikely that the Commission will
disallow a unit determination unless it violates the specific mandate of the legislature
to avoid fractionalized units.
213. The bill is silent on the options open to the Commission and to the union if
the Commission refuses to certify the recognized employee organization on the ground
that the unit is inappropriate. Presumably when the Commission deems it necessary
to make a minor adjustment in the unit, the union will be permitted to amend its
petition and the employer to amend his approval without the necessity of initiating a
new procedure. If the Commission disagrees with the unit approved to the extent that
the number of employees added or reduced is sufficient to affect the union's majority
status, the employee organization should be allowed to withdraw its petition for certifi-
cation or have it treated as a petition for a representation election.
214. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009(2)(a) (1972). The section states in part: "Any
employee organization may file a petition with the commission for certification as the
bargaining agent for a proposed bargaining unit." The section should more accurately
state: "Any employee organization may file a petition with the commission for a
representation election."
In addition, the section might properly require the employee organization first to
demand informal recognition by the employer under Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009(1)
(1972), before filing a petition under subsection 2. Only if the public employer refused
to recognize the employee organization would it be permitted to file the petition for
an election. That procedure is required by the NLRA § 9 (c) (1) (A), 61 Stat. 144 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 159 (c) (1) (A) (1970).
215. The Board "rule" is found neither in the statute nor in the NLRB Rules and
Regulations, but has been included in the Board's Statements of Procedure, 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.18 (a) (1972). It is an informal device used by the Board to administer economically
its responsibility to investigate and determine representation petitions. To save the
time and effort required in pursuing representation questions where employee interest
is minimal or nonexistent, the Board usually requires a union to submit authorization
cards indicating that at least thirty per cent of the employees in the unit desire the
petitioning union to be their representative or wish to have an NLRB election to make
such a determination, before the Board will proceed to a hearing on the petition. See
K. McGUINESS, supra note 196, at 60,
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to use the NLRB system, however, the drafters misworded the section,
requiring only a sworn statement that thirty per cent or more of the
unit employees desire representation.2 1 6 Presumably the Commission
will still find it necessary to adopt a rule requiring the employee
organization to submit evidence of the employees' desires in the form
of authorization or membership cards.2 17 The necessity for another
rule and the inherent unreliability of privately furnished authoriza-
tion cards could be eliminated by a simple amendment requiring that
the petition be supported by statements signed by thirty per cent or
more of the public employees in the proposed bargaining unit setting
forth their desire to vote in a secret ballot election on the issue of
representation for purposes of collective bargaining by the employee
organization filing the petition. To avoid problems in the public
sector similar to those generated by authorization cards in the private
sector, the wording and form of the statement signed by the employees
can be prescribed by the Commission pursuant to its rule-making
2181powers.
Pursuant to its general power to determine the petition's suffi-
ciency, the Commission, of course, may investigate the authenticity
and voluntariness of the signatures if doubts exist that one or more
signatures might have been forged or coerced.219 The investigation
can be accomplished through informal means or, as the NLRB does
it, through nonadversary hearings with all interested parties invited
to furnish the Commission agent with information relevant to the
inquiry.220 At the conclusion of the hearing, if the Commission finds
that a question concerning representation exists-that is, if the em-
ployer has not recognized the employee organization and more than
thirty per cent have indicated a desire for representation-it is directed
to order a secret ballot election.
221
A crucial section was inadvertently omitted from the bill during
the 1971-1972 session when the bill was voted out of the House
Committee on Manpower and Development 22 As a result the bill says
216. The bill reads in part: "The petition shall contain a sworn statement that
thirty percent (30%) or more of the public employees in the proposed bargaining unit
desire to be represented for purposes of collective bargaining by the employee organiza-
tion filing the petition." Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009 (2) (a) (1972).
217. See the discussion of the confusing "dual purpose authorization cards" often
used in the private sector in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 601-10 (1969).
218. See Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.004 (1) (1972).
219. Id. § 2-447.009(3).
220. Cf. K. McGUINESS, supra note 196, at 83-101. The NLRB representation hear-
ing is nonadversary in a technical sense only. Id. at 94.
221. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009(4)(c) (1972).
222. The problem of certification dealt with in this missing section had caused
interpretive difficulties in previous versions of Fla. H.R. 3314 (1972). Fla. H.R. 3065,
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nothing about the Commission's duties subsequent to the election.
The missing section provides that an employee organization which
receives the votes of a majority of the employees voting in the election
shall be certified. 2 3 If the union obtains fifty per cent or less of the
votes actually cast, the union will not be certified; and the Board will
not schedule another representation election within that unit for one
year.
Some of the cut-off percentages used in section 2-447.009 stirred
controversy. The requirement of a showing of interest by thirty per
cent of the employees was regarded with skepticism by some legis-
lators who felt that at least fifty per cent of the employees should
evidence a commitment to the employee organization before the Board
ordered an election.2 24 The objection ignores the purpose of the "show-
ing of interest" requirement, and also some of the realities of an
organizing campaign. The purpose of a thirty per cent showing of
interest is not to make it more difficult for employees to exercise their
§ 112.52 (1970), for example, spoke of "certified" employee organizations, but nowhere
required the certification of an employee organization, or in any other way specified
the duty of the Commission when an employee organization won a representation elec-
tion. Fla. H.R. 3556, § 112.61 (1970), stated that the Commission should not certify an
organization unless it received fifty per cent plus one of the votes, but never affirmatively
required certification. Fla. H.R. 206, § 112.61 (1970), carried forward that anomaly.
The version of Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009 (d)- (e) (1972), which was debated by the
Committee on Manpower and Development stated:
(d) Where an employee organization is selected by a majority of the employees
voting in an election in which at least thirty percent (30%) of the eligible
employees cast valid ballots, the public employer shall certify the employee
organization as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit for pur-
poses of this act.
(e) In any election in which at least thirty percent (30%) of the eligible
employees in the unit cast valid ballots and in which none of the choices on the
ballot receives the vote of a majority of the employees voting, a runoff election
shall be held according to rules promulgated by the commission.
The bill does not make sense without these subsections, which could only have been
omitted through inadvertence; they should be included in any future versions. For the
sake of convenience, references to subsections (d) and (e) will assume their inclusion
in Fla. H.R. 3314 (1972).
223. See note 222 supra. The missing subsections were offered as amendments when
the bill was debated in the Senate Committee on Civil Judiciary "B."
224. The following substitute for subsection (c) was offered by Senators Ware and
Sayler during debate in the Senate Committee on Civil Judiciary "B":
The election ballot shall contain the name of the petitioning employee organiza-
tion and the name or names of any other employee organization showing proof
of at least 10% representation of the public employees within the defined bar-
gaining unit. The ballot shall also contain a statement that may be marked by
any public employee voting that he does not desire to be represented by any of the
named employee organizations.
Hearings on Fla. H.R. 3314 Before the Fla. Senate Committee on Civil Judiciary B (1971)
(on file in Florida Supreme Court Library).
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right to select a bargaining representative, or to hinder the organizing
efforts of employee organizations; rather the purpose is to permit the
Commission to conserve its resources by ensuring that the employee
organization has some chance of winning a representation election.
The commitment of thirty per cent of the employees has apparently
proved in the experience of the NLRB to be a reliable factor in
making that judgment. Given the normal reluctance of employees to
make themselves vulnerable to potential employer retaliation by de-
claring for representation, it is not unreasonable to assume that when
thirty per cent "sign up," the employee organization's request for an
election is based on substantial employee support.
Another percentage that occasioned misunderstanding and some
controversy was the requirement that an employee organization must
obtain a majority, that is, fifty per cent plus one, to earn certification
as the bargaining representative.2 2 5 Some legislators quickly pointed
out that an organization could be certified even though it received
the votes of less than a majority of the employees in the unit. The
experience in the private sector has been that between ninety per
cent and one hundred per cent of the employees vote in representa-
tion elections. 2
6
Despite the experience in the private sector and despite a contrary
law in political elections, strong support existed for requiring a certain
percentage of employees to cast votes before considering the elections
to be valid.227 Since it is likely that most employees will vote in these
elections in any event, little harm would be done by requiring that
225. In theory an organization could be certified with only one per cent of the
employees voting for it, if less than two per cent voted, since the organization need
only receive fifty per cent plus one of the votes cast.
226. See 28 NLRB ANN. REP. 177 (1963). The reasons are few and simple. The
election generally takes place during or at the close of working hours on company
property; no inconvenience results from the employees' exercise of their franchise. In
addition employees are often intensively partisan and concerned in organizational cam-
paigns, since the outcome of the election, unlike most political elections, will have a
direct and immediate effect on their lives.
227. The following amendment was offered by Senators Ware and Sayler during
debate in the Senate Committee on Civil Judiciary "B":
(d) Where an employee organization is selected by a majority of the employees
voting in an election in which at least 50%o of the eligible employees cast valid
ballots, the public employer shall certify the employee organization as the ex-
clusive representative of all employees in the unit for purposes of this act.
(e) In any election in which at least 50% of the eligible employees in the unit
cast valid ballots and in which none of the choices on the ballot receives the
vote of a majority of the employees voting, a runoff election shall be held according
to rules promulgated by the commission.
Hearings on Fla. H.R. 3314 Before the Fla. Senate Committee on Civil Judiciary B (1971)
(on file in Florida Supreme Court Library).
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fifty to seventy-five per cent of the employees must vote before the
election would be valid.
The runoff election procedures caused considerable consternation
because, by providing that the employees would select between the two
top choices in the first election, the section created the possibility that
employees would not be given the opportunity to vote against union
representation. For example, in a typical representation election, two
unions might be vying for the votes of employees. A group of employees
might be strongly opposed to any union representation. The employees
will have three choices on the ballot: Union A, Union B, or No Union.
If forty-eight per cent vote for Union A, forty-seven per cent for Union
B and five per cent for No Union, then since no choice received a
majority of the votes cast, a runoff election is necessary. The bill,
since it provides that the two top choices will be placed on the runoff
ballot, eliminates in this hypothetical the possibility of voting against
union representation.
Some legislators insisted on amendments which would have in-
cluded on every ballot, including runoff election ballots, the choice
of No Union.228 The result of that procedure, however, would be a
repeat of the first election rather than a runoff. It would be possible,
of course, to include on the ballot only the union with the highest
number of votes plus the No Union choice. But Union B could legiti-
mately protest that that would be unfair to it; despite receiving forty-
seven per cent of the vote, it would have been displaced on the ballot
by the No Union choice which originally received only five per cent.
The argument for including the No Union choice points out that
by failing to include the possibility of a No Union vote, the bill is
forcing anti-union employees either to vote for a union or forfeit
their vote. The argument is not without merit, but the alternative in
this hypothetical is to allow five per cent of the employees to eliminate
a choice of forty-seven per cent of the group.
Since one group's choice must be sacrificed if the runoff is going
to be a runoff, the fairer solution is to eliminate the choice receiving
the lowest number of votes.
2. Procedures for Unit Determination.-The proper shaping of
the unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining in the public
sector requires both considerable insight into the nature of collective
228. A third amendment was offered by Senators Ware and Sayler, adding a sub-
section (f) to Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009 (1972). "Such runoff ballot election [sic] shall
also contain a statement that may be marked by any public employee voting that he
does not desire to be represented by any of the named employee organizations." Hearings
on Fla. H.R. 3314 Before the Fla. Senate Committee on Civil Judiciary B (1971) (on
file in Florida Supreme Court Library).
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bargaining as it has evolved in twentieth-century America, and an
added sensitivity to the unique features of public employee bargaining.
The unit determination serves several distinct but related purposes. 2 9
It creates "election districts," since its scope will determine voter
eligibility in the representation election. Only those employees within
the defined unit are permitted to vote for or against the collective
bargaining representative. Secondly, the defined unit constitutes a
governing unit. Since an employee organization that prevails in a
representation election is certified as the exclusive representative of
employees in the unit, the organization becomes "by force of law" the
representative of both the consenting majority and the dissenting
minority. Thirdly, the bargaining unit constitutes an economic unit
"pairing union and management for purposes of collective bargain-
ing.' 230 The collective agreement is generally co-extensive with the unit
and establishes uniform rates of pay and a unified system of regulations
binding on the employer and all members of the unit.
A unit determination also has more immediate consequences. The
size and scope of a given unit will certainly affect and often determine
the outcome of a one-union representation election.2 3 1 Similarly, the
unit designation might influence not only the results of an election
choice between one union and no union: even when two employee
organizations are competing, the unit selected will often control which
has the better chance for employee approval.2 3 2 As a consequence, the
employee organization will often attempt to conform the size of a
unit to the extent of its organizational efforts. The employer, on the
other hand, if interested in defeating the organizational efforts, will
attempt to expand the unit to dilute its opponent's strength.2 33
But there are potential disadvantages both to the organization and
the employer in their attempts to mold the unit as an election district.
229. The following scheme of analysis was suggested by Professors Summers and
Wellington. No attempt will be made to ascribe specific credit during the textual dis-
cussion. See C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, LABOR LAW 511-13 (1968). See also H.
SHERMAN, JR., UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 54-78 (Labor Relations and Social
Problems, Unit One, 1971). For an analysis of the economic impact on unions and
employers of various kinds of bargaining unit structures, see N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 233-63 (2d ed. 1965).
230. C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, supra note 229, at 512.
231. For example, if the appropriate unit includes "all faculty and professional per-
sonnel" in the state university system, an organization which had focused organizational
efforts on only two of the seven universities in Florida might find itself under a serious
handicap at election time.
232. Using the model of the university system again, certain types of employee
organizations would be favored if the unit included "all faculty and professional em-
ployees," and other types favored if the unit was limited to "all tenured faculty
members."
233. See NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965).
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If the organization, for example, successfully limits the unit to those
employees among whom it has significant support, the smaller unit
might be weaker as an "economic grouping" than a larger unit. And
while the employer might achieve a tactical advantage in enlarging
the unit, it would risk having to bargain with a more powerful aggre-
gate of employees if the employee representative wins an election in
the larger unit.
In the private sector the union and the employer resolve the
dilemma of the larger versus the smaller unit depending on their
perception and assessment of the possible risks and advantages involved
in each possibility. Each party then attempts to persuade the other to
accept its unit definition in an informal settlement; 34 or if no settle-
ment is reached, each party may attempt to convince the NLRB that
its suggested unit is the more appropriate for purposes of collective
bargaining.2 13
In resolving appropriate unit controversies, the Board seeks to
group together those employees who share a "community interest";
that is, those who have a substantial mutual interest in wages, hours
and working conditions.2 36 The Board has emphasized that it is charged
to select an appropriate unit, not the most appropriate or best unit.
237
In discharging its responsibilities, the Board looks to a variety of rele-
vant factors.
2 38
Although Congress conferred upon the Board broad discretion
in defining units appropriate for collective bargaining,23 9 the NLRA
234. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, supra note 229, at 256, observe that:
The scope of the bargaining unit will depend upon the pragmatic judgment
of the parties as they balance their answers to three questions: (1) Who will
gain or lose from changes in the unit? (2) How will relative bargaining power
be affected by narrowing or widening the unit? (3) Will the internal authority
of the organization support the agreement covering the unit? The balance may
be precarious and may change over time; thus it is not surprising that units
seemingly well established break up or expand. As the bargaining power of one
party increases or decreases, the other party may find it worthwhile to try to
change the scope of the unit to improve its position. Such changes may lead to a
widening of the unit, but they may also tend to narrow it.
235. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 200-02 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
236. Cf. 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 63 (1962).
237. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408 (1966). For a critical analysis
of the Board's performance in two specific classes of cases, see Note, The Board and
Section 9(c)(5): Multilocation and Single-Location Bargaining Units in the Insurance
and Retail Industries, 79 HARV. L. REV. 811 (1966).
238. These have been listed by Professor Morris as follows:
(1) extent and type of union organization of the employees; (2) bargaining history
in the industry as well as with respect to the parties before the Board; (3) simi-
larity of duties, skills, interests, and working conditions of the employees; (4) or-
ganizational structure of the company; and (5) the desires of the employees.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 201 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
239. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 134 (1944).
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does limit that discretion in several important respects. Besides the
classes of employees completely excluded from coverage under the
NLRA24 0 and, therefore, from inclusion in a bargaining unit, the
NLRA also specifies that a union may not be certified as the repre-
sentative of security guards if it "admits to membership or is affiliated
directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to member-
ship, employees other than guards." 241 In addition, the NLRA also
provides that a unit including both professional and nonprofessional
employees is inappropriate "unless a majority of such professional
employees vote for inclusion in such unit."24 2
H.R. 3314 closely tracks the structure and language of the NLRA.
The bill provides that, if the Commission finds that a question con-
cerning representation exists, it shall immediately "[d]efine the proposed
bargaining unit and determine which public employees shall be quali-
fied and entitled to vote at any election held by the commission. '"243
In defining the bargaining unit, the Commission is charged to con-
sider nine factors,244 six of which have been borrowed from the
NLRB's interpretations of the NLRA,2 4 5 and three of which-the prin-
ciples of efficient administration, the organizational structure of the
public employer, and the occupational classifications of the public em-
240. Section 2 (2), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2) (1970). Excluded are employees
of any federal, state or local government, employees of nonprofit hospitals, persons
subject to the Railway Labor Act, employees of a labor organization (other than when
acting as an employer) and agents of a labor organization. In addition, it excludes
agricultural workers, domestics, members of the employer's family, independent con-
tractors and supervisors. See NLRA § 2 (3), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1970).
241. Section 9(b) (3), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (3) (1970).
242, Section 9(b) (1), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (b) (1) (1970) states: "[T]he
Board shall not ...decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit
includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees
unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit.
243. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009(4) (a) (1972).
244. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009(5) (a) (1972), lists the following factors:
1. The desires and recommendations of the public employer and public em-
ployees to be represented;
2. The duties, skills, and working conditions of the public employees to be
represented;
3. The geographical location of the public employer or of the public employees
to be represented, or both;
4. The occupational classifications of the public employees to be represented;
5. The extent of organization among the public employees to be represented;
6. The principles of efficient administration of government;
7. The community of interest among the employees to be included in the unit;
8. The organizational structure of the public employer;
9. The history of employee relations within the organization of the public em-
ployer.
245. See note 238 supra.
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ployees to be represented-are unique to public sector bargaining
relationships. The Commission also has the responsibility of "[i]denti-
fy[ing] the public employer or employers for purposes of collective
bargaining with the bargaining agent ...... 248
C. Matters of Collective Bargaining
1. Mechanics of Bargaining.-After an employee organization has
been certified as the collective bargaining representative of employees
in a unit appropriate for bargaining, the bill requires the bargaining
agent and the representative of the employer to "bargain collectively
in the determination of the terms and conditions of employment of
the public employees" in the unity47 In carrying out this duty, "[t]he
public employer . . . and the bargaining agent . . . shall meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith. Any . . . agreement
reached by the negotiators shall be reduced to writing and ... signed
.. .8. ,24The definition of collective bargaining adds the important
caveat that in discharging their obligations "neither party shall be
compelled to agree to a proposal or be required to make a conces-
sion ... "249
The language used to describe the mechanics for implementing
the bargaining relationship is borrowed from the NLRA;250 an ex-
246. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009(4) (b) (1972).
247. Id. § 2-447.011 (1).
248. Id.
249. Id. § 2-447.002(13). The entire subsection reads:
"Collective bargaining" means the performance of the mutual obligations of
the public employer and the bargaining agent of the employee organization to meet
at reasonable times, to confer and negotiate in good faith, and to execute a written
contract with respect to agreements reached concerning the terms and conditions of
employment, except that neither party shall be compelled to agree to a proposal
or be required to make a concession unless otherwise provided in this part.
250. The bargaining requirements of the NLRA are set out in three sections.
NLRA § 8(a) (5), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1970), makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a). NLRA § 8 (b) (3), 61 Stat.
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (3) (1970), imposes a similar obligation on labor
organizations. NLRA § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1970), states in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment . . ..
NLRA § 8 (d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1970), states in part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
1973)
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tensive gloss has accumulated, therefore, to aid in the interpretation
of the NLRA. 2s' As a result the outlines of the collective bargaining
system and the attendant obligations of the parties created by H.R.
3314 are clear in general terms, despite the occasional conundrum that
has emerged in articulating the details of the bargaining relation-
ship. 52 H.R. 3314, therefore, has reproduced a system of bargaining
well used and understood in both the public and private sectors.
The Committee's selection of the collective bargaining model should
be noted as a deliberate choice between competing modes that have
been utilized to regulate public sector bargaining. Other states,"' as
well as the federal government,2 5 4 have developed the "meet and con-
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorpora-
ting any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a con-
cession ....
For an excellent discussion of the reasons which led Congress to enact § 8(d) in 1947,
to define good faith bargaining as not requiring the making of a concession, see NLRB
v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
251. The broad outlines of the system of bargaining that have evolved in the
private sector, and that have been given a quasi-official status as a benchmark for
measuring departures from the statutory bargaining duty, are well marked and need
no elaborate explanation. See Order of R.R. Tellers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342 (1944). The representatives of the parties meet for the first time, usually
at the request of the employees' representative, to discuss a list of "demands" for
improvements in wages and conditions, invariably well in excess of what the employees
will accept in a final settlement. The employer responds with counterproposals, usually
close to the status quo. The remaining meetings are devoted to the trade-offs, exchanges
and haggling over words and sums that characterize the bargaining process. Occasionally,
third party intervention is necessary, either at the request of the parties in the private
sector, or because of statutory requirements in the public sector. Most contracts, how-
ever, are settled peacefully without outside aid both in the public and private sectors.
In the rare instance, the employees will strike to enforce their demands. See generally
A. GOLDMAN, PROCESSES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION: SELF-HELP, VOTING, NEGOTIATION AND
ARBITrATION 62-80 (Labor Relations and Social Problems, Unit 7, 1972); D. WOLLETT &
R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACrICE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS 4:17-23, 6:60-65 (1970).
252. For an insightful study of the evolution of collective bargaining in the United
States, see H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (1968).
253. Under some state laws, the employer clearly has no obligation to engage in
the bilateral negotiations that characterize collective bargaining in the private sector.
See, e.g., NEa. REv. STAT. § 48-836 (1968). Other state statutes use "meet and confer"
language but apparently create an enforceable bargaining obligation. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4328, -4333(b)(7) (1971). A third group of state statutes use "collective
bargaining" language but provide no administrative mechanisms for enforcing a bargain-
ing obligation. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 75-6118, -6125 (1971). The larger
group of state statutes require collective bargaining and provide mechanisms for the
enforcement of the obligation. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 204.1 (McKinney Supp.
1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.701, .1201 (5) (Supp. 1972).
254. See Exec. Order No. 11491, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605 (1969), modified in Exec. Order
No. 11616, 36 Fed. Reg. 17319 (1971). See generally K. HANsLowE, TiH EMERGING LAw
OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUnC EMPLOYMENT (1967). Several critical studies of Exec.
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fer" approach, which permits employees to select an agent to represent
them in conferences in which their views on working conditions are
presented to the employer. The employer is under no obligation to
implement employee suggestions or to bargain over his refusal to
do so.
The "meet and confer" approach finds favor both with those who
feel that the collective bargaining relationship is an inappropriate
model of interaction for the public sector and with those who see it as
a necessary first step before moving to the more mature, but also
more complex, pattern of collective bargaining.15 Arguments can
certainly be made in favor of both types of interaction. The majority
of the states that have adopted comprehensive bargaining models have
opted for the collective bargaining model.256
2. The Structure and Subjects of Bargaining.-The structure and
scope of collective bargaining are interrelated concepts which touch
upon many, if not most of the critical sections of H.R. 3314. The
question of who bargains for what with whom involves a number of
sensitive issues. What is the appropriate unit size for public employees?
Who has the authority to bargain for the public employer concerning
different bargaining subjects? What matters are appropriate for col-
lective bargaining? What relationship does the collective bargaining
agreement have with merit service systems and local ordinances or
laws of state-wide application? And, finally, what subjects intrude on
areas reserved for the employer and are, therefore, inappropriate for
bargaining?
No single section confronts or attempts to resolve all of these issues.
In fact, the several overlapping provisions in H.R. 3314 which deal
with the structure and scope of bargaining leave several important
questions unanswered and offer confused responses to still others. The
defects, however, are not incurable.
a. Structure of Bargaining.-In making its unit determination, the
primary task of the Commission will be to identify that group of
employees with a sufficient community of interest to permit effective
representation by a single bargaining agent. It was previously noted
that a preferred approach to this very important responsibility of the
Order Nos. 10987 and 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 550, 551 (1962), were completed and led to
the reforms enacted in Exec. Order No. 11616, supra. See SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS
LAW, ABA, THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS, PROCEEDINGS 79-85 (1968).
255. See generally ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR-
MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 105-06 (1969).
256. There are six states with "meet and confer" legislation: California, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska and Oregon (teachers). See Goldberg, Changing Policies
in Public Employer Labor Relations, Monthly Labor Rev., July 1970, p. 5.
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Commission would be to create the largest employee units consonant
with their right to be represented by an agent of their choice.257
An equally important function of the Commission in the course
of its unit determination involves identifying the "employer."' 258 The
identification of the public employer for a particular group of em-
ployees involves several problems unique to the public sector. First,
the identification of the employer will often turn on a determination
of the employee unit.2 59 The named employer must be an agency
which has at least some authority over all employee members of the
unit. Consequently, the more inclusive the unit of employees, the
fewer the options left to the Commission in identifying the agency
employer.
The size of the employee unit merely limits or expands the Com-
mission's options. But unlike the private sector determination, the
identification of an appropriate employee unit does not automatically
identify the appropriate employer, since no agency in the public sector
determines the wages, hours and working conditions of any particular
group of state employees. Which agency has power or authority to
bargain over the subjects of collective bargaining-wages, hours and
working conditions-must still be determined. At that point the diffi-
culty of creating viable bargaining relationships in the public sector
becomes acute. Whereas in the private sector the appointed managers
of the corporation would have ultimate control over all items of bar-
gaining, the public sector is characterized by a diffusion of responsi-
bility among various agencies, elected officials and elected bodies for
most of the decisions and allocations that affect public employees.2 60
With respect to state employees, and some municipal employees,
the difficulty of structuring a viable bargaining relationship is further
complicated by the merit service system. The Division of Personnel
257. See note 212 and accompanying text supra.
258. For a general analysis of the problem, see Wellington & Winter, Structuring
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805 (1970).
259. If secretaries in a state law school in Florida petition for union representation,
it would be possible to name as their employer the college of law, the university, the
Board of Regents, the Department of Education, the Cabinet or the State of Florida,
depending on whether they organized by themselves or in conjunction with successively
more inclusive groups of state employees. If the secretaries organize on the college level,
and this unit is deemed appropriate, it would be possible to name the college, uni-
versity, Regents, Department, Cabinet, or the State of Florida as their employer.
260. Again with reference to a state law school, entry wages and hours for various
job classifications are set by the Department of Administration, but working conditions
are determined primarily by the university and college. Annual wage increases are
proposed by the Regents, included by the Governor in his budget message, approved
by the legislature, but influenced by the Department of Administration. Promotion
policies are set by the Department of Administration, administered by the university,
but in the case of individual employees, are implemented by the college.
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and Retirement in the Department of Administration has been author-
ized by the legislature to determine by administrative rule making
the wages, hours and employment conditions of career service em-
ployees.2 61 Most of the items that career service employees would wish
to bargain for, therefore, are not controlled by their immediate em-
ployer. Nor, because of the legislation setting up and regulating the
merit service system, are those items amenable to adjustment through
the processes of traditional collective bargaining techniques. 6 2
In some ways, however, the situation of municipal employers is
even more complicated. Some municipal employees work under a
locally adopted and administered merit service system; 263 the same
problems that occur in the case of career service state employees
similarly complicate matters at the municipal level. In addition, mu-
nicipal employees very often "work for" two separate employers: that
is, two functionally distinct persons or bodies that control in some
way their wages, hours or employment conditions. Deputy sheriffs, for
example, are employed by the sheriff but their wages and hours are
influenced, if not set, by the county commissioners. 264 Teachers em-
ployed by a principal who is responsible to an elected school superin-
tendent and an elected board of public instruction are in a similar
situation.
Another vexing problem in the public sector arises from laws and
ordinances which directly regulate pay, hours or working conditions.
On the state level, such matters as the amount of reimbursement for
official travel expenses are set by statute.26 On the municipal level,
the working hours of firefighters are often regulated by ordinance. 266
The problem of identifying the public employer-the "who" in
the bargaining relationship-cannot be divorced from the even more
important question involving the scope of bargaining-the "what" in
the bargaining relationship. If, for example, a public employer is only
authorized to bargain over wage increases, the public employer can
be identified as that person or institution who decides on the wage
increases of a specified group of employees. If, on the other hand, the
endless items subsumed under the deceptively innocent phrase "wages,
hours and terms or conditions of employment" are proper subjects for
261. FLA. STAT. ch. 110 (1971).
262. See note 340 and accompanying text infra.
263. See, e.g., JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CHARTER LAWS § 27.207 (1970).
264. See Anderson, The Structure of Public Sector Bargaining, in PUBLIC WORKERS
AND PUBLIC UNIONS 37, 49-50 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972); cf. Siegal & Kainen, Political Forces
in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 21 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 581 (1972).
265. FLA. STAT. § 112.061 (6) (1971).
266. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 255, at
260-63.
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bargaining, the task of identification becomes proportionately more
difficult.2 67
The crucial phrase in the few sections directly concerned with
identifying the public employer reads that he must have "sufficient legal
distinctiveness to properly carry out the functions of a public em-
ployer.' ' 268 The phrase is ambiguous: what is "legal distinctiveness"
and what are the "functions" of a public employer? The words can be
more easily understood in terms of the purpose of the definition. The
bill is not concerned with providing scientifically correct, abstract
definitions of "public employer"; rather the point of defining "public
employer" is to help the Commission identify the governmental unit
or division which has the power to negotiate with the employees'
bargaining agent. The phrase "sufficient legal distinctiveness to carry
out the functions of a public employer" should therefore be interpreted
as focusing on the question of whether a given employer unit has
sufficient autonomy in regulating the wages, hours and terms and con-
ditions of employment of the employees to negotiate these matters
with the employees' collective bargaining representative. To name as
the employer-negotiator one who does not have the authority to agree
to proposals, or to execute agreements once they are reached, is de-
structive of the collective bargaining concept.2 69 On the other hand,
it is also damaging to a healthy bargaining relationship to name as
the employer an entity which has the authority to execute the agree-
ment but not the responsibility for administering it. 2 70
As has been previously noted, however, it will be the rare case in
which a single public employer has both the authority to execute all
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement as well as the responsi-
bility for administering them. The Commission's responsibility in
selecting the most appropriate unit or division within the hierarchy of
governmental authority will be to search for the appropriate combina-
tion of practical authority and de facto responsibility. The problems
will have to be worked out on a pragmatic, case-by-case basis.
The Commission should not experience too much difficulty in
finding the appropriate structure in the case of school boards with
appointed superintendents in the smaller municipalities. The school
board will be the employer; negotiations will be carried out by the
board or its representative. Any agreements reached will be binding
on the board without the necessity of "legislative" approval. The
267. Forkosch lists eleven pages of bargainable subjects commonly discussed by
management and labor. M. FoRKOSCH, LABOR LAW § 557, at 856-66 (2d ed. 1965).
268. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.002 (2) (1972).




provisions of the agreement might have to be implemented through
budgetary resolutions requiring approval by a majority of the school
board, but the signing of the agreement would itself constitute the
board's approval of it.271 The negotiations might be carried out by the
board or some of its members, by professional counsel, or by the
appointed superintendent.21l But all of these agents would be repre-
sentatives of the board and their agreements would be binding on it.
The structure of bargaining might be different, however, with
school boards that must deal with elected superintendents 27a or with
271. Although the legal effects of the bargaining arrangement permitted by the
"school board-appointive superintendent system" are simply stated, the practical diffi-
culties of negotiating an agreement with a school board which has both executive and
legislative functions should not be underestimated. See generally Livingston, Collective
Bargaining and the School Board, in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC UNIONS 63 (S. Zagoria
ed. 1972). The school board usually will not appoint a professional negotiator to
,represent it. Id. at 74. But even if it does, the representative will have to check constantly
with the board, which probably meets officially once a week, lest he exceed his authority
in agreeing to certain proposals. The negotiator, therefore, does not have complete
authority to agree to a proposal, and will often find himself negotiating with the
school board as well as with the teachers' organization.
In addition, the school board may be unaware of its public constituency during the
negotiating process; the financing for capital expansion, of course, depends on the
electorate. Public approval of board actions may be required. The available budget
for operating expenses may possibly be expanded or contracted according to the amount
of state aid, often an unknown quantity at the time bargaining must be concluded. See
Anderson, supra note 264, at 49-50. One possible response to these uncertainties would
be to agree conditionally to wage and benefit scales depending on the ultimate revenue
received from external sources.
272. An experienced labor relations practitioner observes that "[i]ncredibly, many
school boards still try to negotiate themselves, or through their regular staff, without
retaining competent and experienced professional labor relations advisors." Livingston,
supra note 271, at 74. Even when school superintendents perform the function, they
are usually little better than the school board members: "While they may be expert at
setting educational policy and operating the school system, superintendents generally
have no experience, background, or knowledge which enables them to cope with the
difficult problem of negotiating with teacher unions." Id.
273. The legal status of the elected superintendent vis-A-vis the school board is
unclear. FLA. STAT. §§ 230.32-33 (1971) set forth the general powers, duties, and
responsibilities of the superintendent. These sections do not distinguish between elected
and appointed superintendents. FLA. STAT. § 230.31 (1971) states that the superintendent
shall be the "executive officer of the school board .... ." FLA. STAT. § 230.321 (1971)
similarly provides that the appointed superintendent "shall be the executive officer of
the school board ....... But even if the elected superintendent is identified as per-
forming ministerial functions much like his appointed counterpart, rather than execu-
tive functions, the problems generated by a system of dual responsibility are not
completely averted:
[T]he superintendent . . . is not completely the school board's man. By statute
in many states he is given a legal independence from the school board, and by
tradition and ethics of his profession, he is expected to exercise that independ-
ence. ...
Even though the superintendent is an employee of the school board and acts
as its agent in the negotiotions, experience has shown that some superintendents
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municipalities that have separately elected mayors and city council-
men. In these cases, bargaining might take place between the "execu-
tive officer"-the superintendent or mayor-with the resultant agree-
ment then dependent on approval and funding by the "legislative
body"--the school board or city council. This bargaining structure
would be especially appropriate when the "executive officer" has the
responsibility for supervising the budget preparation of the various
agencies performing governmental services and for submitting a recom-
mended budget for approval by the legislative body. This structural
description fits state government, of course, so that bargaining between
state employees and agency employers would presumably take place
under the general supervision of the Governor, with recommended
settlements submitted in the form of agency budget requests to the
Governor for transmittal to the legislature.274 The same arrangement
might be appropriate for municipal governments, depending on the
legal duties of the affected municipal officials flowing from the instru-
ment creating the local government.275 It might well be that, although
an official has the title of "executive officer," he acts in an administra-
tive capacity with respect to the legislative body. Before determining
the "employer," therefore, the local law establishing the powers, duties,
and relationships of the elected and appointed officials of the munici-
pality, and the customary interpretations given the law, must be ex-
amined.
The identification of the employer as the legislative body or execu-
tive officer has some important practical as well as legal consequences.
If the legislative body is named as the employer, the resultant structure
will eliminate a step in the bargaining process. Instead of bargaining
with the executive who must then seek approval for and funding of
the agreement from the legislature, the employee organization can
rely on execution of the agreement as legislative approval and
budgetary authorization for any increase involved. On the other hand,
if the agreement is reached with the executive officer, but the legis-
lative body fails to fund his settlement, the bill provides that the
"collective bargaining agreement shall be returned to the chief execu-
do not hesitate to make recommendations that are markedly different from the
bargaining position of their boards.
Livingston, supra note 271, at 73.
274. See FLA. STAT. ch. 216 (1971).
275. A complicated array of local governmental structures exist in Florida. For a
penetrating study of local government in Florida, see STAFF OF FLA. HOUSE COMM. ON




tive officer and the bargaining agent for further negotiations within
the framework of the amount of the funds so appropriated. '" 276
In addition, some agreements might necessitate amendment of
statutory provisions or local ordinances to permit their implementation.
The bill provides that where an agreement does contain provisions
"in conflict with any law ... over which the chief executive officer has
no amendatory power, [he] shall submit to the appropriate govern-
mental body having amendatory power a proposed amendment to
such law ... and until such amendment is enacted .. the conflicting
provision of the collective bargaining agreement shall not become
effective. '" 2 7 7 When an agreement is reached directly with a legislative
body, however, the agreement would imply that any conflicting law
over which the body had amendatory power was impliedly repealed.
If the legislative body agreed to a provision conflicting with local law
and then refused to amend the local law, the Commission would
probably find that the body had not bargained in good faith. 271 To
eliminate the possibility of such problems it might be wise to add a
section such as is contained in the Connecticut bargaining legislation,
which would cause an agreement reached or approved by a legislative
body to override any existing local laws, rules or regulations that may
be contrary to the bargained agreement.27 9
The division of authority between executive and legislative officials
often differentiates patterns of bargaining familiar in the private sector
from bargaining relationships required in the public sector.28 0 Very
often the only commitment that can be made by the public employer
amounts to a promise to recommend increases in wages and benefits.
The named employer will usually be able to direct changes in the non-
monetary employment conditions; but if he is an executive rather than
a legislative entity, he will only be able to request or recommend
monetary improvements to the legislative body responsible for appro-
priations.21 Often those recommendations will be made in ignorance
276. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.011 (5) (1972).
277. Id. § 2-447.011 (3).
278. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain in good
faith. Id. § 2-447.019(1)(c); see note 398 infra.
If the public employer agreed to a proposal in conflict with a law or ordinance
over which the employer had amendatory power, the refusal then to conform the law
to the provisions of the agreement would be persuasive evidence that the employer had
not acted in good faith when it signed the agreement. But if the Commission did find
that the employer violated the good faith requirement, its power effectively to remedy
the violation is dubious. See note 399 infra.
279. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474 (f) (1972).
280. See generally Anderson, supra note 264, at 42-46.
281. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 216.162 (1971).
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of the total budget the employer will be working with, and with little
or no idea of the other budgetary requests and revenue expectations
being submitted to the legislative body.
Bargaining on these terms would seem at best a difficult experi-
ence and at worst a frustrating and unproductive exercise. Actual
bargaining, however, probably does not respect the neat orderings and
vertical relationships ordained by laws and ordinances. More likely,
demands are made and commitments undertaken in reliance on both
the past performance of the legislature and readings of its future
allocations. Key legislators and staff members may even be involved
in discussions between employee agents and executive officials. 2 2 In
addition, the bargaining often does not stop with the executive's recom-
mendation. If an impasse occurs, the board of fact finders, employer,
and employee organization are permitted to make formal recommenda-
tions to the legislature with respect to a proposed contract settlement.23
Even if an impasse is avoided, nothing can prevent employee agents
from attempting to improve on the recommended settlement by lobby-
ing the legislature; and nothing can prevent an executive from lobby-
ing against the implementation of the proposed settlement. 
2 4
b. Subjects of Bargaining.-Once the public employer is identified
and the parties enter the bargaining room, what subjects can they
bargain about? What items must the bargaining agent and the employer
discuss to discharge their duty to bargain in good faith? What topics
can the employer refuse to lay on the table for discussion?
The Florida bill is quite conservative both in the explicit and
implicit limitations it places on the scope of bargaining. One explicit
limitation forbidding provisions relating to federally or state-created
rights2 5 would apparently forbid a clause, very common in collective
bargaining agreements, extending recognition to the certified employee
organization; 2 6 or one containing a statement that neither the employer
nor the employee organization would engage in racial or sexual dis-
282. "The Wisconsin State Legislature has fixed the employers' bargaining responsi-
bility for state employees in the executive; but in practice the Joint Committee on
Finance of the legislature has played a significant role in the bargaining process by
maintaining very close liaison with the executive office bargainers and influencing the
terms of the settlement." Anderson, supra note 264, at 43.
283. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.015 (3) (1972).
284. See Anderson, supra note 264, at 44. The author refers to the practice as
"double-deck" or "end-run" bargaining.
285. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 447.013 (1972). This section did not appear in the earlier
versions of Fla. H.R. 3314, such as Fla. H.R. 113 or Fla. H.R. 2556. See note 64 supra.
286. Since Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009 (1972), requires recognition of a certified
employee organization, the recognition clause would "relate to" a state-created right.
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crimination; 287 or even a clause that guaranteed the parties' observance
of Florida's right-to-work provision.288 All of these clauses "relate to"
obligations created by state law. Similarly prohibited would be a
guarantee by the employee organization to respect the employer's
statutory rights. 2 9
The apparent intent of the draftsmen was to ensure that constitu-
tional and statutory rights of employees and employers are not nullified
by private agreements in collective bargaining contracts. The language
can be changed to capture that intent more accurately, 20 but even
with the change many aspects of the section remain troublesome. For
example, the point of the proscription against contract interference
with federal or state rights is unclear. Certainly, if the contractual
provisions interfere with third parties' rights, they would be in viola-
tion of existing law, which would presumably include ample remedies
for its violation. In addition, an insistence by one party on bargaining
over illegal subjects would undoubtedly be characterized by the Com-
mission as a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith.291 The sub-
section therefore appears unnecessary, but is vague enough to cause
substantial mischief. It should be deleted from the section.
The prohibition of contract interference with employer and em-
ployee rights is the logical expression of a premise implied in the
sections creating the substantive rights: if the bill provides what are
seen as needed protective rights for the parties to the collective bargain-
ing relationship, these should not be treated as trade-off items in the
bargaining room.292 The major problems do not exist with the rights
accorded employees, but with the extensive series of prerogatives
287. Racial and sexual discrimination in employment practices of any state agency,
board, commission, department, or officer is prohibited by FLA. STAT. § 112.041 (1971).
288. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
289. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.013 (iii) (1972), prohibits contractual provisions relating
to "public employer rights defined in . . . this act .... ." A provision guaranteeing
observance of those rights would "relate to" them and consequently be prohibited.
290. The critical clause of the section now reads: "[E]xcept, however, that the
scope of a written agreement shall not include provisions relating to .... ." Fla. H.R.
3314, § 2-447.013 (1972). It should be amended to read: "Provided that no provision
in a written agreement may be interpreted or implemented in such a way as to limit
or infringe ...."
291. The NLRB has characterized the insistence on bargaining over illegal subjects
by either the employer or a labor organization as a violation of the duty to bargain
in good faith. See, e.g., National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 980-82 (1948),
enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950).
292. Where, for example, the legislature has expressed the judgment that em-
ployees should be permitted to join labor organizations of their own choosing, the
employer and bargaining agent should not be permitted to nullify that right by an
agreement which limits employees to joining only the employee organization certified
as the bargaining representative.
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awarded to public employers293 which are translated by the bill into
limitations on the scope of bargainable subjects." ' The effect is to
reproduce in the bill a most elastic version of the traditional "em-
ployer's prerogatives" clause295 which, in the private sector, the em-
ployer must secure by bargaining.2 96 Since the intent of this section
is probably to protect the public from the diminution in public serv-
ices that might result from a weak or ineffectual employer-bargainer,
rather than to accord the employer disproportionate bargaining power,
the subsection is defensible. But it has the unfortunate effect of de-
termining for all public employers and all public employees those
items appropriate for bargaining in their particular situation. The
American system of collective bargaining, however, assumes that the
parties themselves can best decide what is appropriate for discussion;2 1T
since H.R. 3314 does not require the employer or bargaining agent to
accede to a request or demand, what harm results from allowing a topic
to be discussed? In fact, foreclosing certain issues from the cathartic
effect of bargaining may well result in their eruption into crises, at
which point they become least susceptible to a reasoned analysis.
Especially in public sector bargaining, in which public employees are
denied the use of strikes or other economic weapons, Florida should
follow the example of other states that have enacted comprehensive
bargaining legislation and allow the widest latitude in the scope of
bargaining2 98s
293. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.005 (1972), states:
It is the right of the public employer to determine the purpose of each of its
constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and
exercise control and discretion over its organization and operations. It is also the
right of the public employer to direct its employees, take disciplinary action for
proper cause, relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or for
other legitimate reasons, and determine the methods, means, and personnel by
which the employer's operations are to be conducted; provided, however, that the
exercise of such rights does not preclude employees or their representatives from
conferring or raising grievances about the practical consequences that decisions
on these matters may have on terms and conditions of employment.
294. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.013 (1972), forbids a contractual provision relating
to public employer rights defined in § 2-447.005 of the bill.
295. See M. Fopaoscu, supra note 267, at 866-67.
296. Id. at 854.
297. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 252, at 49-90.
298. The suggested change in Fla. H.R. 3314 can be accomplished in one of four
ways. First, Fla. H.R. 3314, § § 2-447.005 and 2-447.013 (iii), could be struck in their
entirety. Secondly, § 2-447.013 (iii) should be amended to protect agreements from in-
validation where public employers elect to bargain over issues which are arguably
within their unilateral control by virtue of § 2-447.005. Thirdly, a minimal effort to
avoid some portion of the problems provoked by § 2-447.013 (iii) would involve tightening
the very loose language used to describe an employer's prerogatives in § 2-447.005.
Vague phrases which grant the exclusive right to an employer to "exercise control and
discretion over its organization," "to direct its employees," and to "determine the
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The bill also prohibits bargaining over provisions involving "the
authority and power of any civil service commission . . .established
by constitutional provision, statute or charter."2 "9 This provision has
the advantage of at least giving a definite answer to a difficult question.
The question is whether collective bargaining agreements should take
precedence over pre-existing civil service systems when both attempt
to regulate the same detail of the employment relationship. H.R. 3314's
response is clearly "no." Other states which have encountered the same
problem have often resolved the inevitable conflict between collective
bargaining and civil service by ignoring it.30° The resultant litigation
ends up before judges who have little or no guidance from the legis-
lature.3 0 1 Their responses have, as a result, been varied and con-
fused.3 02
The argument supporting an assigned priority to collective agree-
ments over civil service regulations points out that the most important
items in bargaining are controlled by civil service rules; the exemption
of these items from the bargaining process would leave the parties
with little of substance to negotiate. °3 Consequently, the civil service
regulations should be used only to regulate employees not covered by
a bargaining agreement and to fill in the interstices in negotiated
agreements.
The obvious rejoinder, which will be developed more fully in a
methods, means, and personnel by which the employer's operations are to be con-
ducted," will produce more litigation than protection for the public.
A fourth possibility is to indicate that an employer should "consult with" or "meet
and confer" with the employees' representative on any major decision affecting employees
even though the decision is a prerogative of management. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.702 (Supp. 1972), which states:
Public employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent
managerial policy . . . . Public employers, however, shall be required to meet
and discuss on policy matters affecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment as well as the impact thereon upon request by public employee
representatives.
In addition see HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-9(c) (Supp. 1971), which provides in part:
"The employer shall make every reasonable effort to consult with the exclusive repre-
sentatives prior to effecting changes in any major policy affecting employee relations."
For a strongly worded view opposing an expanded scope of bargaining in the
public sector, see Wellington & Winter, supra note 258, at 852-70. For the view of an
experienced practitioner in favor of expansion, see Wollett, "The Bargaining Process in
the Public Sector: What Is Bargainable?", 51 ORE. L. REV. 177, 178 (1971).
299. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.013 (iv) (1972).
300. See Note, The Civil Service-Collective Bargaining Conflict in the Public Sector:
Attempts at Reconciliation, 38 U. Cut. L. REV. 826-30 (1971).
301. Id. at 830.
302. Id. at 830-41.
303. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 255, at
76-78.
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subsequent section, °3 0 argues that the piecemeal and unregulated re-
peal of the civil service system will create confusion. The complete
repeal of the civil service system is of course out of the question for a
state such as Florida just commencing the bargaining model, and will
not be a serious possibility until most employees traditionally covered
by civil service are under collective bargaining contracts. More to the
point perhaps, a civil service system seems to be required by the
Florida constitution.3 0 5
Several pragmatic responses, which both respect the civil service
system and at the same time seek to maximize the scope of bargaining,
have been suggested by practices in other collective bargaining systems.
The first is to name the Division of Personnel and Retirement as the
"joint employer" along with the agency employer for all state em-
ployees covered by the career service system.30 6 That arrangement,
possible under H.R. 3314 30 7 would allow the employee organization
to negotiate changes in civil service regulations affecting employees it
is representing; but the Division of Personnel would then be forced
to negotiate with one group of employee organizations changes in
regulations that might well affect all employees in the state.
One variation on that approach would require that negotiations
with the Division of Personnel only take place with an employee
organization which represented a majority of those employees covered
by the civil service regulation.30 A second variation would permit
coalition bargaining between the regulators of career service and all
the employee organizations representing employees in the career service
system.
These developments must await the sharper focus that results from
the maturation of a collective bargaining system. It would be precipi-
tate for Florida to tamper with a generally satisfactory civil service
system before it gains some experience with the collective bargaining
model.
3. Procedures of Impasse Resolution.-The sections outlining the
procedures to be used in the event of a bargaining impasse between a
public employer and employee organization attempt to resolve what
many critics have diagnosed as the fatal flaw in public sector bargaining
legislation: employee organizations have no right to strike, and with-
out the right to strike, meaningful collective bargaining cannot take
304. See p. 104 infra.
305. See FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 14.
306. See Anderson, supra note 264, at 42-46.
307. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009 (4) (b) (1972), empowers the Commission to "[i]dentify
the public employer or employers for purposes of collective bargaining ..
308. See Anderson, supra note 264, at 42.
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place.309 In substitution for the right to strike, completely prohibited
by the bill,3 10 the drafters have prescribed two types of third-party
intervention-mediation 3l" and fact finding312-at least to make it
more likely that differences will be resolved equitably despite the
employees' lack of economic weapons.
The system of third-party intervention proposed by the bill has
serious technical deficiencies. The first of these involves the time frame
envisioned by the bill. The drawbacks can best be illustrated in terms
of the budgeting procedure used by state agencies. The fiscal year in
Florida begins July 1 and ends the following June 30.313 The law re-
quires each state agency to submit an annual budget to the Governor
no later than November 1 each year.3 14 The budget must contain an
itemized list of proposed expenditures, categorized by prescribed ap-
propriations categories. 15 The Governor is empowered to hold hearings
on the budget requests of the various agencies; 316 the budgets, at the
same time, go through a rigorous analysis by the Department of Ad-
ministration." 7 Thirty days before the commencement of the regular
legislative session, the Governor is required to submit a copy of the
recommended budget of each state agency "based on his own con-
clusions and judgment." 31s The entire budget is formally submitted
to the legislature in the Governor's budget message. At that point the
political process takes control and the legislature grinds out the ulti-
mate appropriations act by a process of analysis, debate, and compro-
mise.
For purposes of analyzing H.R. 3314, it is important to note that
departments must have their budget requests completed by November
1 of the year preceding their operations. According to the bill, bargain-
309. One union official, for example, has maintained that true collective bargaining
does not take place where the law provides for unilateral determination in the event
of an impasse. Gotbaum, Finality in Collective Bargaining Disputes: The New York
Experience, 21 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 589, 590-91 (1972). According to the definition, only
a few state statutes would qualify as collective bargaining models. See note 419 infra.
310. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.021 (1972); see also § 2-447.001 (5), .019(2) (e).
311. Fla. H.R. 3314, 2-447.014(1)-(2) (1972). For an explanation of the mediation
process, see A. GOLDMAN, PROCESSES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION: SELF-HELP, VOTING,
NEGOTIATION, AND ARBITRATION 86-89 (Labor Relations and Social Problems, Unit Seven,
1972).
312. Fla. H.R. 3314, §§ 2-447.014(3), .015-.018 (1972). For a description of the
varieties of arbitration processes, see M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1-3
(1968).
313. FLA. STAT. § 216.011 (g) (1971).
314. Id. § 216.023.
315. Id. § 216.031.
316. Id. § 216.131.
317. Id. § 216.121.
318. Id. § 216.162(1).
19731
Florida State University Law Review
ing must begin at least sixty days before the budget submission date
to allow time for the impasse resolution procedures, 19 but more
realistically it should begin at least two months before the sixty-day
period to allow ample time for bargaining and the inclusion of the
agreed-upon provisions in the budget request. In other words, bargain-
ing for an agreement which will take effect in July 1973 must begin
by July 1, 1972-one year in advance.
Even if the parties were prepared to bargain one year in advance,
that period of time might not be sufficient under the bill. Although
only sixty days are allotted for the completion of the mediation pro-
cess, it would be possible to stay within the time limitations allotted
to each step of the procedure and consume from 103 to 110 days in the
mediation and fact-finding process.3 20 If that amount of time is con-
sidered necessary, therefore, the parties should begin their bargaining
for the 1973 fiscal year in May of 1972.
The implications are obvious. Too much time has been allotted
for the impasse resolution procedures. Even if the present schedule of
steps is retained, the time allocated to each step should be reduced,
the procedures streamlined to avoid delay, and the parties forced to
settle or withdraw from negotiations within a reasonable period.
Before reducing the time period for the two-phase system, the
legislative draftsmen should seriously consider whether the two steps
are necessary or even desirable. The system was adapted from similar
systems in the Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and New York collective
bargaining statutes. The two-phase system was implemented in those
states primarily because the statutes prohibit the employees from
striking.3 21 No economic sanctions are available to employees, there-
fore, to deal with employer obstinacy or unfairness. In substitution
for the strike action, the legislature permitted, and under certain
circumstances required, third-party interventions. The presence of an
impartial third party would presumably contribute to, if not ensure,
a fair compromise settlement.
Why did the statutes prescribe a two-step intervention? At least
one theory of collective bargaining contends that a collective bargain-
ing settlement which the parties manage to work out themselves is
immeasurably preferable to a settlement imposed on them by a
stranger. 22 Since the parties must live with the agreement and imple-
319. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.014(1) (1972).
320. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.014 (1972). The figure includes reasonable allowances
for mailed notices to the parties, mediators, and fact finders, and for their responses.
321. See generally ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR-
MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 106-07 (Sept. 1969).
322. See Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law,
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ment its provisions, their feeling of responsibility for it is essential to
its effective operation. If neither party feels a degree of responsibility
for the final agreement, either or both could sabotage it by poor ad-
ministration of key provisions. Consequently, the mediator is seen as
a necessary party to attempt to bring the parties together in a volun-
tary settlement.
But if mediation fails, the next step requires the appointment of
fact finders to gather the data needed by the legislative body to make
the "fair" decision for which the legislature is responsible in the
absence of a voluntary agreement. The fact finder in this sense merely
performs a service that could as well be performed by a legislative
committee. But the fact finder, as is evident from H.R. 3314, is also
part of the mediation process. His findings of fact and recommenda-
tions should push the parties to a voluntary settlement.. 2
Although voluntary settlements are undoubtedly preferable to
solutions imposed by strangers to the agreement, and while the medi-
ator and fact finder play some role in facilitating compromise, several
questions should be raised about the two-phase technique before it is
adopted. First, if compromise by the immediate parties is essential to
a workable agreement, then party solution should be the preferred
mode of devising a technique for impasse resolution as well as for
devising a workable contract. Under H.R. 3314, however, the parties
must use the two-step procedure; yet they might be able to agree to
what is for them a better method for resolving impasses. The bill
should be concerned with outlining the general processes for settling
disputes; but the exact details of the process can as well be left to
the parties as to inflexible statutory provisions .3 2  If the parties are
unable to reach agreement on how to settle their disputes, the state,
in pursuance of its legitimate interest in avoiding the interruption of
governmental services and the frequent crises that accompany public
employee strikes, should, at the point the impasse occurs, impose state-
administered techniques for resolving the disputes.
3 25
39 MICH. L. REv. 1065, 1106-08 (1941); H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
54-55 (1968).
323. Thus, Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.015 (1972), provides that a copy of the report
fof the board of fact finders is sent to the parties prior to its submission to the legislative
body to permit further negotiation based on the report.
324. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAW § 209(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972), which provides:
Public employers are hereby empowered to enter into written agreements with
recognized or certified employee organizations setting forth procedures to be in-
voked in the event of disputes which reach an impasse in the course of collective
negotiations. Such agreements may include the undertaking by each party to
submit unresolved issues to impartial arbitration.
325. N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAw § 209(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972) continues: "In the
absence or upon the failure of such procedures, public employers and employee organi-
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For some occasions, therefore, a prescribed formula under the
control of the Commission will be necessary. But whether the impasse
resolution procedures are used only on the occasion of the parties'
default in working out private arrangements, or whether the procedure
is retained in its present form as the required technique for the resolu-
tion of all impasses, changes could be made to make the procedure
less costly, cumbersome and time-consuming.
The most important change would involve the elimination of the
state-appointed mediator.326 Mediation works best when the parties
themselves decide that a neutral third party might contribute to the
resolution of their dispute. A mediator can only function effectively
when he has the trust of both parties. 27 But a mediator who is un-
invited, unknown, and perhaps unwanted by either party, would find
it difficult to establish that rapport with the disputants which he must
create to bring them together. Even if mediators were occasionally
successful in working under these conditions, other potentially serious
disadvantages inhere in coerced mediation.
First, the expense involved, especially when added to the other
costs of municipal government, could work a severe strain on the
budgets of smaller municipal governments s.3 2
Secondly, some experienced observers of the bargaining process
believe that the prospect of third-party interventions actually dis-
courages effective bargaining329 Instead of viewing the negotiations
as the final step prior to the execution of an agreement, the parties
are tempted to regard bargaining as the first in a long series of steps
that usually culminate in a settlement mandated by a legislative body
in an atmosphere of crisis.3 3 0 The risks are few: if one cannot persuade
his opponent across the negotiating table to accept a low (or in the
case of the bargaining agent, a high) offer, perhaps one can persuade
zations may request the board to render assistance as provided in this section, or the
board may render such assistance on its own motion ....
326. See Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.014(1) (1972). This section provides for mediation
when impasse is reached.
327. See Simkin, The Third Seat at the Bargaining Table: A Government Point
of View, 14 LAB. L.J. 5, 7 (1963). Simkin states: "[N]o mediator will be successful in
such [mediation] endeavors unless he has been able to obtain the confidence of both
parties, has a broad over-all grasp of the facts and the needs of both parties and has
the requisite ability to make suggestions that have merit."
328. For a breakdown of costs in various sections of the country, see R. FLEMING,
THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROC 31-55 (1965).
329. See generally H. NORTHRUP, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTER-
VENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES 179-84 (1966).
330. See Zack, Impasses, Strikes and Resolutions, in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC
UNIONS 101, 112 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972). See also Raskin, Politics Up-Ends the Bargaining
Table, id. at 122, for illustration of this tendency as it appeared in New York.
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the mediator to intervene in the bargaining on his behalf. If the
mediator does not succeed in helping, perhaps the fact finder will;
even if one fails to convince the fact finder, one might be able to
persuade the legislature of the legitimacy of the demands. The intransi-
gent party is rarely penalized for refusing to compromise on a reason-
able basis. He is as often rewarded and reinforced for the very behavior
that sabotages meaningful bargaining. 33
The elimination of mediation as a required step, together with
some adjustments in the fact-finding process, might at least remove
an inducement to the parties to forego good faith bargaining or to
use it as a mere prelude to the serious negotiations that take place
during the mediation and fact-finding processes.
The rejection of mediation as a necessary step in impasse resolution
does not mean that mediation has no part to play in public sector
bargaining. On the contrary, a skillful mediator can be of invaluable
assistance in the bargaining process. But his assistance should be re-
quested by the parties, he should be acceptable to, and preferably
known by, both parties, and he should be part of the bargaining pro-
cess, rather than an appendage to it.
Should mediation be deleted from the bill, logic would hardly
dictate the same fate for fact finding. Fact finding should be retained.
While it is true that fact finding has many of the disadvantages
characteristic of mediation-both are costly and time-consuming, and
both in varying degrees postpone serious bargaining-fact finding
appears to be the best of the several options available to resolve an
impasse in the public sector.3 3 2
Fact finding is not the perfect answer to the problem of the bar-
gaining impasse, but it provides some check on the employer while
at the same time avoiding a direct collision with the concept of private
331. Id.
332. The strike option is constitutionally prohibited and outside the realm of
political possibility in Florida. Mediation, apart from its other faults, is inconclusive;
if it does not work, there must be another, stronger step to a final resolution. Some
innovative techniques have recently been suggested, including the nonstop strike and
graduated work stoppage. See, e.g., Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor
Relations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 459 (1971). But both should be tried on a limited basis
in a controlled situation before being used on a state-wide basis.
Consequently, if the legislature wants genuine bargaining between an employer and
bargaining agent rather than mere meetings and conferences between an employer and
some of his employees, then something has to be substituted for the strike. Otherwise
nothing but his good will would prevent the employer from going through the
motions of bargaining, then simply imposing his own contract on the employee organi-
zation at the conclusion of the bargaining process.
Florida State University Law Review
negotiations 3s3 But fact finding as envisioned by H.R. 3314 334 is not
without its problems.
The bill provides that the public employer and employee organi-
zation shall each appoint one member of the three-man board of fact
finders, with the third to be agreed upon by the public employer and
bargaining agent.3 35 The bill goes on to state, somewhat inconsistently,
that "the third fact finder shall be selected by the previously appointed
members in accordance with the rules of the . . .Commission. ' 3 36
The first task, therefore, is to decide whether to have the parties or
their representatives on the board select the third fact finder. For
obvious reasons the selection should be by the parties under the rules
of the Commission.3
7
A more basic objection involves the use of a tripartite board.
There is little purpose in allowing the parties to appoint two members
of the board. Their votes will be predetermined, their positions dic-
tated by their principals, and their role that of an adversary repre-
sentative, not an impartial fact finder. Either the bill should provide
for a board of three genuinely impartial fact finders or require the
parties to select one under the rules of the Commission. The adver-
saries can then present their cases to the fact finder when standing in
front of him rather than while sitting beside him.
D. Administration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
1. Relationship of the Collective Bargaining Agreement to Civil
Service Systems.-One of the recurrent amendments during the com-
mittee and floor debates concerned the relationship between the merit
service system and the proposed collective bargaining mode.3 s8 The
amendment took various forms but it essentially reflected a feeling
that public employees should not have the benefit and security of a
civil service system once they opt for a collective bargaining relation-
ship. In effect, then, the amendment would have removed from the
merit system either an entire unit of employees if a majority of the
unit voted for representation, or at least those employees in the unit
who chose to have their employment rights determined by a collective
bargaining contract rather than by the rules and regulations of a
personnel board.
333. See Zack, supra note 330, at 116.
334. See Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.014 (3) (b) (1972).
335. Id.
336. Id. (emphasis added).
337. This will eliminate one step and an occasion for delay since the principals
will determine their agents' choice in any event.
338. This relationship is presently embodied in Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.024 (1972).
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The suggested amendment reflects very accurately what has long
been an established attitude toward the benefits and burdens impliedly
assumed by the public employee. In exchange for a mediocre but
guaranteed wage, comparatively liberal fringe benefits (including
medical insurance), at least two weeks of paid vacation time, the
usual holidays, a pension at half pay after twenty years, and un-
demanding job performance requirements, the public employee was
expected to give up his usual right to engage in partisan political
activity, to demand wages on a parity with the private sector, and to
join a union for the purpose of collective bargaining.3  To retain
the merit service system in conjunction with a collective bargaining
scheme would mean that the public employee union could rely on
the benefits required by civil service rules and regulations as a secure
base for further bargaining. Reductions in benefits could not be pro-
posed by the employer because of the minima required by the rules.
But across-the-board increases built on the floor set by merit service
regulations could and obviously would be demanded by the collective
bargaining representatives.
This attitude toward the quid pro quo of public employment is
not without a foundation in reality. The salary of a public employee,
while low, is assured;3 40 it does not depend on the vagaries of product
performance, competitors' forays and market conditions. The fringe
benefits are also usually on a par with or slightly better than those
available for similar work in the private sector. 341 Most state employees
and those municipal employees who are covered by a civil service
system have very strong statutory protections against arbitrary dis-
missals.3 42 In addition, the public employer's inability to reduce dur-
ing negotiations previously accorded wages and benefits probably
would provide a more secure base for further demands by the public
employee unions.
Whatever the real or imagined justification for the traditional
restrictions on public employees' bargaining rights, those restrictions
are no longer regarded as functionally appropriate by large numbers
of public employees.3 43 Since that attitude is also apparently prevalent
among public employee groups in Florida, should the legislature con-
339. See Macy, The Role of Bargaining in the Public Service, in PUBLIC WORKa
AND PUBLIC UNIONS 5, 7-8 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
340. See FLA. STAT. § 110.022(1)(b) (1971).
341. Cf. Macy, supra note 339, at 9.
342. See FLA. STAT. § 110.061 (1971), where procedures for suspensions, dismissals,
reductions in pay, demotions, layoffs, and transfers are provided.
343. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 321, at
78; Note, The Civil Service-Collective Bargaining Conflict in the Public Sector:
Attempts at Reconciliation, 38 U. Cn. L. Rv. 826-27 (1971).
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sider removing merit service protections for those public employees
who choose collective bargaining as a way of securing job benefits
and security?
Aside from the practical difficulties involved in implementing the
suggestion, the proposed amendment reflects a partial but serious mis-
understanding of the function of a merit service system. It reflects
also a refusal to acknowledge current economic realities. Merit service
systems do indeed provide protections for public employees, but these
protections are merely means of achieving certain important social
and political goals. To ensure that public employment positions are
not regarded as the spoils of a victorious political campaign, hiring is
based on competitive examinations and demonstrated ability. Similarly,
termination must be for provable cause, not only to provide job
security for individuals but to ensure the survival of a competent work
force during the changeover of elected officials.
3 44
The elimination of groups of employees from the civil service
system, and the consequent elimination of fixed wages and benefits,
might place the state employer in a more advantageous bargaining
position with the bargaining agent. As in the private sector, the state
could respond to employee demands by proposing reductions in cur-
rent wages and benefits. The state as employer would not have to
follow a formal procedure to accomplish reductions in wages and
benefits when state revenue had fallen short of expectations. Like
their counterparts in the private sector, public employees would be
faced with the prospect of losing as well as gaining at the bargaining
table. But in exchange for a tactical advantage at the bargaining
table, the public employer would surrender features of the civil service
system-such as merit hiring and promotion by examination-that
have long been thought essential for an efficient bureaucracy?45 If
the private sector experience provides a reliable guide, it would not
be surprising to find that the demise of the civil service system resulted
in the unions' eventually assuming considerable control of hiring and
promotion functions "6
But the suggested solution to the civil service-collective bargaining
entanglement remains faulty and perhaps unworkable for a number
of related reasons. The proposed elimination of civil service status
would be difficult to implement and administer. Which employees
would lose their civil service status, and at what point in time and for
what purposes? Since the employees in a predetermined election unit
344. See K. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOY-
MENT 7 (1967).
345. Macy, supra note 339, at 9.
346. G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 227-43 (5th ed. 1965).
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might reject representation, these employees certainly could not be
removed from the civil service system prior to their voting in the
representation election. Would the removal occur after a vote by a
majority approving representation? If so, would all employees in the
unit be excluded or only those who voted for the union? If all the
employees were excluded, then forty-nine per cent of the employees
could lose what they might regard as valuable rights and protections
because of the vote of the majority. If only those employees who voted
for the union were excluded, how could they be identified? A repre-
sentation election is a secret ballot election. Even if they could be
identified, would it be at all feasible to have some employees in an
office working under civil service rules and regulations and some under
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement?
Another possible approach might allow the employees to opt for
the collective agreement after the contract is negotiated so that a
comparison could be made between its advantages and the existing
civil service system benefits. But that is obviously unworkable. Be-
sides not giving the employer the position he seeks at the bargaining
table, it means the employee organization would never settle for a
package of benefits unless it was superior to those available under
civil service.
2. Analysis of Grievance Procedure.-During the life of any com-
plex agreement, disagreements invariably arise with respect to the
meaning of a given phrase or the applicability of a contract section to
a specific situation. Collective bargaining agreements, among the most
complex in content and function of all contracts, provoke their share
of disputes. These can be handled in several ways: through economic
warfare, which benefits neither party, and which has been largely re-
jected by modern labor organizations; through breach-of-contract ac-
tions in state or federal court, a time-consuming, expensive and in-
efficient method of settling what are often disputes of minor conse-
quence except to the one or two employees involved; or through
grievance and arbitration procedures negotiated and included in the
collective bargaining agreement.
Most collective agreements in the private sector contain a four-or
five-step grievance procedure, culminating in binding arbitration, to
handle contract disputes.3 7 The inevitable companion of the em-
347. For the form and text of a commonly used grievance and arbitration clause,
see R. KNEE & R. KNEE, JR., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CLAUSES 61 (1969). See also D.
WOLLETr & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS 3:24 (1970).
For a practical guide to the conduct of a grievance through the various steps to binding
arbitration, see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 79-172 (1960).
The literature of grievance arbitration is vast. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 440
n.2 (C. Morris ed. 1971), for a complete reference to bibliographic materials.
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ployer's agreement to arbitrate disputes is the bargaining representa-
tive's agreement not to strike during the life of the agreement." 8
Agreements to arbitrate are specifically enforceable under federal
law349 and violations on the part of the employer s" or the union can
be enjoined.351 Money damages are also obtainable to remedy the
breach of such agreements.
H.R. 3314 specifically empowers all public employers to establish
a grievance procedure "to be used for the settlement of disputes be-
tween the employer and employee or group of employees."3 52 The bill
goes on to state, however, that when an employee organization is
certified, the grievance procedures then in existence may be the sub-
ject of bargaining;313 any procedure negotiated during bargaining
"shall supersede" the previous procedures.3 5 4
The employee is not restricted to the grievance procedure to
voice his complaints. The bill allows him to present his own griev-
ances to his employer, either in person or through legal counsel. This
right is subject to the proviso, first, that the resolution of the griev-
ance is not inconsistent with the collective agreement and, secondly,
that the bargaining agent "has been given reasonable opportunity to
be present at any meeting called for the resolution of such griev-
ances."355 In addition, a career service employee has the option of
utilizing the civil service appeal procedure. 59
The bill is replete with ambiguities and interpretive problems,
some of them avoidable, but most of them inherent features of any
348. Although a union is not required to agree to a "no-strike" clause in exchange
for the arbitration agreement, management will usually insist on that exchange. In
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957), the Court noted
that "the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agree-
ment not to strike."
349. Id.
350. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
351. Boys Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
352. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.012 (1972). The bill empowers all public employers,
"including one whose employees are not represented by a . . . bargaining agent," to
establish grievance procedures. The Department of Administration had already been
authorized by the legislature to create grievance machinery for classified state employees.
See FLA. STAT. § 110.061 (2) (a) (1971).
353. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.012 (1972).
354. Id.
355. Id. § 2-447.006(3).
356. Id. § 2-447.012. This section, however, prohibits the use of both procedures,
so the employee must choose one or the other. The grievance procedure authorized
by FLA. STAT. § 110.022(1)(e) (1971) is contained in Personnel Rules and Regulations
of the Career Service System, Florida Department of Administration, Division of
Personnel and Retirement, ch. 22A-10 (July 14, 1970).
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grievance and arbitration system. The major problems revolve around
four issues: (a) the rights, if any, of minority labor organizations; (b)
the extent of the right accorded employees to process individual griev-
ances; (c) the relationship of the grievance procedure to the tradi-
tional civil service system; and (d) the impact of binding arbitration
on traditional employer prerogatives.
a. Minority Unions.-The directives of the bill providing for ex-
clusive representation will hopefully foreclose the development of
grievance representation by minority labor organizations.3 7 That prob-
lem has arisen in a few states 58 where, because of the absence of
provisions or because of ambiguous statutory language, labor organiza-
tions other than the certified representative have attempted to repre-
sent aggrieved employees.3 59 The desire of the minority union to
handle employee members' grievances might well be altruistic. But
the more likely explanation is that the minority union sees grievance
representation as an opportunity for demonstrating its effectiveness
to unit employees in preparation for an election challenge against
the majority union. Grievance representation also provides an oppor-
tunity for performing the kinds of services the employee will expect
in exchange for his dues.
The disadvantages of minority union representation are several.
First, the grievance procedure itself could easily become the focus
of union political disputes rather than the mechanism through which
employer-employee disputes are peacefully and equitably resolved. 3 °
An organization seeking to create a political image or to impress
357. A minority labor organization is one to which less than a majority of employees
in a unit appropriate for bargaining belong. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.009 (1) (1972),
provides: "the commission shall immediately certify the employee organization as the
exclusive representative of all employees in the unit."
358. For a list of those states, with statutory references, see Note, The Privilege of
Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in Public Employment, 55 CORNELL
L. REV. 1004, 1017, n.70 (1970). New York's Taylor Law is an example of such a statute.
N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 200 (McKinney Supp. 1972). Subsection 1 (a) of § 208 states that a
public employer shall extend to a certified or recognized employee organization the
right "to represent the employees in negotiations . . . and in the settlement of griev-
ances .... ." It does not confer on the recognized or certified organization a right to
be the exclusive representative. For a criticism of this feature of the Taylor Law, see
Kheel, The Taylor Law: A Critical Examination of Its Virtues and Defects, 20 SYRAcusE
L. REv. 181, 182-83 (1968).
359. See, e.g., New Haven Fed'n of Teachers v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 27 Conn.
Supp. 298, 237 A.2d 373 (Super. Ct. 1967). The issue in this case was the extent of an
individual's right to process grievances independent of the bargaining agent. Presum-
ably the right of a minority union to process and present grievances would be no
greater than the right of an individual to do so.
360. See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 186 (2d
Cir. 1962); Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in
Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L, REV. 1004, 1021 (1970). Professor Cox, borrowing
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employees with its aggressiveness is often more concerned with seizing
issues for those purposes rather than with fairly resolving employee
complaints. Grievances, therefore, could easily be distorted or exag-
gerated at the ultimate expense of the grieving employee, of the
employer, or both. Secondly, minority union representation can create
divisions within the employee unit which make very difficult the em-
ployee organization's overriding task of fairly representing all em-
ployees. Since the majority employee organization will negotiate for
all employees, the obligation must be observed; but to create a situa-
tion in which divided loyalties among employees are likely would
inordinately complicate the discharge of the obligation.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the few states which have
faced the issue have severely restricted minority union representa-
tion.3 6 1 The same result should follow from a proper interpretation
of the language of the Florida bill; a brief amendment explicitly
prohibiting the practice would be useful added insurance.
b. Individuals.-Whether an individual grievant has a right to
have his grievance processed through the usual steps to final arbitration
has generated a considerable amount of controversy in the private
sector 312 and is an unsettled issue in the public sector. 63 An under-
standing of the problems that have arisen in reconciling individual
and institutional rights in the context of the grievance procedure re-
quires an understanding of the basic grievance mechanisms.364
The usual grievance mechanism negotiated by an employer and
from a War Labor Board decision, sums up the major objections to minority union
representation in processing grievances:
To deny the majority representative power to control the presentation of griev-
ances offers dissident groups, who may belong to rival unions, the opportunity to
press aggressively all manner of grievances, regardless of their merit, in an effort
to squeeze the last drop of competitive advantage out of each grievance and to
use the settlement even of the most trivial grievances as a vehicle to build up
their own prestige. . . . The settlement of grievances could become the source
of friction and competition and a means for creating and perpetuating employee
dissatisfaction instead of a method for eliminating it.
Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 626 (1956), quoting from
Douglas Aircraft Co., 25 WAR LAB. Ra. 57, 64-65 (1945). But see R. DOHERTY & W.
OBERER, TEAcHERs, SCHOOL BOARDS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A CHANGING OF THE
GuARD 77 (1967).
361. See Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights
in Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1022-23 (1970).
362. Compare Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963), with
Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962). For
a thorough collection of the literature on the subject, see THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
726 n.l (C. Morris ed. 1971).
363. See Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights
in Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1021 (1970).
364. See pp. 99-101 infra.
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bargaining representative contains a four- or five-step procedure: the
grievant is first required to voice his complaint with his immediate
supervisor; if he does not obtain satisfaction he must then seek re-
dress from a higher supervisor; if he is still dissatisfied, he must go
through one or two more levels of management before presenting his
complaint to an impartial arbitrator or umpire who will make a
binding decision on the merits. At some one of the steps after step
one, the bargaining agent will become involved as the representative
of the grievant. In some contracts, the bargaining agent's consent is
necessary before the grievant can move beyond step one.365 In virtually
all contracts, the bargaining agent must consent to binding arbitra-
tion. 66
There are several reasons for the bargaining agent's superior
authority in the grievance procedure: primarily, the bargaining repre-
sentative is the signatory to the agreement and the possessor of the
rights it creates. The contract will not usually create individual rights
that can be enforced by employees independently of the collective
bargaining representative. 367 With respect to the grievance procedure,
the representative has even greater authority in representing employees
with grievances since traditional collective bargaining practice con-
templates his weeding out frivolous employee complaints that might
otherwise choke the grievance machinery.368 Finally, the bargaining
representative must generally share the costs of final arbitration; 369
he therefore has a strong financial interest in disallowing the un-
meritorious grievance.
Nevertheless, the bargaining agent's control is not absolute. Like
some other statutes,370 the Florida bill places some limitation on him
by expressly protecting the rights of individual grievants to present
their complaints to their employer "without the intervention of the
bargaining agent," provided any resolution of the grievance "is not
inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement...
and . . . the bargaining agent has been given reasonable opportunity
to be present at any" adjustment of the grievance.3 7 1 Despite one state
365. See R. KNEE & R. KNEE, JR., supra note 347, at 62.
366. Id. See also D. WOLLETT & R. CHANIN, supra note 347, at 3:25.
367. See Cox, supra note 360, at 616-17. The author states: "Wherever labor agree-
ments are treated as binding contracts, the union is the proper party to enforce these
obligations and an individual does not have standing to sue." (Footnotes omitted.) But see
Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
362 (1962). But cf. Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
368. See D. WOLLETr & R. CHANIN, supra note 347, at 3:29; Cox, supra note 360, at 601.
369. See D. WOLLETr & R. CHANIN, supra note 347, at 3:25.
370. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153b(d) (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Supp. 1972).
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decision to the contrary, s7 2 the National Labor Relations Board,3 71
the federal courts, 374 and the state courts interpreting similar pro-
visions in private sector bargaining legislation,37 5 have all held that
the right to present a grievance to an employer does not give an
employee the right to take his grievance to binding arbitration.3 76
The Florida bill will almost certainly be interpreted to bar public
employees from guaranteed access to binding arbitration.
c. Civil Service System.-The existence of parallel grievance mech-
anisms is unfortunate, but because of the existence of civil service
systems, fairly common. "Forum shopping" of any sort involves an
unseemly manipulation often productive of discontent. The tension
that might well be generated by these two competing grievance mech-
anisms is, perhaps, unavoidable and symptomatic of the larger tensions
produced by the transition from a civil service to a collective bargain-
ing model in public employment.3 7  The reduction of the tension will
take place over a period of time, and its eventual disappearance will,
in large measure, turn on the competing effectiveness of the two
modes of regulating the employment relationship. If collective bar-
gaining proves a superior model, civil service systems will be phased
out, or vice versa.
In the meantime, the continued coexistence of different procedures
for resolving conflicts will on occasion produce inconsistent interpreta-
371. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.006 (1972). This provision is misplaced in that section.
It should be included as a proviso in § 2-447.012, which deals generally with grievance
procedures.
372. Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
373. Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944), enforced, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
374. See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d
Cir. 1962); Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), aJJ'd, 273
F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960).
375. Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 162, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 581, 156 N.E.2d 297,
300 (1959) (concurring opinion of Fuld, J.); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa.
145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960).
376. The employee is not, however, completely unprotected. Under the Supreme
Court's "fair representation" rule first announced in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
U.S. 192, 207 (1944), unions have a duty to represent all members of the bargaining
unit fairly. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 322, at 155-84. An arbitrary refusal to
process a meritorious grievance would thus subject the union to equitable orders and
money damages for violations of this duty. Although the stiff evidentiary requirements
for a successful action of this type have prevented all but a few employees from suc-
cessfully challenging union grievance processing, the presence of the rule may deter
unions from generally denying the use of the grievance machinery to dissenting or
unpopular employees. Whether the Florida courts would find a similar duty implicit
in the bill is problematic. It might be advisable to fix the duty of fair representation
on the organizational representative, as does New Jersey. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:13A-5.3
(Supp. 1972).
377. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR MANAGEMENT
POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 77 (Sept. 1969); Macy, supra note 338, at 9.
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tions of contract clauses, jurisdictional wrangles, cases where the de-
cision reached in a grievance is urged as a binding precedent in a
subsequent grievance, and a host of other problems yet unforeseen.
But it is not worth jettisoning the civil service system to avoid them.
d. Bargaining.-The relationship of grievance procedures and arbi-
tration decisions to the collective bargaining process is subtle, complex
and symbiotic 7 8 The problems arising from that relationship are
several . 79 First, a collective bargaining contract, regardless of its detail,
cannot anticipate and resolve the myriad points of conflict between
employees and employer.38 0 As a result, grievances frequently invoke
rights founded on custom, or as it is sometimes called, the common
law of the shop.38 ' Whether an arbitrator has the authority to search
out and apply the customary law is a controversial point.3 8 2 Assuming
378. For a thorough explanation of the history, development, and present uses
of labor arbitration, see R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS (1965). For a
sensitive analysis of the effects that recent Supreme Court decisions on the arbitrability
of grievances have had on the collective bargaining process, see H. WELLINGTON, LABOR
AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 91-125 (1968). For a controversial reaction to the recent de-
velopments in labor arbitration, see P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING
VIEw (1966).
379. Suppose a certified teachers' organization proposes to the school board during
collective bargaining a clause limiting a teacher's extracurricular duties to three
hours a week. In the past no uniform policy had existed. Let us assume that no
agreement can be reached on the number of hours that should be devoted to this
task. A teacher is disciplined for refusing to spend five hours a week as had
been the "custom" in the teacher's school. The teacher grieves and the issue goes to
the arbitrator. What decision?
Or assume that inconclusive bargaining takes place and then, during the term of
the agreement, the school board unilaterally adopts a policy requiring five hours of
extracurricular duties. A teacher refuses to obey, is disciplined and goes to arbi-
tration on the question of the school board's authority to issue such an order. What
decision should the arbitrator make?
Assume, for purposes of a third illustration, that a collective btrgaining con-
tract provides that a teacher shall receive tenure after five years of continuous employ-
ment, that a teacher employed for four years shall receive one year's notice of non-
renewal, and that the school board shall have the exclusive right to grant or deny
tenure. In facts based on an actual case, envision a teacher who midway during his
fourth year is advised that his contract will not be renewed. He grieves on the
ground that the one-year notice of requirement was not observed. The arbitrator agrees
and orders the school board to continue his employment for the fifth year. The
effect of the decision, however, is to confer tenure on the teacher even though the
contract reserves control over tenure to the school board. Was the arbitrator justified?
What other options did he have?
380. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv.
999, 1004-05 (1955).
381. "The collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It
calls into being a new common law-the common law of a particular industry or of
a particular plant." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960) (Douglas, J.) (footnote omitted). See also Cox, Reflections
Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1498 (1959).
382. See Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: The Musings of an Arbi-
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the arbitrator is given or assumes the authority, of what relevance is
the bargaining history of the disputants in the arbitrator's search for
the common law?
Secondly, an arbitrator's decision might have the effect of varying
the terms of the agreement;3 8 3 more seriously, in the public sector,
the decision might well infringe a provision of the legislation regu-
lating collective bargaining, perhaps by trenching on rights guaranteed
employees or employers.
Arbitration can indeed add to, subtract from and even change
the rights and responsibilities allocated to the parties in a collective
bargaining agreement.38 4 Under the NLRA the impact of arbitration
on contractual obligations has spawned a variety of interpretive prob-
lems and policy disputes that show no sign of abating.38 5 Unfortunately,
in the public sector, the victim of the confusion resulting from the
law's attempt to reconcile employer prerogatives, employee bargaining
rights and the need for arbitrated settlement of disputes will be the
public.
To avoid the problems that have arisen under the NLRA and to
protect the public from inexperienced employer negotiators, the drafts-
men might consider amending the bill to ensure that an arbitrator's
authority is limited to interpreting provisions in the agreement; that
the contract will be deemed to include the entire agreement; that
matters not included in the agreement cannot be the subject of a
grievance; and that only those issues which are specifically enumerated
as subject to the grievance procedure can proceed to arbitration.
Finally, the bill should specifically forbid any arbitral remedy which
has the effect of trenching on rights or prerogatives reserved by the
bill to public employers."8 6
trator, 36 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 138, 141-45 (1961); Meltzer, The Supreme Court,
Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 464 (1961).
383. See Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.
1966).
384. P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATON: A DISSENTING VIEW 100-18 (1966).
385. See generally M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE SETTIEMENT 273-419 (1968).
386. The suggested amendments would, in a sense, depart from a model of free
collective bargaining to the extent that the statute overrides the terms of a collective
agreement. The justification for close statutory regulation of this aspect of the col-
lective bargaining relationship is nevertheless justifiable. As has been pointed out,
considerable controversy exists in the public sector with respect to various aspects
of the arbitration phenomenon. Through a series of questionable decisions, the
Supreme Court, according to Professor Wellington, has
made it possible for arbitrators to exercise enormous discretion without regard
to the desires of the parties. Indeed, the exercise of such discretion may be
directly contrary to what the parties desire. Where arbitrators have such power,
one can be sure that from time to time the power will be used. Thus, in this
important class of cases, the Supreme Court has upset the reasonable expecta-
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E. Unfair Labor Practices
1. Employer Practices.-The unfair labor practice sections reflect
the strong influence of the NLRA, both in design and substance. As
does section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA3 7 the bill prohibits employers
from interfering with, restraining, or coercing public employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed under the bill.3ss Section 8(a) (1) has
been interpreted to protect an employee engaged in activities related
to his rights to form, join, and participate in, or refrain from forming,
joining, or participating in, any employee organization of his own
choosing.38 9 The Board frequently "balances" the business justification
of the decision against the harmful effect on the employees.3 90 The
balance, however, is not always struck consistently and even the careful
tions of parties who with words have tried to order the future in that fashion
which they deemed . . . to be best for them.
H. WELLINcTON, supra note 378, at 112.
Consequently, statutory restrictions on the power of the arbitrator are necessary
to avoid what might become a problem under the Florida legislation-not to restrict
the power of the parties to contract privately, but to ensure that an arbitrator does
not vary this private ordering.
387. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). This section provides in
part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.
Section 7. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a)(3).
388. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.019(1)(a) (1972), provides: "Public employees or their
agents or representatives are prohibited from: (a) Interfering with, restraining, or
coercing public employees in the exercise of any rights guaranteed them under this act."
389. For example, employers have been found in violation of § 8(a) (1) for for-
bidding union buttons on the job, Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945); for prohibiting the solicitation of union membership, Stoddard-Quirk Mfg.
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962), or the dissemination of written material during non-
working hours on company property, Republican Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, supra; or for
threatening or interrogating employees who join unions, Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962). Employers are also forbidden to make otherwise justifiable
decisions which seriously impede the employees' rights to engage in or not engage in
union activities. See NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964). Employer
acts which are intended to induce employees into foregoing statutory rights are, of
course, violative of the NLRA. See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
Moreover, § 8 (a) (1) also prohibits many employer decisions affecting employees regardless
of the employer's motivation. Cf. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967);
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). But not all employer decisions
which interfere with an employee organization's rights violate § 8 (a) (I). See American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
390. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB and NLRB v. Brown, supra note 389.
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scholar finds it difficult to predict the Board's next decision in certain
kinds of section 8(a) (1) cases.391 The problem, however, probably lies
more with the inherent difficulty of the issues involved than with the
concept or language of section 8(a) (1); little would be gained, there-
fore, by tampering with the similar language in H.R. 3314. In general
section 8(a) (1) has served its purpose, as have the section's counter-
parts in other public employee bargaining legislation.
The bill also tracks the language of section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA-92
in forbidding an employer from "[e]ncouraging or discouraging mem-
bership in any employee organization by discrimination in regard to
hiring, tenure, or other conditions of employment ... ,,393 The equiva-
lent section under the NLRA has been used principally to remedy the
termination of employees who engaged in union-related activityA 4
But numerous interpretive problems have been generated by con-
flicting Supreme Court decisions involving the "intent" element in
section 8(a) (3) cases. 95 Although illegal intent is usually required to
sustain a section 8(a) (3) complaint,396 similar interpretive problems
could be avoided under the proposed bill by amending the appropriate
section to require unlawful intent as a specific element of the offense.
Section 2-447.019(1) (c) 3 may well prove to be one of the most
391. See Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair
Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269,
1331 (1968); Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Labor
Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491, 516 (1967).
392. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970), provides: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- . . . (3) by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.....
393. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.019 (1) (b) (1972).
394. In Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-43 (1954), the Supreme
Court summarized § 8(a)(3) in the following words:
The language of § 8 (a)(3) is not ambiguous. The unfair labor practice is
for an employer to encourage or discourage membership by means of discrimina-
tion. Thus this section does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement
of membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished by dis-
crimination is prohibited. Nor does this section outlaw discrimination in em-
ployment as such; only such discrimination as encourages or discourages member-
ship in a labor organization is proscribed.
395. Compare American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), and Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), with NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), and NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221 (1963).
396. See Oberer, supra note 391, at 503-04.
397. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.019(1)(c) (1972), provides that public employers or
their agents or representatives are prohibited from "refusing to bargain collectively or
failing to bargain collectively in good faith, or refusing to sign an agreement orally
agreed upon with the certified bargaining agent for the public employees in the bar-
gaining unit."
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difficult sections of the bill to interpret and administer. Both this
section and section 8 (a) (5), its NLRA equivalent, articulate the
obligation that constitutes the essence of collective bargaining legis-
lation-the duty of the employer to bargain in good faith with the
certified bargaining representative concerning wages, hours and con-
ditions of employment. The NLRB and the courts have experienced
an inordinate number of conceptual and practical problems in inter-
preting and administering section 8 (a) (5).-8
The problems that have arisen with this section of the NLRA
cluster around two interrelated points: the requirement can be cir-
cumvented by recalcitrant employers; 399 and, because of the nature
of free collective bargaining, violations are difficult to remedy. 0 No
solution to these problems has been suggested, however, which does
not do violence to the basic value sought to be implemented in a
system of free collective bargaining.40'
398. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 271 n.2 (C. Morris ed. 1971), for a thorough
listing of law review articles on the duty to bargain in good faith. Professor Morris
quotes one analyst's reaction to §8(a) (5) as illustrative of the difficulties experienced
by most commentators in interpreting that section and its agency and judicial gloss:
"If one were to select the single area of our national labor law which has posed
the greatest difficulties for the National Labor Relations Board, that area would
be encompassed within the phrase 'the duty to bargain in good faith.'" Cooper,
Boulwarism and The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 653,
653 (1966).
Id.
399. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cummer-Graham Co., 279 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1960); White v.
NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958).
400. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
401. The well-advised employer can simply act out a charade of bargaining while
concealing a firm intent not to yield to the bargaining agent on any point or proposal,
however reasonable or undemanding the proposal might be. See White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d
564 (5th Cir. 1958). As long as the employer goes through the motions of bargaining-
meeting at reasonable times, talking with the bargaining representative, and responding
with counterproposals-the courts have been reluctant, because of the legislative history
and clear language of § 8 (d) of the NLRA, to find that he has failed to bargain in
good faith by refusing to agree to reasonable union proposals. See NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
The reluctance springs not only from the history and language of the NLRA but
also from the absence of remedies effective to enforce the bargaining obligation. If an
employer, for example, should refuse to incorporate a union-proposed "check-off" clause,
not because he has any objection to the clause, but simply to make it difficult to reach
a final agreement on any point, the Board has, in the past, done one of two things: it
has issued cease and desist orders to stop bargaining in bad faith, or it has ordered the
employer to include the "check-off" proposal in the agreement. The first remedy is
too vague to be useful; the second allowed the Board to dictate the substance of the
collective agreement in violation of the specific language of the NLRA and the essence
of free collective bargaining; this was held to be beyond the Board's powers in H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
The dilemma created by the conflict between effective enforcement needs and the
essentially private nature of the bargaining process cannot be resolved by changes in
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Consequently, despite the problems that might arise under the
bill because of the similarity of language and the ever-present possi-
bility of employer resistance to the bargaining concept, little would
be gained by manipulating language changes. Hopefully, the incidence
of employer failure to bargain in the public sector will be less fre-
quent than in the private sector; public officials should appreciate
more than most managers the need for voluntary observance of legal
obligations.
2. Employee Organization Practices.-The provisions dealing with
employee organization unfair labor practices track the language of
the employer sections.40 2 The problems that were discussed in the
context of employer unfair practices are, mutatis mutandis, present
in the context of employee representative unfair practices. The only
subsection that differs from the employer unfair practice sections
concerns the prohibition on strike activities by employee organiza-
tions.4 0 3 The anti-strike provisions will be considered in toto at a
later point.40 4
3. Unfair Labor Practice Procedures.-The unfair labor practice
procedures permit an employer or employee organization to file a
charge alleging that an employer or employee organization has com-
mitted an unfair labor practice. 4° s The procedures outlined in the
bill create a sound framework for the processing of unfair labor
practice charges.4 0 6 A few language changes and a substantial rearrange-
statutory language. No solution has been suggested which does not do violence to one
of the values involved. The only acceptable response is to allow the occasional,
intransigent employer to go unchecked in order to preserve for the overwhelming
majority of sincere bargainers the system of private ordering that has evolved under
the NLRA. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 378, at 59.
402. See Fla. H.R. 3314, § § 2-447.019 (2) (a)- (c) (1972).
403. Id. § 2-447.019 (2) (e).
404. See note 412 and accompanying text infra.
405. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.020 (1) (1972).
406. The Commission or its agent investigates the charge and if, after a pre-
liminary investigation, it decides that there is not substantial evidence indicating a
prima facie violation, the charge will be dismissed. Id. § 2-447.020 (1) (b). If, however,
the Commission finds that there is substantial evidence indicating a prima facie
violation, "the commission . . . shall issue . . . a copy of the charges and a notice
of hearing before the commission ....... Id. § 2-447.020(1)(a). The Commission or
its agent or a member may conduct the hearing. Id. The testimony presented "shall
be reduced to writing and filed with the commission." Id. § 2-447.020(3). In the
hearing, the Commission is not bound by the judicial rules of evidence. Id. § 2-447.020
(1) (a).
If the Commission finds substantial evidence that an unfair labor practice has been
committed, the bill directs that "it shall state its findings of fact and shall issue . . .
an order requiring the respondent party to cease and desist from the unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of
this part." Id. § 2-447.020 (3) (a). If the Commission finds that the charged party did
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ment of several subsections need to be made to achieve greater clarity
and consistency, 47 but these would not work any substantial changes
in the procedures.
One major difference in the procedural scheme utilized by the
bill and the methods and structure used to remedy similar practices
under the NLRA is that under H.R. 3314 the Commission is the
prosecutor, the judge and the jury in an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding. Under the 1947 revisions to the NLRA, the investigative
and prosecutorial functions previously performed by the Board were
removed and allocated to an independent "General Counsel."'4 ° The
General Counsel decides whether to prosecute an unfair labor practice
charge independently of the Board.41 9 Unfair labor practice complaints
are then tried before another independent component within the
system, the administrative law judge who issues a recommended order
before the final decision is made by the independent NLRB.4 0 That
structure of related but independent components within a single
agency was created precisely because of objections directed to the
conflicts of interest the Board obviously faced in discharging its func-
tions as investigator, prosecutor and judge.41' Perhaps the Commission
will some day have to adopt a similar structure. Initially, however,
the legislature is certainly justified in experimenting with the less
cumbersome and less costly single-unit model.
F. Status of Strikes and Strike Penalties
The strike is labor's traditional weapon in the institutionalized
warfare of collective bargaining.4 2 The various forms of the strike
are used to compel recognition 4 1 3 to coerce favorable economic settle-
not commit an unfair labor practice, it is directed to state its findings of fact and
dismiss the charge. Id. § 2-447.020 (3)(b).
407. Fla. H.R. 3314, §§ 2-447.020(1)(b)-(c) (1972), should be renumbered sub-
sections (2) and (3), respectively, and should follow immediately after subsection (1)
to clarify the sequence of the procedures. Subsection (c), which now reads "[a] charging
party, so dismissed . should be amended to read "[a] charging party, whose charge
is thus dismissed ... " For other changes, see note 428 and accompanying text infra.
408. Section 3 (d), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (d) (1970). See also
the text of a memorandum describing the authority and assigned responsibilities of
the General Counsel of the NLRB quoted in McGuINEss, How To TAKE A CASE BEFORE
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 399-401 (1967).
409. See generally McGUINESS, supra note 408, at 29.
410. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 823 (C. Morris ed. 1971). The administrative
law judges were formerly called "trial examiners."
411. Id. at 820.
412. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 390-94 (1965); H. WELLING-
TON, supra note 378, at 7-26.
413. Cf. International Hod Carriers Local 840, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
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ments,41 4 to protect unredressed grievances and occasionally to demon-
strate labor's strength.4 15 Although the incidence of strikes has varied
considerably during different periods of economic growth and re-
cession, the right to strike for better terms and benefits is a frequently
exercised and aggressively defended right of organized workers in the
private sector.10 The legality of the primary strike weapon, in frequent
doubt during the entire nineteenth and early twentieth century,"'
is no longer a debatable issue. 1 "
In the public sector, however, all forms of the strike have been,
and continue to be prohibited in most jurisdictions.4 1 9 H.R. 3314 not
only prohibits strikes in every conceivable guise, but includes for
violation of its no-strike provision some of the harshest penalties to
be found in state legislation. 9
414. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
415. H. PELLING, AMERICAN LABOR 70-72 (1960).
416. Professors Chamberlain and Kuhn indicate that while the number of strikes
has decreased since the turn of the century, the number of workers involved as a per-
centage of the total employed and the total man-hours lost have steadily increased
since the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, supra note
412, at 394-95.
417. H. WELLINGTON, supra note 378, at 7-26.
418. Although the primary strike is legal in a general sense, and protected by
§§ 7 and 13 of the NLRA, "the Court has never clearly enunciated the degree of
constitutional protection, if any, to which the strike is entitled." TiE DEvELOPING LABOR
LAW 518 (C. Morris ed. 1971). Compare Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), with
Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926). See generally Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the
Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1951).
419. See Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. CURRENT REPS. (July-Dec.) No. 459, at B-6
(July 3, 1972). A few states have recently passed legislation which permits certain
categories of pubilc employees to strike under limited circumstances. See HAWAII REv.
STAT. ch. 89 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1 (Supp. 1972).
420. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.021 (1972), forbids both public employees and em-
ployee organizations from instigating or participating in a strike against a public em-
ployer. If a strike is called, either the Commission or the public employer involved is
authorized to petition the appropriate circuit court for an injunction. Id. § 2-447.022 (2).
The bill requires a hearing after notice and mandates the issuance of a temporary
injunction, pending final disposition, if the petitioner makes a prima facie showing
that a strike is in progress or is imminent. Id.
If the injunction is disobeyed, the bill requires the circuit court to initiate contempt
proceedings against violators. Id. § 2-447.022 (3). If an employee organization is found
in contempt, the court is authorized to fix an appropriate fine, up to $5,000, depending
on "the extent of lost services and the particular nature and position of the employee
group in violation." Id. The section also authorizes, but does not require, the court
to levy a fine on officers and agents of public employee organizations, as well as on
public employers, of not less than fifty dollars and not more than one hundred
dollars for each calendar day the violation is in progress. Id.
Those penalties are taxed only for a contempt of the court order enjoining the
strike. In addition the Commission is authorized to use an arsenal of sanctions against
those employee organizations and public employees striking in defiance of the bill.
With respect to employee organizations the Commission may: (1) issue cease and desist
orders, id. § 2-447.022(6) (a) (1); (2) suspend or revoke the organization's certification
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING
As originally drafted, however, the penalty sections were even more
Tigorous. 2 1 It is not a matter of record why the change from mandatory
to discretionary penalties was effected, but the substitution of "may"
for "shall" in the various subsections dealing with strike penalties422
contributed to the creation of a more workable bargaining system.
The mandatory system has serious disadvantages. It assumes that a
strike is entirely the fault of the employee organization or the em-
ployees involved. Yet an intransigent employer can as easily provoke
a strike as a demagogic union officer. The scheme of required penalties
not only did not permit a court or the Commission to apportion the
penalties according to what might be shared responsibility for the
strike, but did not even permit the mitigation of damages where, in
all but the formal sense, the employer had caused the strike. Under
the revised version damages can at least now be reduced to a minimal
amount where justice requires it.423
as bargaining agent, id. § 2-447.022(6)(a)(2); (3) revoke any "check-off" right that
might have been granted to the organization, id. § 2-447.022(6)(a)(3); and (4) fine the
organization up to $20,000 for each calendar day of a violation or determine the
appropriate cost to the public due to each calendar day of the strike and fine the
organization an amount equal to such cost, id. § 2-447.022 (6) (a) (4).
In addition, subsection (6) (b) categorically denies certification to an employee
organization in violation of § 2-447.021 for a period of one year from the date of
final payment of any fine levied against it.
The Commission is not limited to penalizing the employee organization for insti-
gating or supporting a strike. If any public employee participates in a strike in violation
of § 2-447.021, the Commission may order the termination of his employment. Id.
§ 2-447.022 (5). If the employee is then reappointed, it will be on the following con-
ditions: (a) the employee will be on probation for six months following his reemploy-
ment, id. § 2-447.022(5) (a); (b) his compensation may not exceed that received by
him immediately prior to the time of the violation, id. § 2-447.022 (5)(b); and (c) the
compensation of the employee may not be increased until after the expiration of one
year from his reappointment, id. § 2-447.022 (5)(c).
Finally the bill provides in § 2-447.022 (4), a section without parallel in other state
collective bargaining laws, that an employee organization in violation of § 2-447.021
"shall be liable for any damages which might be suffered by a public employer, or
any other person, natural or corporate," as a result of the strike. The circuit court with
jurisdiction over such actions is specifically empowered to enforce judgments against
employee organizations "by attachment or garnishment of union initiation fees or
dues which are to be deducted or checked off by public employers." Id.
421. For example, under Fla. H.R. 206, § 112.70(3) (1970), the circuit court was
required to fine an employee organization which violated its injunction, as well as
the officers or agents of the organization. In addition, the Commission was required
to fine the employee organization for violating the no-strike section. Id. § 112.70(4).
The Commission similarly had no discretion with respect to the other penalties
applicable either to employee organizations or to public employees-revocation of certifi-
cation for one year, suspension of "check-off" rights, termination of employment, and
probation for six months upon reinstatement. Id. § § 112.70 (5) (a), (6) (a) (2) - (3).
422. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.022 (1972).
423. For example, Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.022(3) (1972), states in part: "In de-
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In addition the penalties were so arranged that, once a strike was
called, the employee organization had little incentive to end it. Since
the organization would face fines which on almost the first day of the
strike would bankrupt its treasury, no advantage accrued in avoiding
the further financial penalties resulting from a continuation of the
strike. Similarly, since the organization would incur all the other
penalties as of the first day of the stoppage, little would be gained by
attempting to negotiate an immediate end to the strike. Yet the bill
should not only be concerned with deterring strikes, but also with
creating a scheme of laws which makes it possible to end strikes soon
after they begin.
It should be noted that public employee strikes have occurred in
virtually every state in the union, in those states which have com-
prehensive legislation and in those states which have none.4 24 Strikes
will undoubtedly occur again in Florida, whether the penalties are
harsh or nonexistent. Consequently, the bill should reflect the fact
that the occasional strike will occur, and that, depending on the
group of employees involved and the nature of the services interrupted,
the public might generate irresistible pressure for an end to the
strike.4 2 5 If the employees cannot be enticed to end what they per-
ceive as a justifiable "job action" by agreements to recommend lenient
fines, the alternative often is "arrangements" whereby public officials
simply do not initiate any action against the organization or the em-
ployees in exchange for their agreement to return to work.4 2 6
Although changes have been made which cure many of the ob-
jectionable features of the penalty provisions, further improvements
could be made. Specific directions should be given in the bill to
circuit judges responsible for policing anti-strike injunctions to take
into consideration possible employer misconduct. Similarly, the bill
should direct the Commission to weigh possible employer misconduct
termining the appropriate fine, the court shall objectively consider the extent of lost
services and the particular nature and position of the employee group in violation."
424. "The record of strike activity as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
shows almost as many strikes in states without bargaining laws as have occurred in
heavily organized states with such laws." Anderson, The Structure of Public Sector
Bargaining, in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC UNIONS 38 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
425. See generally Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969). But see Burton & Krider, The Role and
Consequence of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970).
426. For an example of employer inaction in the face of a strike, see Gotbaum,
Finality in Collective Bargaining Disputes: The New York Experience, 21 CATHOLIC
U.L. REv. 589, 593 (1972), in which the author points to the failure of the Yonkers
School Board to bring contempt proceedings against striking teachers and their repre-
sentatives or to invoke the potent penalties of the Taylor Act for employee strikes,
despite threats to do so.
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in the balance before assessing damages and penalties against the
employees and their representative. 427 More specifically, the Commis-
sion should be directed to conclude any pending hearings alleging
strike-connected unfair labor practices by the employer before reach-
ing a final decision on the measures to be taken against the employee
organization and the employees for participating in a strike. 28
G. Procedure for Appeals
The procedures outlined for securing judicial review of orders of
the Commission are based on the NLRA and are comparatively un-
complicated. Some of the language used in describing the appellate
process is confusing,429 but the broad outline of the system is simple
and straightforward. The procedures, however, fail to profit from the
obvious faults in NLRA procedures, and even add, somewhat gratui-
tously, faults that have been avoided by that Act.
427. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-471 (4)(B) (iii) (1972), providing that, if
the Board finds that either party has refused to bargain in good faith, it can order
the guilty party to pay the full costs of the fact finding arising out of the refusal.
428. Several possible inconsistencies should also be resolved in the sections dealing
with prohibited strikes. It should be made clear, for example, that the Commission
will prosecute and adjudicate violations of Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.021 (1972), according
to the usual procedures used to dispose of unfair labor practice charges. In addition,
there is confusion between § 2-447.022 (6) (a) (2), which empowers but does not require
the Commission to "[s]uspend or revoke the certification of the employee organization,"
and § 2-447.022(6), which mandates that "[a]n organization determined to be in violation
of section 447.021, Florida Statutes, shall not be certified until one (1) year from the date
the final payment of any fine against it." The amendment again should be in the direction
of giving the Commission discretion in choosing the appropriate remedy. The Commission
might, for example, choose to continue the certification of the guilty employee organiza-
tion perhaps because of its cooperative role in getting employees back to work, perhaps
because of its stabilizing influence on emotion-charged employees. To deprive angry
people of their chosen leaders in a moment of crisis will as often exacerbate the
crisis as resolve it. In a more practical vein, the suspension or revocation of the
certification of an employee organization will invariably reduce the membership since
the organization will not be able to act as the collective bargaining representative; the
reduction of membership would cut into the primary source of revenue, members' dues,
and perhaps result in the organization's paying only a small amount of the total fines
levied against it. In any event, the suspended employee organization would have little
trouble in dissolving the guilty organization and forming another under a different name.
429. The district courts of appeal are empowered, upon the filing of an appropriate
petition, to review orders of the Commission. Fla, H.R. 3314, § 2-447.020(4) (1972). Two
kinds of petitions can be filed: the petition for enforcement of an order, which can
be filed by the Commission or the charging party, id. § 2-447.020 (5) (a), or the petition
for review seeking to have the order set aside or modified, which can be filed by any
person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission, id. § 2-447.020(6). A third kind
of petition is also alluded to, involving a review of orders adverse to a "charging
party"; its precise function is unclear. See id. § 2-447.020(5)(e).
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For example, a major obstacle to the efficient and economic func-
tioning of the federal legislation arises from the absolute requirement
of judicial intervention subsequent to a final order by the NLRB. '
To save the Commission needless expense, and to reduce an increased
and unnecessary caseload in the district courts of appeal, the Com-
mission's orders should be self-executing. The Commission's orders
should, of course, be reviewable; but only at the petition of an ag-
grieved party and then only on very narrow grounds. It might even
be well to make the review discretionary with the district court of
appeal.
The legislative preoccupation with judicial review and multi-step
appellate procedures has placed an intolerable strain on the institu-
tional ordering of legal relationships in this country.'31 Delays of two
or three years43 2 (in some cases, nine years433) are not uncommon
before an unfair labor practice charge filed with the Board is finally
closed in the courts. Judicial review is useful to guard against the
occasional abuse, but is not necessary and is certainly not desirable
in every case. The traditional "justice delayed is justice denied" can
no longer be viewed as a reliable aphorism for bar association talks;
it must be accepted as imposing a direct responsibility on the legis-
lature to avoid the time-consuming maze of appellate review in creating
new statutes and reviewing established laws.
A variation on that larger theme is reflected in a section of the
bill which permits either the Commission or the charging party to
petition the district courts of appeal for enforcement of a Commission
order.4 34 Assuming that the Commission will be forced to petition
for enforcement of its orders, it should at least have the exclusive
control over the enforcement mechanisms, as the NLRB does under
the NLRA.43 5 A requirement that the Commission share control of
430. Miller, Our Rube Goldberg Labor Board, Nation's Bus., Feb. 30, 1972, p. 30.
Mr. Miller, Chairman of the NLRB, ranked the nonself-executing orders of the Board
as one of the principal reasons for the delay in processing Board cases.
Employers can, of course, voluntarily observe an order of the Board; but, the
Board's orders are not self-executing, and to insure compliance the Board must petition
a court of appeals for enforcement. Consequently, the Board routinely petitions for
enforcement of all its orders, even where the employer indicates he will comply, to
ensure that quick action can be taken to compel enforcement where the employer fails
to carry out a promise of voluntary compliance.
431. See Address by Chief Justice Burger, ABA 95th Annual Meeting, Aug. 14,
1972, in 93 Sup. Ct. 3 (1972).
432. Miller, supra note 430, at 32.
433. For example, NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
434. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.020 (5) (a) (1972).
435. Section 10 (e), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) (1970); accord,
Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
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the litigation with the charging party is not only inconsistent with
the purposes of the bill and the responsibilities of the Commission,
but also creates the likelihood of complexity and delay where none
need exist.48 6
While no solution is perfect, the arrangement that has evolved
under the NLRA, in which the NLRB retains control of the litigation
and the charging party is allowed to intervene4 37 seems preferable
to the forced sharing of control seemingly permitted by the Florida
bill.
Another problem which has come up under the NLRA, and which
the present bill fails to solve, involves the reviewability of interlocu-
tory orders of the Commission, particularly those involving unit
determinations. Under the NLRA a decision by the Board in the
course of a representation hearing is not a "final order" and is con-
sequently not reviewable by the courts of appeals. 3 8 Strong arguments
can be made for permitting interlocutory appeals, but the better
436. The overriding purpose of the bill is to promote harmonious relationships
between public employers and groups of employees. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.001 (1972).
The Commission has the responsibility of enforcing the specific constraints imposed by
the bill so that the obstructive tactics of a few will not thwart that purpose. The
Commission is therefore required to provide remedies that will effectuate the policies
and purposes of the bill. Id. § 2-447.020 (3)(a). In ensuring that the purpose of the
bill is achieved, the Commission will generally protect the individual rights of em-
ployers and employees; but the vindication of private rights generated by the bill is
a means to the larger end of promoting harmonious relations between public employers
and employees. The larger public purpose and the specific private rights will usually
coincide. But on occasion it may be necessary for the Commission to sacrifice or dis-
count a private right in the interests of the public purpose. This conflict will arise
most often in the Commission's decision to accept a compromise settlement of an
alleged violation or in the selection of remedies it will pursue.
The resultant conflict in the values symbolized by the Commission and the charging
party is not amenable to easy solutions. But giving the charging party enforcement
powers under the bill is not likely to produce a workable solution to the conflict. If
the bill is interpreted to mean that whichever party first files the petition thereby
gains control of the appeal, it is indefensible; races to the courthouse are too often
productive of conflict and confusion. If the bill is interpreted to require co-control of
the appeal by the charging party and Commission, the aforementioned divergence in
the objectives sought by the two parties will often produce conflicting views on the
strategy to be pursued in arguing the appeal. The bill could mean that each should
pursue its own case independently of the other, and while that is preferable to a
sharing of control, it will result in a wasteful duplication of effort and expenditure
of time.
437. See Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965).
438. Only final orders are subject to review by the courts under NLRA §§ 10(e), (1),
61 Stat. 147, 148 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f) (1970). Decisions made
in the course of a representation proceeding are not final orders for purposes of
§§ 10(e) and (f). See AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). Review of directions of
elections in representation proceedings is obtained incidental to review of an order
entered in an unfair labor practice proceeding. See NLRA § 9(d), 61 Stat. 144 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 159 (d) (1970).
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approach is to avoid providing opportunities for the dilatory appeals
that can paralyze the effective enforcement of labor relations legisla-
tion.
H.R. 3314 is confusing on the question of the appealability of
Commission orders. The bill speaks in one section of power in the
district courts of appeal to review "orders" of the Commission; 439 in
a second section it refers to the Commission's "final decision;" 440 in
a third section to the courts' power to review a "final order. ' ' 4 1 The
sections should be amended to refer uniformly to "final order." The
powers of the district courts of appeal will then be clearly limited
to review of final orders. If interlocutory reviews of unit determina-
tion decisions are thought desirable, a specific section should be added
clearly setting forth the precise scope of that review.
A final problem connected with the scope of judicial review of
Commission orders involves the reviewability of orders dismissing
unfair labor practice charges.4 4 2 Two sections address the question: one
is confusing and one is ambivalent. Under the confusing section, the
only action that can be taken by the Commission with respect to the
charging party is a dismissal of his charge.44 3 It is difficult to envision,
therefore, how the charging party would "comply" with that order
or why the Commission would attempt to enforce it. If, however, the
drafters meant to refer to "charged party," the section would make
sense as an obvious attempt to strike a compromise between the
desirability of allowing the Commission to issue self-executing orders
and the felt need for judicial scrutiny of such orders. In that likely
event the section would have no bearing on the question of judicial
review of orders dismissing a charge.
Another section of the bill, however, might be interpreted as pro-
viding the right to such an appeal.444 A similar provision in the NLRA
does not permit judicial review of orders dismissing unfair labor
439. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.020 (4) (1972).
440. Id. § 2-447.020 (5) (e).
441. Id. § 2-447.020(6).
442. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.020(1)(b) (1972), directs that if the Commission or
its agent decides there is not substantial evidence substantiating an unfair labor practice
charge, the charge shall be dismissed. Subsection (c) provides, however, for an appeal
of that decision to the Chairman and one other member of the Commission who have
the power to reinstate a meritorious charge. After full consideration, if it finds that
the charge has not been proved, the Commission is directed to issue an order dis-
missing the charge. At that point, it is open to question whether the order dismissing
the charge is amenable to judicial review as a "final order."
443. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.020 (5) (e) (1972), states that if the Commission's final
decision is adverse to the charging party and he fails to seek review in thirty calendar
days, the order will be automatically enforced by the district court of appeal upon the
petition of the Commission if the charging party fails to comply with the order.
444. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.020(6) (1972), provides that any person "aggrieved
[V7ol. 1:26
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING
practices;4 5 those orders are issued by the General Counsel, who
functions independently of the five-member NLRB; and the statute
contains no provision for judicial review of orders of the General
Counsel.44 6 The same language used in the differently structured
Commission, however, accomplishes different and perhaps undesirable
results. Since the Commission itself dismisses unmeritorious unfair
labor practice charges, a provision permitting review of final orders
might well include orders dismissing unfair practice charges.
That result would work an unfortunate departure from the federal
practice which has succeeded in damming the potential flow of appeals
at that one point without apparent damage to the rights of those
persons offered protection by the NLRA. Again, in the interest of the
efficient and effective enforcement and administration of the bill,
section 2-447.020 (3) (b) should be amended to foreclose judicial
review of orders dismissing unfair labor practices.
H. Analysis of Miscellaneous Provisions
1. Local Option.-A crucial question involved in drafting public
employee legislation is which employers should be included in the
statutory scheme. Should one statute, for example, encompass all
public employers, including state, county, municipal and school board;
or should separate schemes be utilized for each level of government;
or should some or all of the public employers be allowed to opt out
of a statutory scheme provided certain conditions are met? Various
states have taken widely different positions in response to these ques-
tions;447 the Committee on Manpower and Development recommended
by a final order of the commission granting or denying in whole or in part the relief
sought, may obtain a review of such order ....
445. See §§ 10(e), (f), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160 (e), (f) (1970).
446. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.19 (1972); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 834 (C. Morris
ed. 1971).
447. Connecticut, for example, has separate provisions for municipal employees and
teachers but no provision for state employees. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-467 (1972);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153a (1967). Delaware permits municipalities to stay out-
side the Public Employees Bargaining Law unless they elect by legislative act to come
under the statute. 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1301 (a) (3) (Supp. 1970). Kansas law also
allows local governments to vote themselves in or out. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4335 (Supp.
1971). Pennsylvania has no local option, but has a separate statute for police and firemen.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Supp. 1972). Wisconsin has separate provisions for munici-
pal and state employees. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70, .80 (Supp. 1972). New York makes
certain parts of its comprehensive statute inapplicable to a local government which "has
adopted by local law its own provisions and procedures which have been submitted to the
[public employment relations] board by such government and as to which there is in effect
a determination by the board that such provisions and procedures ... are substantially
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in this article with respect to
the state." N.Y. Cav. SERV. LAW § 212 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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that Florida adopt a local option provision that would have per-
mitted local governments to opt out of the statutory scheme provided
that the local government adopted "in lieu of the requirement[s]" of
the bill "its own provisions and procedures . . . provided that such
procedures are substantially equivalent to and in accordance with the
intent, provision and procedures set forth" in the bill.448 According
to this version the Commission would determine whether local laws
were substantially equivalent and therefore valid.
That recommendation provoked a vigorous floor fight in the House
of Representatives. Opponents of the Committee's version of the local
option succeeded in substituting a much more permissive provision,
entitling a local government to opt out of the bill's coverage if it
adopted measures respecting rights guaranteed employees in the bill.
Among these were the rights of employees to form, join, and assist a
labor organization, and the right to engage in collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing.49 The amended version
did not specifically confer power upon the Commission or any court
to determine in the event of a dispute whether a particular local
ordinance complied with the requirements of the bill. By arguing
forcefully that the concept of centralized administration-a constant
theme in the Committee bill-runs counter to the philosophy of
"home rule" and decentralized government implicit in the 1968 con-
stitutional revision,'50 the proponents of "true" home rule overcame
the Committee's commitment to centralized administration.
Neither version was a genuine "local option" provision. The
former clause would have bound local governments to the statutory
mechanisms by forcing them to reproduce the same mechanisms before
they would be released from observance of the bill. Local governments
would therefore have been forced by the expense of replicating the
statutory scheme to stay within it.
The substitute measure, on the other hand, did not provide an
"option" so much as it did an "escape" for local governments resistant
to public employee bargaining. To require public employers merely
to protect the rights guaranteed in section 2-447.006 required nothing
more than the constitution already required. 45' The significant step
in the bill moved the law from an unenforceable enumeration of
abstract rights to the affirmative statement of procedures and remedies.
448. This provision was contained in the version of Fla. H.R. 3314 that was
reported out of the Appropriations Committee in § 2-447.024.
449. This version of the local option appeared in Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.025 (1972),
and was contained in the engrossed copy that was sent to the Senate after passage in
the House.
450. See FLA. CONsT. art. VIIU.
451. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
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A local government could, under the substitute measure, have exer-
cised its option by publishing a local ordinance guaranteeing the
rights specified, without making provision for the procedures neces-
sary to implement the rights.
Fortunately, the adversaries of the local option issue were forced,
by chance or necessity, to compromise their conflicting views. In work-
ing out the compromise, they managed to accomplish a delicate balance
in which the advantages of both versions were preserved and their
objectionable features eliminated. 452
Instead of the local government having to adopt "provisions and
procedures . . . substantially equivalent to and in accordance with
the intent, provisions and procedures set forth in this part," the com-
promise provision would deem it sufficient if the local ordinance
"effectively secure[s] to public employees substantially equivalent rights
and procedures . . ... " The change in emphasis is subtle but im-
portant. The local bargaining legislation need not slavishly track the
substantive and procedural details of the bill; it is sufficient if, what-
ever the details, the local law effectively secures "equivalent rights
and procedures" for public employees. In addition, the circuit court,
rather than the Commission, will determine whether the local law
satisfies the requirements of the section. This change improves the
amended version, which did not provide either for judicial or ad-
ministrative review of local legislation. The possibility of inconsistent
interpretations of the section has been mitigated (if not eliminated)
by providing for appeal to the district courts of appeal.
2. Government in the Sunshine.-Florida's Government in the
Sunshine Law provides: 54
(1) All meetings .. . [of any state or local government body]
are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times,
and no resolution, rule, regulation or formal action shall be con-
sidered binding except as taken or made at such meeting.
452. The new version reads in part:
Any ...political subdivision (other than the state or a state public authority),
may elect to adopt by ordinance .. . its own provisions and procedures in lieu
of the requirement of this part, provided that such provisions and procedures
effectively secure to public employees substantially equivalent rights and procedures
as set forth in this part. Any interested party may apply to the [appropriate]
circuit court . . . for a determination as to whether local provisions or pro-
cedures, or both, are substantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures
set forth in this part. The determination of the circuit court may be appealed
to the district court of appeal.
Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.025 (1972).
453. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.025 (1972). The amendment was accomplished when
Fla. H.R. 3314 was offered as an amendment to Fla. S. 2008.
454. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1971).
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(2) The minutes . . . [of any such meetings] . . . shall be
open to public inspection.
The scope of this law is defined in three leading cases. In Times Pub-
lishing Co. v. Williams, 455 the court held that, with one exception rela-
ting to attorney-client relationships, the legislature intended the statute
to apply to all assemblages of boards or commissions governed by the
act. The statute is applicable whenever discussion, deliberation, de-
cision or formal action takes place.4 56 When the statute was challenged
for lack of due process, the supreme court held in Board of Pub. Inst.
v. Doran45 7 that it was sufficiently definite and contained sufficiently
adequate standards to afford due process. Finally, in City of Miami
Beach v. Berns,45 8 the supreme court held that "[w]hen . . . officials...
transact or agree to transact [in a secret meeting] business . . . they
violate the government in the sunshine law, regardless of whether
the meeting is formal or informal."4 59
Should collective bargaining be subject to this statute? Although
Florida's Attorney General has refused to exempt collective bargain-
ing,4 60 the court, in Bassett v. Braddock,46 1 exempted such bargaining.
The court relied on the earlier decision in Times Publishing Co. v.
Williams,462 in which it was held that "constitutional impediments"
are the only exceptions to section 286.011. The court noted in Bassett
that the constitutional right-to-work provision 463 is such a constitu-
tional impediment. The court stated that this provision guarantees
the right of collective bargaining and that applying the sunshine law
would abridge that right. Since "[t]he discussions and deliberations
... in an executive process often take place beyond the veil of actual
'meetings' of the body involved" and since "[tihe 'other side' (teachers'
negotiator) is being 'coached' and given advices privately ... it is only
common sense and fair play that 'our team' [government employer]
have the same advantage in order to be effective in his efforts." 46
H.R. 3314 provides that "[a]ll bargaining, negotiating, mediation
proceedings and hearings of the fact-finding board .. .shall be sub-
ject to section 286.011, Florida Statutes. ' '46 This section of H.R. 3314
455. 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
456. Id.
457. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
458. 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
459. Id. at 41.
460. See FLA. Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 071-32 (Mar. 3, 1971).
461. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
462. 222 So. 2d 470, 474 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
463. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
464. 262 So. 2d 425, 427, 428 (Fla. 1972).
465. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 6 (1972).
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should be amended to exempt collective bargaining by statute from
the requirements of section 286.011, just as the supreme court has
done by decision in Bassett. The Government in the Sunshine Law
places a restriction on public employers that unduly strengthens the bar-
gaining position of public employees. As noted in Bassett, this would
abridge rather than further the right of collective bargaining.
3. "Check-Off."-The question of whether a certified employee
organization should be allowed to negotiate a "check-off" clause with
a public employer proved one of the more abrasive issues in the de-
bate on H.R. 3314. A suspicion lurks that check-off has acquired a
symbolic value in the debates between opponents and proponents of
collective bargaining, with the unfortunate result that the immediate
merits of the check-off proposal tend to be at worst forgotten or at
best distorted.
Check-off is a process whereby an employer deducts from the
employee's wages the dues and assessments owed by the employee to
an employee organization and transmits the amounts collected to
the employee organization. Under the NLRA, a check-off proposal
is a mandatory subject of bargaining; but, of course, as with other
mandatory subjects, the employer need not agree to the union's pro-
posal for check-off.4 66 Assuming the employer agrees to a check-off
proposal, the cost of implementing the agreement is as well a subject
of bargaining; the employer is perfectly within his rights in insisting
that the union absorb whatever administrative costs may be in-
volved.4 6 7 Most employers in the private sector, however, negotiate
check-off as a matter of routine; they rarely attempt to shift the book-
keeping and clerical costs to the union.
Under the Taft-Hartley Act employee consent is a prerequisite to
dues deduction. If the employee is a member of the union, and a
check-off clause is negotiated, the employer can legally deduct dues
only if he receives the employee's specific permission. s The NLRA
also permits (except where prohibited by state right-to-work legisla-
tion) an employer and a union to negotiate a union security clause,
the most usual version of which requires each employee to become a
member of the union on or after the thirtieth day of his employ-
ment.4 69 In the event that the employer and the union negotiate both
466. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), for a brief history of
"check-off" as a bargainable item. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 716 n.106 (C.
Morris ed. 1971).
467. A fortiori, if the practice itself is bargainable, its cost must be also. The point
has not come up in a Board proceeding.
468. See Labor Management Relations Act § 302(c)(4), 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 186 (c) (4) (1970).
469. See § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (1971);
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a check-off and a union security clause-a not unusual contract com-
bination-the employee has dues deducted as a condition of con-
tinued employment. The employee is free to demand that the em-
ployer discontinue checking off dues, but if he neglects to pay the
dues personally the union can insist that the employee be terminated. 7 0
The provisions in H.R. 3314 regulating "membership dues de-
duction" resemble in some respects the companion provisions of the
NLRA. Like the NLRA, the Florida bill states that the employees must
present "cards authorizing the deduction of such dues .... .471 But
under Florida law, since no employee can be compelled to join a labor
organization or contribute to its support, 72 the result is that only those
employees who voluntarily join a labor organization and then volun-
tarily sign authorization cards can have their dues deducted. In addition
any authorization furnished by an employee is revocable at will.*73
The layers of protection furnished against abuse of the check-off
are several-and thick. First, a dues deduction clause has to be negoti-
ated by the employee organization with the employer. There is no
obligation that the employer agree to its inclusion. Assuming his condi-
tional acceptance of the check-off proposal, the employer can insist
that the union pay for its costs. If the employer and the employee
organization manage to agree on a check-off clause, the employee must
still voluntarily join or continue his membership in the labor organi-
zation, then sign an authorization card and present it to the employer,
before dues can be deducted from his wages.
To include a provision that forbids the negotiation of a dues
deduction clause would be carrying a paternalistic concern for em-
ployees, or a dislike for employee organizations, to the point of inter-
ference with the essence of free collective bargaining. Under H.R.
3314 and other similar legislation, the parties themselves determine
what is best for them in their unique situation. It is only when one
party threatens the rights of the other participants in the bargaining
process or the rights of neutral third parties that government inter-
venes. Given the ample protections available to the employer and the
employees, government's intervention via a prohibition of check-off
is simply not justified.
Ironically, if no mention had been made of check-off in H.R. 3314,
it would probably have been adjudged a subject of bargaining as a
Rosenthal, The National Labor Relations Act and Compulsory Unionism, 1954 Wis.
L. RE:v. 53, 55.
470. See Producers Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1960).
471. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.007 (1972).
472. See FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
473. Fla. H.R. 3314, § 2-447.007 (1972).
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"term or condition" of employment.4 74 In the alternative, it would
have been a subject of bargaining under section 112.171 of the Florida
Statutes, which has authorized the negotiation of check-off agreements
since 1959.475 Perhaps the best solution to the present controversy is
to eliminate section 2-447.007 from H.R. 3314 and allow present law
to control the issue.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Whether collective bargaining between public employers and em-
ployee organizations is ultimately regulated by executive order, judicial
decree, or legislative enactment, the issues confronted in the course
of this analysis of H.R. 3314 must be understood and resolved. The
questions generated by this particular bill, involving representation
matters, collective bargaining requirements, strikes and strike penal-
ties, unfair practices and mechanisms for administration and judicial
review, are not peculiar to legislative enactments regulating bargain-
ing nor to this particular legislative effort. Whatever legislative, ex-
ecutive or judicial vehicle is used for containing public sector bar-
gaining, the same value choices and technical problems that have
been analyzed in terms of H.R. 3314 will be encountered. The dis-
cussion of H.R. 3314 should therefore be useful whatever device or
bill is ultimately chosen to regulate bargaining.
But the question must be confronted whether a statutory instru-
ment is the appropriate device for regulating collective bargaining;
whether comprehensive legislation such as H.R. 3314 is preferable to
a skeletal guideline such as some of the "meet and confer" statutes;
and whether 1973 is the appropriate time for attempting that regu-
lation. That these questions must be answered affirmatively is fairly
obvious. With respect to the comparative virtues of legislative regula-
tion, the statutory approach is certainly accompanied by fewer prob-
lems than executive or judicial regulation. An executive order would
have to survive powerful constitutional challenges. Even if it suc-
ceeded, it would probably cover only state employees, leaving teachers
and municipal employees unregulated. Judicial enforcement would
be of more doubtful constitutionality than executive regulation and
would be severely limited in its effectiveness because of the difficulties
that would be faced in policing and administering the details of a
bargaining system. The legislature, on the other hand, can involve
all the affected parties in working out a viable and comprehensive
response to the challenge of public employee bargaining demands.
474. See id. § 2-447.002(13).
475. See FLA. STAT. § 112.171 (1971).
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The appropriateness of the timing is a question that is difficult
to answer because the growth of public employee organizations in
Florida has been uneven. If the rate of growth in this state accelerates
rapidly, however, the legislature might well find itself debating col-
lective bargaining in an atmosphere of crisis. The response will then
be dictated by raw political power rather than by rational assessment
of options and careful selection of a collective bargaining system
oriented to the public interest rather than to partisan demands.
The final and most difficult hurdle to clear in recommending the
passage of collective bargaining legislation is the effect that a bargain-
ing bill will have on the state and municipal fisc, as well as on the
authority of government to deliver services and protection to its
citizens. Much of the legislative opposition to a collective bargaining
statute seems grounded on three basic fears: (a) that employee organi-
zation membership will increase due to the legitimization of collective
bargaining; (b) that the employee organization will use superior
bargaining strength to bankrupt state and municipal government with
exorbitant bargaining demands; (c) and that the organizations will
use bargaining techniques along with political power to wrest control
of public institutions from elected and appointed public officials.
A. The Impact on Union Membership
No solid evidence exists to support the hypothesis that links the
growth of employee organizations to collective bargaining legislation.
It appears, of course, that the numbers of organized employees in-
crease after the passage of collective bargaining legislation; but it
could just as defensibly be assumed that the collective bargaining bill
resulted from the political pressure generated by increased employee
organization membership. The relationship between bargaining legis-
lation and membership in employee organizations is undoubtedly a
symbiotic one: increasing membership numbers will often force a
collective bargaining bill which appears to accelerate union member-
ship or at least the selection of an employee organization as the bar-
gaining representative by public employees.
The more important question for opponents of collective bargain-
ing, however, is not whether legislation affects employee organizational
growth, but whether that growth can be delayed by the absence of
legislation. Since unionization in the private sector seems to be as
much the by-product of urbanization as legislation, the pace of public
employee organizing in Florida will probably increase regardless of
the action or inaction of the legislature. Eventually, of course, legis-
lation will have to be enacted as it has had to be enacted in other
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urban states. The issue, consequently, is not whether, but when and
under what political circumstances public sector bargaining legislation
will be enacted in Florida.
Another troublesome problem that must be faced by individual
legislators is whether the legislature should foreclose the exercise of
a right that the people have conferred on public employees. A response
to public employee demands for bargaining that says, "You have a
right to bargain but no means to enforce that right," can only inculcate
disrespect for the rule of law and encourage a resort to self-help that
does not comport with civilized processes of government.
B. The Effect on the Fisc
The suspicion that increased collective bargaining will result from
the legitimization of bargaining and that bargaining will bankrupt
the public treasury is deep-seated and passionately held. In fact the
same "financial disaster" arguments that have been proffered to sup-
port a ban on public sector strikes could, with appropriate modifica-
tion, be urged to support a prohibition on public sector bargaining.
Just as no market checks exist in a public employee strike situation
to limit exorbitant strike settlements, no natural political or financial
checks exist to curb the feeding of exorbitant employee bargaining
demands.
Little agreement can be found, however, on the question of the
impact that collective bargaining has on wage rates.476 It would seem
from casual observation that public sector wages have risen consider-
ably in those areas that have experienced collective bargaining with
public employee organizations.47 But reputable economists dispute
the theory that collective bargaining has a significant impact on wage
476. Compare Kasper, The Effects of Collective Bargaining on Public School Teachers'
Salaries, 24 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 57 (1970), with Baird & Landon, The Effects of
Collective Bargaining on Public School Teachers' Salaries, 25 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
410 (1972). See generally Effects of the Union: A Symposium, 24 IND. & LAB. REL. REv.
159 (1971). In a recent study of the effect of collective bargaining on the salaries of
teachers and class size in 118 elementary school districts in Cook County, Illinois, Pro-
fessors W. Clayton Hall and Norman E. Carroll stated:
Our findings strongly indicate that teachers' organizations do indeed increase
salaries.... Apparently, however, the magnitude of the increases are [sic] relatively
small. Our estimates suggest that they average around $165.00 per year ...
In addition, it appears that teachers' organizations are associated with a larger
student-teacher ratio. This lends support to the common allegation that school
boards are offering teachers higher salaries in exchange for larger classes and
that these offers are being accepted.
Hall & Carroll, The Effect of Teachers' Organizations on Salaries and Class Size, 26 IND.
& LAB. REL. REV. 834, 840-41 (1973).
477. See Hayes, Collective Bargaining and the Budget Director, in PUBLIC WORKERS
AND PUBLIC UNIONS 89, 93 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
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structure."' Given the principle of legislative finality, any significant
increases would have to occur as the result of legislative action or
approval. These decisions then are made by elected officials who are
responsible to, and can be removed by, the taxpaying public. A very
significant check exists, therefore, on employee demands-the desire
of elected officials to remain in office.
If bargaining power must be translated into political power before
it can achieve significant improvements in public employee benefits,
an argument might be made that the shift will merely change the locus
for the exercise of organized employee power rather than provide a
significant check on it.
C. The Impact on Control of Public Institutions
This objection touches on the third concern behind the opposition
to public employee bargaining, the suspicion that collective bargain-
ing legislation will result in the usurpation of employer and legislative
control of public services. Although these concerns are often expressed
interchangeably, they involve two separate phenomena: first, the pos-
sible exploitation of bargaining power by employee organizations to
gain control of traditional management functions; secondly, the
manipulation of political power through lobbying, services and bloc
voting to achieve the objectives denied the employee organization at
the bargaining table.
With respect to the first concern, a weak public employer can
undoubtedly collapse during negotiations in the face of determined
and knowledgeable bargaining by public employee bargaining agents,
even to the extent of surrendering the power needed to discharge
duties and obligations imposed by law. But the mere existence of a
collective bargaining statute does not compel surrender to exorbitant
employee demands; it does not necessitate high wage increases; nor
does it require the employer to act contrary to the public interest.
Only employers can make the decisions that will produce these effects.
Rather than compelling employer concessions, the bill attempts to
provide every possible protection to the employer (and thus to the
public) to ensure that he will not lose control of the public enter-
prise. 79 The primary protection against the demanding employee
478. See N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 310-12 (1965).
479. One section states explicitly that collective bargaining only requires that the
employer bargain-not that he reach an agreement acceptable to the union. Fla. H.R.
3314, § 2-447.011 (1) (1972). A second section indicates that bargaining in good faith
does not require the making of a concession. Id. § 2-447.002(13). Still other sections
define an employer's "rights" very broadly to include the right to "determine the
purpose ... [of the organization], set standards of [service] .. . exercise control . . ,
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organization, however, is the prohibition on strikes. Employers in the
public sector simply have no excuse for their failure to resist exorbitant
demands; public employees, unlike those in the private sector, have
no way to compel accession to those demands except by joining in a
strike which could irreparably damage their organization and personal
careers.
The balance of power at the bargaining table has been struck in
the decided favor of the public employer. Refusals to exercise and
retain that power can hardly be remedied by a statute without com-
pletely distorting the nature of free collective bargaining. The public
is not without remedy, however, in the face of employer vacillation.
School board personnel can be voted out of office, as can legislators.
Contracts must be renegotiated every two years and objectionable
features can be eliminated. The public has ample opportunity to voice
its displeasure with the handling of employee relations.
Undoubtedly some abuses of the bargaining process will occur.
But the experience of states with mature bargaining relationships
indicates that these will be uncommon. Indeed it is possible that what
some denote an "abuse"--close employee participation in the policy
decision affecting delivery of services to the public-may actually im-
prove the quality of those services.
The second aspect of the concern for employees' usurpation of
control of public services and institutions, the fear of the achievement
of political power by bargaining representatives, is certainly not far-
fetched. The "end-run" bargaining technique has become fairly com-
mon in some states and municipalities. The bargaining agent obtains
the maximum concessions possible at the bargaining table, then at-
tempts to improve on them by using political leverage to force legis-
lative intervention. Thus, after state employees negotiate a recom-
mended across-the-board increase of five per cent of base pay with
the state as employer, the same negotiators may then attempt to lobby
legislators to approve a seven per cent increase.
Again it is not a collective bargaining statute that permits, re-
quires or even legitimizes such political intervention. The same phe-
nomenon could easily exist independent of the statute. Nor can
legislative provisions foreclose political activity of this type. Public
employees are citizens and have the same right of access to their
representatives as other citizens. The protection against what some
over its . . . operations . . . direct its employees, take disciplinary action . . .
relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work . . . and determine the
methods, means, and personnel by which the employer's operations are to be con-
ducted .... ." Id. § 2-447.005.
1973)
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see as a misuse of the political process inheres in the sensitivity
of the legislature to the dangers involved in its intervention in the
bargaining process and in the pressure of other lobbyists representing
public employers to counter the appeals of public employees and
their representatives.
